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ABSTRACT 
We cannot take for granted that when we speak of “the human” we speak of 
something unchanging, unquestionable, ontologically durable. On the contrary, what it 
means to be the kinds of beings that we are is always fluctuating in response to forces 
beyond our control. Historically, deathcare practices have forcefully impinged upon how 
we think of ourselves. For more than 150 years in the United States, conventional burial 
and cremation have been working to materialize Enlightenment ideas of humans as 
discrete, autonomous, and self-contained beings, thus estranging us from our very 
conditions of (im)possibility. In Mortal Assemblages, I argue that contemporary shifts in 
the rhetoric and practice of deathcare are transforming how some groups think about 
what it means to be human. Tracking several emergent ruptures to this predominant way 
of thinking, I demonstrate how long held ideals of the human are giving way to more 
ecological understandings. The cases that animate this project variously disperse, 
decompose, and digest classical concepts of human subjectivity in favor of thinking the 
human as finite gatherings of material-symbolic forces. Marshaling resources from the 
fields of rhetoric, history, continental philosophy, social theory, and ecology, I 
extrapolate from texts circulating in and around the practices of conservation burial, 
human composting, and consumptive reciprocity to create concepts that might help us 
better respond to the fact that we are fundamentally, collectively, and inescapably 
entangled in complex ecosystems.
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This text, like all texts, is an accumulation of fragments which hold together 
under the sign of a signatory. It bears a title, Mortal Assemblages: Rhetorics of Ecology 
and Death, and the name of an author. It would be easy, all too easy, to treat this text as if 
it were the culmination of thoughts that inhabit the person, the subject, to which this 
signature points. No doubt, the word “I” even appears throughout the pages that follow as 
a shorthand for the complex relational forces which give rise to the signatory as such, to 
the author himself. The “I,” of course, is a lie, an illusion, an overused figure of common 
parlance. It enables us to ignore the complicated networks that must be in place for an “I” 
to think, much less write, in the first place. The “I” is always already a placeholder for 
something much more interesting, enduring, historical, social. It is the condensation point 
for a dense layering of fragments which one inherits without choice. The “I” covers over, 
it veils, the more rigorous work of tracing the networks of inheritance that compose the 
author. Hence, by convention we “acknowledge” at the beginning or ending of works 
those others who have impacted our capacity to think and to write, and so to sign, the text 
itself, without ever discarding the “I.” 
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It is theoretically much stronger, for reasons that will become apparent in the 
unraveling of this text, to treat the signatory as a writing assemblage, that is, as a 
gathering of heterogeneous material-symbolic forces that contingently compose it as a 
writer. In this sense, the “I” is always already a “we” or an “us,” a collection of human 
and more-than-human forces which hold together for a shorter or longer while and that is 
inscribed, indefinitely, on the title page of a work. It is the surviving vestige of these 
relations, an attestation to certain comings-together. In the making of a dissertation, many 
forces come together to capacitate the author in particular ways. There are the obvious 
persons—supervisors, committee members, department chairs, directors of graduate 
studies, professors, classmates, students, administrators of all kinds, and colleagues 
outside one’s organizational home—who directly impact the writing of such a work. 
Somewhat less directly, partners, friends, family members, casual acquaintances, and 
companion species indelibly leave their mark as well. Then there are the funding 
mechanisms, technological apparatuses, writing machines, reams of paper, special pens, 
physical spaces, chairs, couches, institutions, and other ephemeral resources that are, if 
not required, certainly quite helpful. A gambit of chemicals are often involved (coffee, 
tea, soda, water, wine, and vodka key among them), as are more or less healthy 
foodstuffs. This writing assemblage requires fuel after all. Time plays a chief role in the 
writing assemblage, too. Time is the gift which this assemblage needs most—time to 
read, to think, to walk, to write and rewrite, to sleep, to retreat, to eat, to share, and to re-
write again and again. In short, the “I” is an assemblage of forces which make it possible 
to write, an ecology of things that gather together to generate the conditions of possibility 
for authorship, for compositions of other kinds. 
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An acknowledgements section is a way of retrospectively accounting for the gifts 
which have made the composition of a text thinkable and doable. It is, Derrida writes in 
Cinders, “where a book is dedicated, offered, rendered up to those who, known or 
unknown, have already given it to you in advance.” To acknowledge is to recognize 
publicly the forces which have mattered most, as well as to demonstrate the extent to 
which one’s capacities as a writing assemblage hang on the delicate, contingent dance of 
multitudes of others, human and more-than-human alike. Because the writing assemblage 
which composes its “acknowledgements” cannot itself be privy to every force that has 
made its work possible, every attempt at recognition is thwarted from the outset. 
Precisely because the “I” has never been an “I” in the classical sense, it cannot make total 
sense of itself nor of the complex relations which make it possible. Nevertheless, it is a 
task well worth pursuing. 
No single person has given me as much to think about as Kevin DeLuca. Before 
deciding to move to Salt Lake City to pursue my doctorate, I visited the University of 
Utah to meet with faculty and graduate students, and to get a sense of whether this place 
and program were right for me. After two days of whirlwind meetings, parties, and tours, 
I was to meet Kevin on my final morning in town. He arrived at my hotel a few minutes 
late wearing hiking boots, black cargo pants, and a T-shirt. He asked if I wanted to go for 
a hike and, although I didn’t bring the right shoes or clothes for that kind of thing, I said 
sure. We drove to the top of one of the foothills that surrounds the northern edge of the 
city and began winding our way up a well-worn path bordered by the native sagebrush 
that covers the western United States. More ambitious hikers and bikers rushed past us as 
we moseyed around deep in dialogue about environmental politics, higher education, and 
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shared histories in Athens, Georgia. Every hundred yards or so, we stopped to take a 
breath and take in views of the valley. Kevin gave me the lay of the land. All we could 
see to the north were the ridges, sloping softly upward, which we were soon to mount. 
Looking west, we saw the university perched on a hill. To the south, we glimpsed Mount 
Olympus and other snowcapped mountains. Way south, too far to see, Kevin said, were 
magnificent deserts, beautiful and brutal at the same time, and well worth visiting. 
Looking to the east, two things caught our attention: the Great Salt Lake, shining in the 
sunlight, and the Kennecott Copper Mine, proudly touted by some as the deepest man-
made hole anywhere on Earth. Spread before us, the valley revealed the beautiful, 
necessary, violent union of nature and culture. 
By the time we made it down the mountain and back to the car, I knew that I was 
going to move to Salt Lake City and that I was going to write my dissertation somewhere 
in the valley we had just surveyed. What I did not yet know is that Kevin would exert 
such force on my thinking. He convinced me to read and appreciate philosophers I had 
been convinced to avoid—Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze key 
among them. He gave me permission to challenge traditions I had been trained by others 
to accept, to take my intellectual work seriously, and to pursue above all the life of the 
mind. He engenders the idea that something in the world forces us to think by incessantly 
inciting and provoking both in and out of the seminar room. Never content with common 
sense, he showed me how to think against the grain and to theorize without succumbing 
to comfortable forms of reactionary moralism. He told me when my work was good and 
interesting, but, more importantly, he told me when it was imprecise and wanting. He 
worked hard to ensure that I had the time and the space and the money to engage the life 
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of the mind in a sustained way. For these and other reasons, I am grateful to Kevin for 
giving me, again and again, opportunities to think the world anew.  
In addition to Kevin’s provocative influence, my committee members—Danielle 
Endres, Robin Jensen, Helene Shugart, and Stephen Tatum—have made an especially 
strong impression on my thinking and writing. Little do they know, I have been referring 
to them as the “dream team” behind their backs, and they have consistently earned this 
appellation by reading my work, commenting on drafts of various writing projects, 
chatting about hang-ups with theory, and, in general, being kind people to whom I could 
turn in good times and bad. Stephen turned me on to the joys of eco-critical thinking and 
reminded me of the pleasures of relationality. Helene pushed me to clarify my thinking, 
and she was a source of much fodder in the preparation of certain portions of this 
dissertation, especially Chapter Five. Robin engaged my ideas on their own terms and 
showed me ways that I might contribute to the rhetorical tradition. And Danielle provided 
immense intellectual support over the years: we have worked together on all sorts of 
scholarly projects, and I am better for our encounters and interactions. Like Robin, 
Danielle helped me to understand—and to embrace—the ways in which my work not 
only ruptures but also supplements the discipline of rhetoric. Above all, my committee 
members have collectively made this process entirely enjoyable. I could not have done 
this without them. Nor would I have wanted to. 
Colleagues near and far have provided support, encouragement, and occasions for 
thinking about the issues which occupy me throughout this dissertation. Leland Spencer 
has been a singularly important intellectual companion since we met in 2010, when he 
first arrived at the University of Georgia to pursue his own doctoral work on the rhetoric 
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of women religious leaders. Leland has read more of my crappy first drafts than perhaps 
anyone else and yet is somehow still endlessly willing to help me think about rhetoric and 
social change. Jamie Landau, too, has been an abiding source of intellectual and 
professional support. Besides encouraging me to follow my heart and attend graduate 
school, Jamie has provided important and wise advice to me too many times to calculate 
here. Corey Johnson was the first person to show me how to pursue a life in academia, 
and he continues to demonstrate for me the pleasures of combining intellectual labor with 
leisure. Brandon Hill has given me the joy of thinking across disciplines, methods, and 
theories, not to mention a friendship fortified by champagne-soaked conversations. 
Chuck Morris has, for half a decade, made time every year to chat with me, usually over 
a glass of good wine, queer rhetorician to queer rhetorician, about the joys and struggles 
of pursuing transgressive thoughts. To these five, all my gratitude. 
Yet others have impinged upon me in significant ways, which I want to recognize 
here in an inescapably partial accounting of my intellectual and professional debts. Mary 
Alice Adams, Michelle Ballif, Mariam Betlemidze, Brenda Bowen, Robb Bruce, Betsy 
Brunner, Julia Corbett, Kathleen de Onís, Jake Dionne, Tom Dunn, Michaela Frischherz, 
Beth Kaszynski Gilmore, Daniel Grinberg, Yancey Gulley, Blake Hallinan, Kelly Happe, 
Marouf Hasian, Joe Hatfield, Ammar Hussein, Robert Ivie, Eric Jenkins, Casey Kelly, 
Brian Kumm-Schaley, Sean Lawson, Susan Lepselter, Katie Lind, John Lynch, José 
Ángel Maldonado, Maureen Mathieson, Megan McFarlane, Marek Muller, Norma 
Musih, Kent Ono, Nicholas Paliewicz, Phaedra Pezzullo, Brian Ray, Donald Rubin, Julie 
Madrone Schutten, Steve Schwarze, Natasha Seegert, Jon Simons, Mary Strine, Ye Sun, 
Robert Terrill, Anjali Vats, Kirstin Wagner, and Janet Walker, among others I have no 
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doubt failed to mention here, have given me so much. Some have read drafts of this and 
other works, providing insightful commentary that has enriched my thinking. Many have 
played a role in my intellectual development over the years as teachers and mentors. All 
have shown me extraordinary compassion, care, and kindness within the academy in 
ways which feel increasingly rare.  
Others have directly supported my work on this project. Audiences at the National 
Communication Association, Western States Communication Association, the University 
of Nebraska Lincoln, and the University of Minnesota Duluth have responded generously 
to various portions of this dissertation project. Several students in my Communication 
and Social Responsibility seminar at the University of Utah—especially Christine Brady, 
Connor Richards, and Aly Schwermer—have inspired me to think, write, and teach in 
more provocative ways. At the University of Utah, I have been fortunate to receive 
yearlong fellowships from both the Global Change and Sustainability Center and the 
College of Humanities, which have enabled me to spend immense amounts of time with 
my nose in books and in cafes writing. The chair of the Department of Communication, 
Kent Ono, has been an abiding source of material and emotional support. In her role as 
director of graduate studies, Helene Shugart has given me the gift of mentorship and 
guidance. And our departmental administrators—Amity Mower, Stephanie Krussell, 
Jennifer Duignan, and Jessica Tanner—have made my endeavors uncomplicated. 
My family deserves all the praise I can foist upon them. My parents, Tammy and 
Trey Barnett, have been an enduring source of psychological, material, and social support 
not only during my graduate studies but throughout my life. By their own example, they 
have demonstrated for me the value of hard work and integrity. Over the years, they have 
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celebrated my successes, condemned my bad behavior, and encouraged me to work 
harder and go farther than I might otherwise have gone. They have loved me in ways that 
only the best of parents can. I am eternally grateful to them. While writing this 
dissertation, my family confronted ruptures unlike any others we had experienced before. 
One of those ruptures was the materialization of mortality in the form of the loss of a 
beloved family member. On November 4, 2016, my paternal grandmother, Mary Lou 
Sanders Barnett, died at her home in Nicholson, Georgia. “Granna,” as she was 
affectionately known, taught me the ways of unconditional acceptance and love, of a 
hospitality without questions. During those trying times, my sister, Malorie Hughes, and I 
grew closer over the course of countless phone calls that stretched late into the night, and 
I am appreciative of her listening ear and mature wisdom. Her children, James Douglas 
and Nora Kate, provided the pleasures of cuteness and youth from afar. They make me 
glad to be an uncle and hopeful for the future. 
I am endlessly thankful as well to my closest friends who, though often separated 
by distance and time, have given me ample opportunities to let my hair down in the midst 
of all this earnest intellectual labor. Jasmine Morrissette was the first person I met as an 
undergraduate at the University of Georgia. She helped me realize who I was at 18 years 
old and has been a fiercely loyal friend since the day we met. Since 2010, Meg Graham 
has been a friend and a confidante, not to mention a near-daily (tele)presence in my life. 
Many of my most cherished friends have come in pairs, and I am grateful for it. Corey 
Johnson and Yancey Gulley took me in when I was an up-and-coming academic and 
queer activist in Athens, Georgia. They helped me realize what my life could be. Brandon 
Hill and Erick Amick queered my life in Indiana in all the best ways, and they continue to 
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make Chicago one of my favorite weekend destinations. And the companionship of 
Spencer Turner and Clint Urvand has deeply enriched my years in Salt Lake City. Now 
that they live in the Capital City, they are turning out to be excellent travel mates as well. 
Jasmine, Meg, Corey, Yancey, Brandon, Erick, Spencer, and Clint—thank you for being 
a friend. 
Finally, I am sustained at home by two lively companions—one human, one 
feline. My love, Brandon Killen, is the smartest, kindest, funniest, strangest person I 
know. He is “my” strange stranger. Not only is Brandon my mate in the mundaneness of 
everyday life, but he is also a source of constant intellectual stimulation. He thinks about 
every question, event, and challenge in ways that inevitably give me something new to 
ponder. He pushes me to see the world differently. I am a better person and scholar 
because of his presence and influence. Brandon also makes me good food, walks with me 
on difficult paths, travels about with me, and helps me imagine my future. I am so happy 
that he entered into and transformed my assemblage. And Judith, my dissertation kitty, 
our feline friend and foe, keeps me always alert and reminds me daily the joys of play 
and response. Her early morning snuggles and mid-day feistiness have furnished 
welcome distractions throughout otherwise routine days spent worshipping books and 














Can this text become the margin of a margin? Where has 
the body of the text gone when the margin is no longer a 
secondary virginity but an inexhaustible reserve ... ? 
 




Situated somewhere on the margin of a margin, this dissertation is a response to 
two mortally significant questions: First, what does it mean to be a human becoming, an 
assemblage, instead of a human being? And, second, how are emergent rhetorical 
practices associated with deathcare impacting upon the form and figure of human beings? 
These two questions summon responses that take seriously the fact that finitude entails 
exposure and that it is exposure, rather than enclosure, that makes us the kinds of beings 
that we fundamentally are. Moreover, it is these conditions of finitude and exposure 
which connect us to other humans and the more-than-human world in relations of 
(rhetorical) response. I venture answers to these questions by tracing (de)compositions of 
several mortal assemblages—a phrase which articulates mortality, or finitude, together 
with assembly, understood as modes of gathering—at the beginning of the 21st century in 
the United States. By dwelling on mortality, I stray somewhat from the fashionable 
Foucaultian emphases on human vitality and livability, as well as on their biopolitical 
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management. Finitude directs attention not necessarily to what makes a human life more 
or less livable but, rather, to how death engenders certain forms of relationality and 
response-ability. Hence my concern with assemblages. Death occasions all sorts of 
gatherings that bear directly upon the kinds of assemblages which human beings become, 
and our relations with those gatherings suggest the kinds of creatures that we hope to 
become. This dissertation is a sustained endeavor to trace some of the mortal assemblages 
that are currently composing human beings in relation to the ecosystems in which we are 
always already entangled. 
One of my key concerns throughout Mortal Assemblages is with the ontological 
status of the “human,” a word whose etymology sheds some light on the challenges and 
opportunities that will appear again and again in the following chapters. The English 
word human is a distant relative, temporally anyway, to the Latin term hūmānus, which 
meant “of or belonging to people (as opposed either to animals or to divine beings).” This 
seemingly transparent sense of the term resurfaces again in the French word humain, 
meaning simply “human being.” In both its Latin and French iterations, as well as its 
English form, the word human appears self-referential: it seems to refer to something 
obvious, something whole that need not be defined in terms of its parts. Where it is 
distinguished, it is against or apart from animal and divine others. Thus, the word human 
ostensibly points to a material entity which is itself recognizably human and therefore 
needs little explanation. The Oxford English Dictionary, which includes three definitions 
of the word human in its noun form, divulges this roundabout sense of the human: the 
word human means variously “a human being, a person; a member of the species Homo 
sapiens or other (extinct) species of the genus Homo;” “that which is human or relates to 
3 
humanity;” and “the average or typical human being; humans collectively, the human 
race” (“Human, Adj. and N.” 2016). 
These definitions suggest at least two ontological interpretations: first, that the 
human has obvious, if not unquestioned, boundaries, and that to define it is in some sense 
to be redundant; and, second, that this apparent redundancy is associated with a more 
complex sense that the human is contingent, that it refers not to a stable entity but, rather, 
to a changing set of material-symbolic forces that we choose to call human at a given 
time and in a given place. As Friedrich Nietzsche (1999) teaches us, what counts as “the 
human” is an open question, one which receives its answer only in the shifting flows of 
rhetorical activity that mark out, for a time, the contours of this sort of being. And, as 
Nietzsche’s heir Michel Foucault (1994, 387) contends, it is not even clear how long any 
version, any definition, of the human will last: “man is an invention of recent date. And 
one perhaps nearing its end.” Throughout this dissertation, I contest the obviousness of 
the human by exploiting its incessant articulation to diverse practices, especially those 
rituals which are carried out on the corpses of the kinds of beings we choose to call 
“human beings.” In other words, I repeatedly demonstrate how the human itself shifts in 
relation to the postmortem practices to which it is exposed. 
In teasing out some of the ways in which the human is composed in different 
assemblages, this dissertation engages in a form of “play” that “tries to pass beyond man 
and humanism” (Derrida 1978, 292). I riff on the shifting form of the human by insisting 
on the word assemblage as an open but organizing “terministic screen,” which reflects, 
deflects, and selects our attention in particular ways (Burke 1966). As I use it here, the 
term assemblage can be traced to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s (1987, 4) A 
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Thousand Plateaus, where they conceptualize the assemblage as “a multiplicity” that is 
“a kind of organism, or signifying totality” that also takes part in “continually 
dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or 
circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as 
the trace of an intensity.” Moreover, as Manuel DeLanda (2016) points out, the notion of 
assemblages deployed by Deleuze and Guattari names both the process of gathering and 
the contingent products of those gatherings. Assemblage functions both as a noun and a 
verb. Assemblages are simultaneously and noncontradictorily singularities and 
multiplicities or, more precisely, they are singularities because they are multiplicities. 
Assemblages are specific gatherings of heterogeneous materials that contingently 
compose a singularity for a while. In Vibrant Matter, the political theorist Jane Bennett 
(2010, 23–24) offers a useful definition that strikes close to home for the work of this 
dissertation:  
Assemblages are ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant 
materials of all sorts. Assemblages are living, throbbing confederations 
that are able to function despite the persistent presence of energies that 
cofound them from within. They have uneven topographies, because some 
of the points at which the various affects and bodies cross paths are more 
heavily trafficked than others, and so power is not distributed equally 
across its surface. Assemblages are not governed by any central head: no 
one materiality or type of material has sufficient competence to determine 
consistently the trajectory or impact of a group. 
 
What Bennett explicates, and what I want to highlight, is the extent to which assemblages 
are comings-together of strange, diverse materials, including discourse, that make things 
happen in the world. Assemblages are loaded with particular capacities to act and be 
acted upon by the emergent qualities imbued in the contingent collective by the arrayed 
elements. Assemblages are everywhere. Human beings are simultaneously assemblages 
5 
in their own right, since every body is in some significant sense a collective of several 
sorts of material interacting for a while, and they act as elements in other assemblages, 
including postmortem gatherings that produce different ecological futures. 
While Deleuze and Guattari understood discourse as intricately important to the 
concept of assemblages, all too often attending to assemblages comes at the expense of 
engaging the impacts of rhetoric on the composition of such gatherings. Pushing back 
against this common oversight, my other central concern in Mortal Assemblages is with 
the rhetorical force that deathcare discourses exert on ecological assemblages of which 
the human is but one part. The field of deathcare comprises the various postmortem 
practices exercised on dead human bodies. For example, embalming, funerals, burials, 
and cremations are all forms of deathcare carried out by, among other actors, professional 
undertakers. Deathcare practices powerfully impact upon our sense of what it is to be a 
human being (Harris 2007; Laqueur 2015; Mitford 2000). Not only is the meaning of the 
word human open to emergent articulations, but so too are embodied humans subject to 
shifting ontologies of their very becoming (a word that I prefer to “being,” which too 
easily connotes stability) through encounters with deathcare rituals.  
Put simply, different rhetorical practices compose the human differently. This is a 
strong claim, which I develop in the central chapters of this dissertation by paying close 
attention to the rhetorical practices of three emergent, ecological discourses of deathcare. 
Plato’s (2005) early writings on rhetoric, especially those in the Phaedrus, foreshadow 
this view of rhetoric as world-making. Whereas Plato’s Socrates often turned a critique of 
rhetoric into an ethical lesson (Weaver 1985), I am more interested here in understanding 
how these deathcare discourses impact the form of the human. Rhetoric, as Kevin 
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DeLuca (1999a, 346) argues, is “ontological” and can be defined as “the mobilization of 
signs for the articulation of identities, ideologies, consciousnesses, communities, publics, 
and cultures.” In this sense, rhetorics do not simply reflect or re-present social relations in 
more or less accurate terms (though certainly they do this, too). On the contrary, rhetorics 
compose, decompose, and recompose social relations in real time by linking certain 
elements (and not others) together and by authorizing or provoking particular ways of 
thinking and acting in the world. Rhetorics circulating in and around deathcare are 
particularly potent though often overlooked. As we will see, they deeply inform who and 
what we think we are, as well as how our bodies enter into various kinds of relations with 
the more-than-human world. The ontological status of the human is not simply given over 
as an a priori but is, rather, composed in the mundane rhetorical practices of everyday 
life and death. 
Deathcare rhetorics forcefully impact relationships among humans and the more-
than-human world. Such rhetorics not only set into motion certain expectations about 
whether and how human corpses will come into contact with elements like dirt, water, 
air, and other organisms, but they also shape and sustain material practices that literally 
compose the human body differently by creating distinctive assemblages. As the religious 
scholar Gary Laderman (2003, xvi) contends, the  
final ceremonies that accompany a corpse’s disposal, as well as its 
preparation for these ceremonies and the manner in which it vanishes from 
living society, reveal a great deal about the animating cultural values and 
integrating social principles at work in any particular community.  
 
Since the mid-1860s in the United States, dominant deathcare practices have sequestered 
human corpses from the more-than-human world. The popularization of embalming 
during the American Civil War gave rise to the multibillion dollar modern burial 
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industry, which is predicated on practices (deep burial) and products (heavy caskets and 
concrete vaults) that keep dead human bodies from mingling with the soil in which they 
are buried and organisms that could facilitate their decomposition (Plumwood 2008). 
Conventional burial, as this sequestration model of interment is often called by 
practitioners and academics alike, treats the human as a material entity apart from the 
more-than-human world, something privileged which ought to be protected from what is 
not human, a form worth preserving even at increasingly high consumer and ecological 
costs (e.g., Harker 2012; Rumble et al. 2014). While it requires fewer material resources 
than conventional burial, cremation consumes immense quantities of fuel and produces 
troubling amounts of emissions. Since its introduction in the United States in the mid-
1870s, cremation has steadily become more and more popular, with 49 percent of 
deceased Americans being incinerated in 2015 (“Trends and Statistics” 2015). 
Conventional burial and cremation not only reveal, as Laderman suggests, a great deal 
about the values and principles undergirding dominant American culture, such as our 
willingness to pollute the soil, air, and water in our death rituals, but they also produce 
assemblages in which dead human bodies are needlessly implicated in unsustainable 
ecological practices. These assemblages—on the one hand, a body-formaldehyde-casket-
vault-earth assemblage and, on the other, a body-fire-emissions-ash-air assemblage—give 
way to damaging ecological relations that are increasingly difficult to ignore. 
Shifts in deathcare practices have been afoot in the United States since at least the 
late-1990s, when the first green burial ground opened in Westminster, South Carolina, 
along the banks of Ramsey Creek. As globalization continues to link all of us in more and 
more intricate webs, and as climate chaos makes its effects felt on scales both intimate 
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and grand, ecological concerns are surfacing in unexpected places. Granting that 
deathcare practices are neither neutral nor necessarily benign, at least from an ecological 
perspective, human death and the rituals surrounding it have become not only a religious, 
cultural, and legal issue but also something which ecological activists and entrepreneurs 
now confront as opportunities for critique and creation. Writing in The Atlantic, Erica 
Hayasaki (2013) declared that “death is having a moment” and Shannon Palus (2014) 
argued that, “As people become increasingly concerned with the environment, many of 
them are starting to seek out ways to minimize the impact their body has once they’re 
done using it.” To state it within the vernacular of this dissertation, activists and 
entrepreneurs are creating discourses of deathcare that make different sorts of mortal 
assemblages possible. The list of alternative deathcare practices includes promession, a 
system that freezes bodies with liquid nitrogen and then shakes them into a fine dust 
(Grundhauser 2016); alkaline hydrolysis, a technical process in which bodies are 
dissolved in a basic solution before being flushed into wastewater treatment systems 
(Olson 2014); Celestis, a company that flies cremated remains into outer space (its motto 
is “From the stars we are born, to the stars we will return...”); Capsula Mundi, a burial 
capsule that is infused with tree seeds (“Capsula Mundi” 2015); BioUrn, an urn that also 
contains seeds (Rogers 2016); and others. As the development of these and other 
practices suggests, we are living amidst momentous shifts in deathcare rituals and, thus, 
also amidst changing ideas of the human itself. 
In the rest of this dissertation I demonstrate how the rhetorical fragments 
circulating in and around three alternative deathcare practices are recomposing what it 
means to be human by generating emergent ecological assemblages. In Chapter Two, 
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“Modes of Proceeding,” I briefly explain my methodological approach, which combines 
what I term “rhetorical extrapolation” with the Deleuzo-Guattarian (1994) practice of 
creating concepts. In Chapter Three, “Dispersal: Conservation via Carnal Claims,” I 
explore the rhetorical force of conservation burial, a practice of burying bodies in ways 
that prevent land from being developed in the future. Summoning works by Aldo 
Leopold, Michel Serres, and Jacques Derrida, I treat conservation burial as a means of 
writing the land that is productive of particular kinds of effects, including the radical 
dispersal of dead human bodies into local ecosystems. In Chapter Four, “Decomposition: 
Rhetorics of Urban Dirt-Work,” I contemplate the rhetorical “dirt-work” that makes the 
Urban Death Project (UDP), an effort to design and develop human composting systems 
in cities across the world, such a disruptive ecological alternative. Against contemporary 
rhetorical theory’s focus on the productive force of rhetoric, I suggest that we consider as 
well the decompositional force of material-symbolic practices. Rhetorics work not only to 
constitute or articulate subjects, but also to radically deteriorate the subject as such. In 
Chapter Five, “Digestion: The Risks and Promises of Consumption,” I turn my attention 
to the Infinity Burial Project’s (IBP) efforts to transform dead human bodies into food for 
mushrooms. After an extended detour through the works of Derrida, Donna Haraway, 
Val Plumwood, and Bennett on the relationship between subjectivity and consumption, I 
demonstrate how the IBP rhetorically composes the human in terms of its exposure, 
edibility, and ecological response-ability. Finally, in Chapter Six, “Notes Toward the 
Possibility of a Postmortem Politics,” I zoom out from the specific case studies to 
consider ecological deathcare practices as openings for other ways of imagining and 
practicing modes of coexistence for ecological ongoingness. Conservation burial, human 
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composting, and mushroom burial suits collectively disrupt long-practiced deathcare 
rituals in the United States. They materialize the possibility that conventional burial and 
cremation are but two of many postmortem fates, and creatively yet practically 
recompose the human within ecological assemblages. They are rewriting the future of 
deathcare. Indeed, by gathering together familiar materials in new and disruptive ways, 
these deathcare practices are rhetorically subverting convention and generating 
alternative endings. 
  
Inklings of Rupture: Diogenes and Abbey on Death 
And yet, while the discourses of ecological deathcare that I explore in this 
dissertation mark a signal departure from contemporary, industrialized forms of interment 
they are, in fact, part of a long, though rarely rehearsed, history of alternative views 
towards death and deathcare. In general, the historian Thomas Laqueur (2015, 9) writes, 
“as far back as people have discussed the subject, care of the dead has been regarded as 
foundational—of religion, of the polity, of the clan, of the tribe, of the capacity to mourn, 
of an understanding of the finitude of life, of civilization itself.” In the United States, the 
sense that deathcare is foundational has resulted in large-scale, corporatized versions of 
what were historically familial, community-driven activities. Moreover, burial and 
cremation are now so conventional that to opt out of the normative procedures for 
postmortem care is understood as a form of resistance. The taken-for-grantedness of what 
Jessica Mitford (2000) famously called the “American way of death” conceals alternative 
views toward death and deathcare, some of which are remarkably in line with the 
practices that occupy me throughout this dissertation. Two stories, widely separated by 
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time, are useful for grasping just how enduring the belief that human bodies ought to 
decompose with as little intervention as possible has been.  
The first story takes us to ancient Greece where Diogenes the Cynic lived and 
died. Scornful of conventions of all sorts, Diogenes resisted societal norms in favor of the 
rhythms and cycles of nature. In addition to masturbating in public, Diogenes subverted 
tradition by requesting that his dead body not be buried but, on the contrary, be given 
over to animals that might consume it. This request is recounted in Cicero’s (1927) 
Tusculan Disputations, in which the Roman philosopher meditates on, among other 
things, the subject of death. Cicero recounts first the death of Socrates, who asked his 
friends to bury his body as they saw fit (see Plato 1954), but quickly moves on to 
Diogenes, who, he writes, 
was rougher [than Socrates]; his feeling it is true was the same, but like a 
Cynic he spoke more harshly and required that he should be flung out 
unburied. Upon which his friends said: “To the birds and wild beasts?” 
“Certainly not,” said he, “but you must put a stick near me to drive them 
away with.” “How can you, for you will be without consciousness?” they 
replied. “What harm, then, can the mangling of wild beasts do me if I am 
without consciousness?” (124-125, emphasis mine) 
 
Whether Diogenes’ request to “be flung out unburied” was part of an intentional effort to 
live a more ecological life is beside the point. What matters, however, is that Diogenes 
described Greek burial practices as a kind of aberration when compared to his 
observations of the more-than-human world. Too much intervention at the moment of 
interment, he suggested, was pure folly since the person (equated here with 
consciousness) no longer inhabits the body (reduced to materiality) after death. Even if 
there is an immaterial afterlife, Diogenes surmised, it matters little what happens to the 
corpse because the soul evacuates it anyway at (or a little after) the moment of death. 
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Though Diogenes’ view of burial might be founded on questionable assumptions about 
the relationship between minds and bodies, it nevertheless decenters the human by 
conceptualizing the corpse as potential food for other organisms.  
The second story takes place some two millennia later, in the late-1980s, amidst 
the red rock country of the American southwest. Despite the temporal and spatial distance 
that separate these stories, the protagonist in this narrative shares several affinities with 
Diogenes. By many accounts, the author Edward Abbey was also a crass, convention-
crushing cynic very much interested in the lessons we might learn from observing the 
natural world. His two most famous works—Desert Solitaire (1968) and The Monkey 
Wrench Gang (1975)—take readers into harsh climates and ask them to consider the 
ways in which their own bodies connect them to the more-than-human world. Not long 
before he died in 1989, Abbey inscribed the following in a notebook: “If my 
decomposing carcass helps nourish the roots of a juniper tree or the wings of a vulture—
that is immortality enough for me. And as much as anyone deserves” (Lamberton 2005). 
The body become carcass is nutritive for Abbey, something to be taken up and used by 
the many species with which humans coexist on planet Earth. Forcing the given order—
what we typically call the “food chain”—out of kilter, in Abbey’s vision humans become 
fodder for hungry plants and animals. And immortality is achieved neither by chemically 
endowing the cadaver with a lifelike glow nor by sequestering it from carnivorous 
microorganisms, but by dispersing the decaying body’s latent energy throughout an 
ecosystem. Immortality, here, is ecological ongoingness. As in reincarnation myths, life 
carries on, just in a different form. Incorporated into the cellular structure of other flora 
and fauna, the human body does not so much go away as it shifts shape. 
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Needless to say, neither Diogenes’s nor Abbey’s requests exemplify dominant 
perspectives on death and deathcare in the United States today. Both thinkers eschewed 
societal expectations for a funeral and proper burial, preferring instead to have their 
bodies thrust into ecosystems where they could nourish other kinds of beings while 
contributing as little as possible to the folly of funereal extravagance. “The Cynic’s 
argument,” Laqueur (2015, 4) writes,  
has had lots of admirers but has never been persuasive for very long. Just 
as the dead body has always been disenchanted, it has also always been 
enchanted: powerful, dangerous, preserved, revered, feared, an object of 
ritual, a thing to be reckoned with. 
 
The enchanted corpse is subject to all sorts of postmortem practices, though, that do 
serious damage to the very ecosystems that supported the life of the deceased. 
Conventional burial, for example, as it is practiced in the United States requires 827,000 
gallons of toxic embalming fluids, 30 million board feet of hardwoods, 2,700 tons of 
copper and bronze, 104,272 tons of steel, and 1,636,000 tons of reinforced concrete each 
year (Harker 2012). Unlike Diogenes, Abbey was aware of the ecological burdens of 
American burial practices and actively avoided them. Like Diogenes, though, Abbey was 
also alert to the potential of his own body to nourish the earth rather than pollute it. Both 
thinkers linked embodiment to death and death to the cycles of nature. As embodied, 
finite creatures, they each surmised, it makes little sense to shield our corpses from the 






Finitude: Notes on Death in Life  
Death haunts nearly every instant of life. It permeates the human experience in 
ways which are easily apprehended and barely detected, both extraordinarily disruptive 
and mundanely ignorable, and in modes that are private, interpersonal, public, and 
political all at once. Just moving through the motions brings us each into close contact 
with death: we tread on soil that is made of decomposing remains; we consume the dead 
bodies of flora and fauna; and we clothe ourselves in garments constructed from plant 
fibers and animal skins. Private and public debates alike follow morbid paths: whether 
and how humans should socially condone and support the death penalty, physician-
assisted suicide, and state-sponsored end-of-life care, not to mention the slaughter of 
billions of animals annually for our consumption and commercial gain, are all open-
ended questions. Epidemics of all kinds spontaneously explode into public consciousness 
and stir our worst fears: in the 1980s, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) 
shocked Americans, setting off a persistent moral panic; today, the “C” word—cancer—
seems to be on the tips of everyone’s tongues; outbreaks of Ebola and SARS make even 
the healthy fear for their lives; and perennial occurrences of the common cold, flu, and 
pneumonia remind us all that the littlest cough can, and occasionally does, become lethal. 
And then there are the more intimate encounters with death: The death of a loved one 
(including a companion species) can leave us unmoored, psychologically and physically 
adrift in the wake of devastating personal loss. Unexpected deaths, such as those suffered 
during the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, may induce a sense of 
profound precariousness in the face of uncertain futures. And, of course, there is always 
the promise, looming somewhere on the horizon, of our own mortality. No one escapes 
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death: it is an incessant, even primordial, force which helps make us who and what we 
are. Death is always already at work composing the human. 
Death exerts such force in part because it is constitutive of human being. That is, 
finitude is an integral, ontological component of the kinds of assemblages that human 
beings are, an element of our being which we can neither wish away nor evacuate. The 
existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger (1953, 11) famously defined “Dasein,” his 
term for a “being [that is] concerned about its very being,” in relation to finitude.1 In 
Being and Time, Heidegger (1953, 224) argues that, “The ‘end’ of being-in-the-world is 
death. This end, belonging to the potentiality of being, that is, to existence, limits and 
defines the possible totality of Dasein.” That is, death has a strong constitutive function 
when it comes to shaping human beings. Death is not a thing that is ready-to-hand (like a 
hammer or a pencil) but is, rather, a possibility, and so must be conceptualized as a 
constitutive form of potential that inheres in Dasein. “The ending that we have in view 
when we speak of death,” writes Heidegger, “does not signify a being-at-an-end of 
Dasein, but rather a being toward the end [...] of this being” (236). In other words, 
humans do not experience death as such. Rather, humans experience an incessant 
orientation towards death. As Dasein, we are always already “being-toward-death” 
insofar as we are living, which is to say, insofar as we are dying. To be living is to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 In Margins of Philosophy, Derrida compellingly contends that Heidegger’s 
invocation of “Dasein,” though posited as a move away from humanism, in fact repeats 
well-worn notions of the human as near to itself in the form of self-consciousness. 
Having arrayed several quotations from Heidegger’s (1953) Being and Time, Derrida 
(1982, 127) concludes that, “We can see that Dasein, though not man, is nevertheless 
nothing other than man. [...] The value of proximity, that is, of presence in general, 
therefore decides the essential orientation of this analytic of Dasein.” I return to this issue 
throughout the central chapters, but especially in Chapter Five. Convinced, however, by 
Derrida’s critique, I alternate between the terms Dasein and human in this section for 
clarity about the kind of assemblage I am discussing—human beings. 
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dying, and to be dying is to be always already in relation to death.2 As Heidegger puts it, 
“it must be understood as possibility, cultivated as possibility, and endured as possibility 
in our relation to it” (250). Death, then, becomes horizontality, something which we 
anticipate but never quite touch experientially.  
In this Heideggerian logic of finitude, the possibility of death makes Dasein 
meaningful. The very fact that one is mortal becomes the condition of possibility for 
meaningful existence since mortality implies finitude and because finitude entails an 
absolute end, an end from which one cannot recover. That Dasein ends, Heidegger 
surmises, is precisely why it takes on significance. “Death,” Heidegger (1953, 241) 
writes, “is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself 
as one’s ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable [...] possibility.” More simply put, 
death is always mine and no one else’s, always gives rise to an individual, and is always 
inescapable. From this perspective, death is radical alterity: we cannot contemplate death 
as such, but only our possibility of ceasing to be the kinds of beings that we are. We 
know that death is certain, that it will come to pass, and that we cannot escape it. Thus, 
we know that we are dying even as we are living, that death is always on the horizon. The 
open question is how we respond to this intimate form of mortality. 
When Dasein is understood as an orientation towards death, it can manifest in 
subtle forms of anticipation or in more fleshed out modes of anxiety. “Anxiety about 
death must not be confused with a fear of one’s demise,” Heidegger writes, “but, as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 The psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud similarly holds that an orientation to death is 
foundational for human experience. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud (2015, 30) 
introduces the concept of the death drive, which he calls thanatos, or “an urge inherent in 
organic life to restore an earlier state of things,” which he opposed to the “life instinct,” 
or Eros. 
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fundamental attunement [...] of Dasein” (241). Feeling anxious about one’s death is an 
acknowledgement of one’s finitude and, thus, of one’s kind of being. For Heidegger, such 
anxiety incites a more robust form of concern about what kind of being one is and, 
therefore, makes it possible to live more authentically. As he put it,  
anticipation reveals in Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it 
face to face with the possibility to be itself, primarily unsupported by 
concern that takes care, but to be itself in passionate, anxious freedom 
toward death, which is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and 
certain of itself. (255, emphases in original)  
 
Put more simply, being anxious about one’s death is a way of coming to terms with 
oneself as Dasein (a being that contemplates its being[-toward-death]) and, thus, of 
discarding societal expectations about how one ought to comport oneself toward death. 
Embracing finitude as a constitutive component of human being is, in other words, a 
means of delinking oneself from the willfully ignorant “they,” which labors to keep death 
out of sight, out of mind. 
While finitude is constitutive of human being, our relations to death are also 
socially facilitated and disciplined by cultural norms expressed in discourses of death and 
deathcare. Heidegger was principally interested in understanding death existentially, but 
it is possible as well to embark on a study of the various modes by which death is 
disclosed in a given time and place. There are, as Derrida (1993, 24) writes, “cultures of 
death. In crossing a border, one changes death.” Death both means something different 
and is experienced differently depending on when and where one encounters it. For 
instance, the historian Philippe Ariès (1974) argues in Western Attitudes Toward Death 
that death has transformed from a familiar, even banal fact of life to something which can 
barely be spoken of in many Western societies. Heidegger (1953, 244) suggests 
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something similar when he writes that, “the they [...] justifies itself and makes itself 
respectable by silently ordering the way in which one is supposed to behave toward death 
in general.” There are norms when it comes to dealing with death, and these norms are 
dependent to some extent on context. In the United States, for example, one finds 
contradictory norms: it is neither abnormal nor frowned upon to speak at length about the 
deaths of celebrities, but speaking about more familiar deaths for too long or too often 
marks one as particularly morbid. The normative demand to filter whether and how one 
deals publicly with one’s own or another’s death is a limitation on the possibilities of 
what Heidegger called anxiety: “The they does not permit the courage to have anxiety 
about death” (244, emphasis in original).  
Death inundates human beings at multiple levels and in numerous ways, yet we 
are expected not to dwell too much on our finitude, to put death out of our minds, to go 
on living as if we were immortal. This is, at any rate, part of what drives Heidegger’s 
(1953) concern—that we are culturally coached to suppress our anxieties about our own 
mortality and, as a consequence, that we diminish our understanding of ourselves as 
Dasein. Some thinkers call this attitude a form of “death denial.” In his Pulitzer Prize-
winning book The Denial of Death, Ernest Becker (1997) contends that human beings do 
everything in their power to overlook their mortality. Becker writes that, “in man’s 
physiochemical, inner organic recesses he feels immortal” (2) and, thus, “everything that 
man does in his symbolic world is an attempt to deny and overcome his grotesque fate” 
(27). Whereas Heidegger argues that meaning is found in an embrace of one’s mortality, 
Becker suggests just the opposite: by denying one’s finitude, he argues, humans are able 
to symbolically transcend the corpo-reality that destines them for death. Death denial is 
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materialized not only in a lack of public and private discourse about death but also in 
postmortem practices like conventional burial, which thwart bodily decomposition and 
attempt to preserve the body. As the eco-philosopher Val Plumwood (1999; 2008) argues, 
conventional burial practices in the West are an expression of human exceptionalism to 
the extent that they seek to preserve the dead human body for as long as possible by 
thwarting its interaction with more-than-human others.  
Though I suspect that both Heidegger’s (1953) and Becker’s (1997) works on 
death each have some explanatory power, I am interested here in rhetorical practices that 
embrace finitude as a means of changing the world. Along this path, I follow Derrida 
who, following Heidegger, found in death a significant point of departure, if not the only 
real point of departure, for thinking the world anew.3 Derrida (1993, 55), in Aporias, 
writes that,  
it is the originary and underivable character of death, as well as the 
finitude of the temporality in which death is rooted, that decides and 
forces us to decide to start from here first, from this side here. A mortal 
can only start from here, from his mortality. 
 
Beginning with mortality is a way of acknowledging the kinds of beings which we are, as 
well as an opportunity to trespass against the more fashionable emphases on vitality and 
livability that currently predominate in academic circles. Mortality gives us something to 
think about precisely because it pushes us to the limits of the human. It raises questions 
about our relations not only with one another but also with the more-than-human world. 
The rhetorical practices I explore in the central chapters of Mortal Assemblages all begin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 It is worth noting here that my extended engagement with the Heideggerian 
(1953) concept of Dasein as “being-towards-death” serves a larger purpose within Mortal 
Assemblages. Not only does Heidegger furnish a significant theorization of humanity’s 
relation to mortality, but his texts are foundational (even if only implicitly) for many of 
the thinkers whose ideas animate this text. 
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with the fact of finitude and then proceed to question the ways in which dead human 
bodies come into contact with other ecological elements like air, water, soil, and 
organisms that might consume them.  
Thus, my thinking in Mortal Assemblages is decidedly and unapologetically 
morbid. From the Latin morbidus, meaning “diseased, sick, causing disease, unhealthy,” 
the English word morbid is often associated with “excessive gloom or apprehension, or 
(in later use) by an unhealthy preoccupation with disease, death, or other disturbing 
subjects” (“Morbid, Adj.” 2016). Although I am unconvinced that thinking about death is 
either “excessive” or “unhealthy,” I find the word’s resonance with a kind of obsessive 
contemplation useful. In cultures that systematically deny death, preoccupation might be 
in order as an antidote to the nearly myopic focus on living and life, that is, with bio-
politics (see Foucault 1990; 2008). Thus, I dwell on the question of death in order to 
disrupt the ease with which human mortality escapes everyday engagement within 
ecological discourses. By embracing morbidity, we are pushed to ask not only how we 
can sustain life, prevent or forestall extinction, and shore up the conditions of coexistence 
(all important and worthwhile projects), but also how our own deaths and deathcare 
practices might be related to ongoing ecological calamities, as well as how shifting the 
terms of those practices might be in tune with an ecological view of relationality. Thus, 
morbidity must be delinked from nihilism: approaching ecology from a morbid 
perspective certainly entails thinking about and accepting death but not at the expense of 
life. Life and death need not be diametrically opposed; they are, in contrast, deeply and 
necessarily intertwined. Ecology is another name for these twin phenomena.  
In So Much Wasted, Patrick Anderson (2010) theorizes what he calls a “politics of 
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morbidity.” Anderson suggests that there is a rhetorical potency to death. In particular, he 
suggests that the physical deterioration of the human body makes possible new ways of 
thinking about and responding to the shared conditions of coexistence that give shape to 
both life and death (cf. Mbembe 2003; Murray 2006). As Anderson defines it, a politics 
of morbidity is “the embodied, interventional embrace of mortality and disappearance not 
as destructive, but as radically productive stagings of subject formations in which 
subjectivity and objecthood, presence and absence, life and death intertwine” (3). Death 
not only destroys life. It also creates life, or gives the conditions necessary for the 
production of life. As human bodies wither away, they do not simply disappear. Rather, 
their disappearance is also always an appearance of something else, a new kind of 
subject. Death veils and unveils in one and the same stroke. 
A politics of morbidity centers on and works with the simultaneously destructive 
and productive aspects of death. “Morbidity is marked,” Anderson (2010, 19) writes, 
“both by dying and by a preoccupation with dying […] morbidity is consciousness of the 
profoundly affective significance of one’s own mortality.” Grappling with death is a 
means of dealing with a profoundly singular event that nevertheless brings us into webs 
of interconnection and interdependency. All animate creatures die; we cannot deny this 
fact/fate. Thus, death connects all of us in a shared cycle of living, dying, decomposing, 
and being transformed. And yet, each creature, and thus each death, is absolutely 
singular. No one or no thing can take my place when it comes to dying. Attending to the 
ways in which death both individuates and collectivizes, the morbid approach to ecology 
deployed in Mortal Assemblages not only pushes us to think about the potentially 
productive aspects of death (and about the ecological significance of various deathcare 
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practices), but also about the status of the “subject” as it morphs and is transformed by its 
ecological enmeshment. 
 
Exposure: The Outside Within 
Or, we might say, following Heidegger (1953, 111), that the human “is taken over 
by [...] its world.” Its worldliness means that the human is never alone in itself, by itself. 
The human is always given in its relations with others: “The world of Dasein is a with-
world [...] Being-in is being-with,” he writes (116). To put it differently: in our finitude, 
we are fundamentally exposed to the world. If death is the possibility of the impossibility 
of Dasein, this is so because mortality results from incessant forms of exposure. Mortality 
implies an openness to forces which simultaneously threaten and support life, forces 
which make life possible and foreclose upon it at the same time. As mortal beings, we are 
not simply open to all sorts of incursions from the outside, but are, rather, constituted by 
forces that are not of our own creation. The outside is already within us, composing us as 
the sorts of assemblages that we specifically are. The examples are practically endless. In 
a general sense, human beings are exposed to an abundance or lack of material resources 
such as water, food, land, clothing, warmth, and transportation; (lack of) prospects for 
employment, social support systems, state-funded welfare programs, insurance, and 
affordable short- and long-term medical care; rules of law, economics, culture, religion, 
and kinship formations; unpredictable and unavoidable natural disasters like hurricanes, 
tornadoes, tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, droughts, fires, and health epidemics, as well as 
their long-lasting consequences; other human beings who both care for and diminish 
one’s quality of life; bacteria, viruses, and parasites; and more-than-human actors upon 
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whom we are reliant for things like oxygen, nutrients, minerals, pharmaceuticals, 
building materials, recreational enjoyment, and so forth. We become what we are in our 
exposure to these forces. Or, as David Abram (1996, 22) eloquently puts it in The Spell of 
the Sensuous, “We are human only in contact, and in conviviality, with what is not 
human.” 
We are exposed in our finitude precisely because we are embodied creatures. Our 
bodies, typically thought of as containers of the self, are in fact porous openings onto the 
world around us. Far from the impervious borders we might wish them to be, our bodies 
are dense contact zones where inside and outside blur into the assemblages we recognize 
as human beings. Western thinkers from Plato (2008) to René Descartes (1999) have 
chastised the human body as a deficient, dubious element of human being, preferring 
instead to locate humanity in the mind or soul. Descartes’s famous statement, cogito ergo 
sum (“Je pense, donc je suis”; “I think therefore I am”), encapsulates this view and has 
for centuries enshrined the notion that what makes us human is above all our capacity to 
think and respond rationally. Thinkers in the Cartesian tradition routinely bracket out the 
human body or condemn it for precisely the reasons I hope to highlight here.  
The human body is indeed opened up, exposed, and this is what makes us the 
kinds of beings that we are. In “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” 
Derrida (2002) deconstructs the too-easy equivocation between rationality and humanity 
by engaging with “the question of the animal,” which is also the question of corporeality. 
More-than-human animals have historically been reduced to their embodiment, for the 
most part stripped of the capacity for rational or intellectual activity, and given over as 
the objects of human control and mastery, as in many interpretations of the biblical 
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decrees in Genesis. Over and against this dominant view of humans as primarily thinking 
beings, Derrida thinks the human as “following” animals in both the biological-
evolutionary sense that we descend from other animals and in the sense that we are the 
kinds of beings we are because we are, first of all, animals. In other words, it is our 
animality and embodiment that matter first to the kinds of beings we are. Everything else 
proceeds on this condition of corporeality. 
In our corporeality, we are given over to forms of relationality that we cannot 
entirely control or predict. Since our bodies are dense openings to the world, scenes of 
fundamental exposure, we are always already composed in our relations with others. In 
this way, it becomes difficult to tell myself apart from the others who make me what I 
am. Bodies bleed and leak into one another. The ecological literary theorist Stacy Alaimo 
(2010) suggests that a more accurate term for this condition of embodied exposure is 
“trans-corporeality,” a word which highlights the extent to which bodies are always 
overlapping and crossing one another in consequential ways. The prefix “trans-” calls 
attention to how bodies never exist on their own, but constantly cross one another in the 
making of the world. As Alaimo (2010, 2) puts it in Bodily Natures, “trans-corporeality” 
names the “material interconnections between the human and the more-than-human 
world”; it also “indicates movement across different sites,” which “opens up a mobile 
space that acknowledges the often unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, 
nonhuman creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and other actors.” As various 
bodies are composed together in different ways, they seep into and impact one another. 
The human body provides a remarkable example of trans-corporeality: not only are “we” 
made up of many others, including several sorts of bacteria, and in that sense an 
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ecosystem in our own right, but “we” constantly re- and deterritorialize the ecological 
assemblages to which we belong. Trans-corporeality is another name for assemblages: 
even as bodies are contained by porous boundaries, those weak limits expose them to 
other trans-corporeal bodies. Trans-corporeality is embodiment minus guarantees, plus 
collective becoming.  
Thus, corporeality is the condition of our ecological enmeshment. As embodied 
creatures, we become interconnected and interdependent with others in consequential 
relations. Like Alaimo, Timothy Morton (2010) conceptualizes corporeality not as an 
enclosure but as an opening for such relations. “The surfaces of living beings,” he writes, 
“are envelopes and filters, thick regions where complex chemical transfers and reactions 
take place. [...] The more we know, the less self-contained living beings become” (36). 
Human skin offers a useful example of trans-corporeality: human skin is porous (not only 
do we absorb all sorts of nutrients through our skin but we also release sweat to cool our 
bodies) and teeming with life (all sorts of bacteria, benign and otherwise, occupy the 
space of our largest organ). What trans-corporeality reminds us is that the body itself, 
despite its appearance of boundedness, is an important space where human and more-
than-human comingle in consequential ways. All corporeal beings are always already 
trans-corporeal becomings. 
Trans-corporeality also focuses attention on the transformative force of various 
forms of exposure. As such, trans-corporeality does not simply name the ontological 
status of human beings, but, rather, invites us to see the form of the human as always 
already in flux. Form changes as relationships change. Expose a human body to high 
levels of radiation, for example, and watch as it transforms. Or, throw a human into a pen 
26 
with hungry grizzly bears and witness the privileged human body quickly reenter the 
food web in spectacular fashion. One of the foremost thinkers of relationality, Donna 
Haraway (2008), argues that we become what we are only in relation to other kinds of 
beings, human and more-than-human alike. She develops a terminology of “becoming-
with” to counteract the sense of stability which the word “being” imposes on our 
understanding of human beings. Haraway contends that, 
We are in the midst of webbed existences, multiple beings in relationship, 
this animal, this sick child, this village, these herds, these labs, these 
neighborhoods in a city, these industries and economies, these ecologies 
linking natures and cultures without end. This is a ramifying tapestry of 
shared being/becoming among critters (including humans) in which living 
well, flourishing, and being ‘polite’ (political/ethical/in right relation) mean 
staying inside shared semiotic materiality. (72) 
These “webbed existences” of which we are “in the midst” are the relational ontologies of 
exposure upon which our very selves depend. We become only in the midst of such 
relationships with human and more-than-human others, including those we know and do 
not know, those which strengthen our capacities to act and those which weaken them. 
These relations take shape in what Haraway calls “contact zones,” or the “mortal world-
making entanglements” (4) where things happen. The human body is one such contact 
zone: a scene where heterogeneous materials—the bits of us that are human, bacteria of 
all sorts, nutrients, minerals, synthetic chemicals—converge to produce the assemblages 
we recognize as human. The assembled materials usually coordinate to sustain our 
bodies, to maintain life, but they also function to foreclose upon life. Becoming-with in 
mortal contact zones is the name of the game for ecological coexistence.  
So far, I have been giving exposure a positive spin. I understand exposure as a 
foundational and inescapable part of what it means to be a thing in the world, and as a 
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defining element of corpo-reality (embodied existence) that we cannot do without. 
However, just as Heidegger (1953) and Becker (1997) argue that humans usually strive to 
forget about their own mortality, so too have humans historically attempted to ignore or 
overcome their exposure to the world. This history of avoiding exposure can be glimpsed 
in the development of deathcare practices in the United States from the mid-1860s 
forward. The American Civil War ruptured long held funereal traditions. Prior to the war, 
when someone died, their body would have been kept in a cool part of the home and 
cared for by family and friends until being buried, inside a simple wooden casket or cloth 
shroud, in a nearby churchyard (Harris 2007; Laderman 1996). Up to this point, deathcare 
in the United States was a familial, community affair. During the Civil War, however, 
soldiers died far from home, complicating usual ritual practices and creating the 
conditions for the birth and development of the modern funeral industry. Families 
demanded that the bodies of their fallen sons be returned home, but geography, weather, 
and transportation technologies thwarted efforts to reunite staggering numbers of dead 
bodies with their families. By the time a body could be transported home by train it 
would usually have already begun decomposing. To remedy this, the ancient art of 
embalming, historically shunned by most Christians in the United States (Laderman 
2003), was invoked as a means of preserving the soldiers’ bodies. Mobile embalming 
operations were set up on the edges of battlefields, and bodies were pumped full of 
formaldehyde so that they might be preserved long enough to endure the train ride home 
without succumbing to the inevitable—decay. In the decades that followed, an array of 
practices and products were assembled into a funeral industry run by a professional class 
of undertakers. 
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One way of interpreting the rise of the modern funeral industry is as a series of 
attempts to overcome the body’s fundamental exposure to the world. Corpses raise all 
sorts of issues of exposure both for the body itself and for survivors. Consider this typical 
sequence of postmortem events: First, a person dies and a family member calls the local 
funeral home, whose employees rush to the scene of death to whisk the body away to a 
morgue. Hence, the survivors are spared the burden (or joy) of dealing with the body 
themselves—of washing the body, dressing it, visiting it, preparing it for burial, and so 
forth. Second, if the body is going to be buried, and especially if it is going to be shown 
in an open casket, it is very likely that someone at the funeral home will embalm the 
body. Though not required by law, most funeral home directors insist on embalming as a 
means of preserving the body and, thus, of protecting survivors from witnessing the 
unfolding process of decomposition. Thus, the body itself is shielded from exposure to 
the inevitability of decay for a while. Embalming fluids have the further effect of 
imbuing the corpse with a lifelike glow, enabling survivors to see their loved one as if 
they were still alive (Troyer 2007). Third, it is likely that the body will be placed inside a 
heavy (and expensive) casket, which will be placed inside a reinforced concrete vault 
before being buried on a small plot of land promised (for a price) indefinitely to just this 
corpse. Caskets and vaults further estrange the corpse from the forces of nature that 
would otherwise speed up the decomposition process. Enclosed in multiple layers of 
wood, metal, and concrete, the corpse is seemingly closed off from the more-than-human 
world. Of course, each of these postmortem practices exposes the corpse to still other 
kinds of forces. Embalming is an especially strange force confronting millions of corpses: 
corpses are drained of their internal fluids, toxic preservatives are pumped inside, and the 
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body is plugged up so that it does not leak (Harris 2007; Roach 2003). Not only does 
embalming pose groundwater contamination risks (Chiappelli and Chiappelli 2008), but 
it also exposes funeral workers to elevated chances of certain types of cancer (Harris 
2007, 41). Thus, even in attempting to diminish postmortem exposure, the body remains 
inescapably exposed to the world. 
By emphasizing finitude and exposure, I am attempting neither to efface the 
human nor to posit an idea that the human somehow falls away in the wake of ecological 
thinking. It is simply untenable to suggest that something like “the human” does not exist. 
By arguing that the human is better understood not as an individual entity but as a dense 
layering of networked relations forged in its exposure to the world, I am suggesting 
instead that we need to attend very specifically to divergent compositions that assemble 
the human differently. In What Is Posthumanism?, Cary Wolfe (2010, xxv)  
insists that we attend to the specificity of the human—its ways of being in 
the world, its ways of knowing, observing, and describing—by 
(paradoxically, for humanism) acknowledging that it is fundamentally a 
prosthetic creature that has coevolved with various forms of technicity and 
materiality, forms that are radically ‘not-human’ and yet have nevertheless 
made the human what it is.  
 
Following Wolfe, who was following Derrida and others, I am concerned with thinking 
the human in its particularity. Rather than affirming a transparent human subject 
characterized by self-consciousness, autonomy, and boundedness, any serious attempt at 
understanding what it means to be human must account for the sorts of relations that 
exposure entails. As Judith Butler (2009, 3) argues, “to be a [human] body is to be 
exposed to social crafting and form, and that is what makes the ontology of the body a 
social ontology.” Highlighting embodied exposure does not preclude acknowledging that 
the human has “ways of knowing” but instead couches those forms of understanding in 
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the densely woven webs of relationality that make the human possible in the first place. 
Doing so makes it impossible to ignore the ecosystems in which we are always already 
entangled.  
If there is a lesson lurking in this discussion of exposure, it is that any approach to 
the question of the human must be refracted through ecology. Ecology is not an optional 
way of thinking about how human beings are in the world, but a necessary alternative to 
the individualizing narratives that normally shape our understandings of the human. 
Ecology is the condition both of finitude and of exposure—it is the inescapable relational 
context in which we live and die. We are exposed not to the world as such but to specific 
ecosystems and all the attendant human and more-than-human actors that entails. 
Conceptualizing the human in explicitly ecological terms is a way of recognizing not 
only how we are materially entangled and enmeshed in these biotic communities but also 
of better grasping the ontological conditions of exposure that we cannot will away. It is a 
step towards, Morton (2010, 7) contends, “becoming fully aware of how human beings 
are connected with other beings—animal, vegetable, and mineral.” In probing these 
connections, we feel our way into new ontologies. Thus, thinking ecologically about the 
human is a way of restoring all the complexity of exposure to our sense of who and what 
we are. Plumwood (2008, 73) argues that, “an ecological understanding of the self can 
point towards such reshaping narratives and practices, of which we stand so greatly in 





Response-Ability: Rhetoric and the Challenge of Coexistence 
I have written at length about the issues of finitude and exposure because they are, 
I believe, the absolute condition of possibility for rhetorical response. Precisely because 
we are exposed in our finitude—to human and more-than-human others; to forces of 
nature, law, economics, culture, and religion; and to the sometimes violent, sometimes 
sustaining work of strangers—we are called upon and capacitated to respond to those 
forces that impinge upon us. Such responses are not simply retrospective attempts to 
make sense of the world or to persuade others that something ought to change. More 
significantly, rhetorical responses become forces in the world. These forces coalesce 
around the challenges of coexistence. Exposure creates in us a necessity of response to 
conditions which are not all, or even mostly, of our own making, but rather imposed upon 
us in our exposure. If we were not exposed, there would be no need for rhetorical 
response. Indeed, there would be nothing to respond to because we would be the kinds of 
autonomous, self-enclosed, free-willed beings that certain thinkers have made us out to 
be. Exposure entails, however, a lack of control, a loss of autonomy, an openness to what 
is not us, and multiple impingements upon our will that we cannot will away. Such 
incursions demand responses of several sorts, and rhetoric is one of our key modes of 
responding. 
The relationship between exposure and rhetorical response is detailed in Diane 
Davis’s (2010; 2011) work on rhetoricity, which offers an important precedent for my 
claims here. Drawing especially from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, Davis articulates a 
theory not of rhetoric but of rhetoricity. Rhetoricity, she argues, is “an affectability or 
persuadability,” which serves as “the condition of symbolic activity” (2010, 2). These 
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dual abilities can be summed up as capacities to affect and be affected, to act and be 
acted upon by others. Rhetoric emerges out of conditions of being-with or becoming-with 
others to the extent that one can only respond from within the condition of embodied 
withness. And while others have accounted for the enduring role of the body in rhetoric 
(e.g., Hawhee 2006), Davis locates in the body’s exposure to the world what she calls the 
“preoriginary” source of rhetorical activity. Indeed, Davis (2011, 89) suggests that 
“rhetoric, at its most elemental, takes place at the level of the creature” and is thus “not 
first of all an essence or property ‘in the speaker’ (a natural function of biology) but an 
underivable obligation to respond that issues from an irreducible relationality.” One 
responds to and within the relationships one finds oneself a part of or enmeshed in. 
Rhetorical activity is one means of negotiating those forms of relationality that, while we 
cannot simply wish them away, are also neither stable nor permanent. Thinking of 
rhetoric as a response to exposure is a means of acknowledging both that humans are 
impinged upon from the outside and that humans are able to impinge upon their 
conditions of coexistence.  
Following Davis, I am positing a concept of rhetoric as one among several means 
of negotiating coexistence, of grappling with the circumstances into which we have been 
thrown, of shifting the relationships that take shape within dynamic ecosystems, and of 
composing assemblages whose effects ramify throughout biotic communities on 
timescales that exceed any individual human life. This sense of rhetoric is entrenched in 
what Morton calls “the ecological thought,” which is a thinking of interconnectedness 
and interdependency. “Ecology,” writes Morton (2010, 4), “includes all the ways we 
imagine how we live together. Ecology is profoundly about coexistence. Existence is 
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always coexistence. No man is an island.” By thinking rhetoric ecologically we are 
forced to begin not from the old categories of sender, receiver, message, and context, 
which preserve the subject as an intentional actor within determinable contexts, but, 
rather, from the messy entanglements of mortal coexistence where what it means to be 
human, as well as what it means to inhabit ecosystems, are at stake. Ecologically 
speaking, rhetorics cannot be conceived of as somehow outside the ecosystem. Rhetorics 
do not simply re-present ecosystem relations, nor do they function merely as deliberate 
efforts to persuade other human beings to inhabit those relations differently. Rather, from 
an ecological perspective rhetorics are always already at work composing, decomposing, 
and recomposing relations in real time. Just as humans, more-than-human animals, 
natural disasters, and climate cycles impact ecosystems, so too do rhetorics exert force on 
the forms of relationality that simultaneously threaten and sustain life. 
Students of rhetoric have long recognized the force with which it moves (in) the 
world. Following Plato, however, many of the more prominent commentators have 
framed rhetorical force in more or less skeptical terms. In the Phaedrus, for example, 
Plato (2005) famously condemned rhetoric on the grounds that, although it might induce 
some good, it has the potential, in the wrong hands, to convince citizens that the wrong is 
right, that the bad is good. Rhetoric, which was then largely associated with speeches 
given by prominent leaders in society, was opposed to philosophy, the search for wisdom 
and truth. So positioned, rhetoric appeared as the dangerous supplement to a philosophy 
of the good and true. Similarly, scholars indebted to the Marxist tradition routinely 
condemn rhetoric on the grounds that it is, first, distinct from material reality and, second, 
always in some sense in service of deceiving audiences by instilling in them a form of 
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false consciousness (e.g., Cloud 1994). The false consciousness furnished by rhetoric in 
the form of ideology, such scholars contend, is opposed to a true consciousness borne out 
of materiality. The Platonic and Marxist traditions are just two examples of a more 
fundamental point: even when scholars seek to detract from the status of rhetoric, they 
usually are forced to admit the force with which rhetorics move in the world. These 
traditions, however, are hemmed in by ideological projects that determine from the outset 
an (often negative) orientation to rhetoric. For these thinkers, force is predetermined as 
the negative characteristic of rhetoric, something to be suspicious of, something even to 
condemn. Abandoning the moralizing of the Phaedrus and Marxism’s focus on false 
consciousness, Derrida (1981) offers a more intriguing third way in Dissemination. There 
he mines Plato’s use of the word “pharmakon” to describe rhetoric in the Phaedrus, 
noting that the word originally meant both “poison” and “cure.” For Derrida, as for me, 
rhetoric exerts numerous forces in the world—some better than others for certain ends. 
The challenge of approaching rhetoric, then, is to do so without assuming the approach of 
the skeptic from the very beginning. 
As I discuss in Chapter Two, my interest in rhetoric is not, primarily, driven by 
either a desire to criticize or to praise but, rather, to understand and render sensible the 
force of rhetorics as they move (through) the world. The fundamental question for me is 
not whether a particular rhetorical practice is true or not, nor whether it serves some 
apparently positive end, but, rather, what rhetorical practices do, what they accomplish, 
what sorts of relations they authorize or disable, what kinds of assemblages they help to 
compose. In asking these questions, I find considerable resources in the theoretical 
project outlined by Michael Calvin McGee (1975; 1980a; 1980b; 1990) during the latter 
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third of the 20th century. McGee insisted on treating rhetoric as a kind of force. In his 
essay on “the People,” for instance, he argued that rhetorics have the force of temporarily 
defining who counts as part (or not) of a particular collectivity: “the people,” he wrote, 
“are conjured into objective reality, remain so long as the rhetoric which defined them 
has force, and in the end wilt away, becoming once again merely a collection of 
individuals” (1975, 242). Force here takes on the quality of pressure, the capacity to hold 
things in place for a while. Like Nietzsche (1999), McGee understood rhetorics as having 
the capacity to contingently, temporarily fix our understandings of the world.  
Although the notion of rhetorical force remains to be rigorously theorized (e.g., 
Foley 2013), exploring rhetoric’s capacities to make things happen is an important means 
of understanding the force with which rhetorics move. Maurice Charland’s (1987) theory 
of “constitutive rhetoric” moves us in one potential direction, asking us to consider the 
ways in which rhetorics are deployed to constitute collective identities. For reasons 
partially outlined in Chapter Four, I find articulation theory to be a more explanatory 
framework. For instance, Kevin DeLuca (1999a; 1999b) extends McGee’s argument by 
framing rhetoric through articulation theory. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe’s (1985) work, DeLuca demonstrates how rhetorics do not mediate relations 
among pre-existing subjects with thoughts and ideas of their own but, rather, how 
rhetorics “articulate” the very subject positions from which individuals think, speak, and 
act in the world (see also Biesecker 1989; 1992). Articulation is the doubled practice of 
“speaking forth elements and linking elements” into a “temporary unity” (DeLuca 1999a, 
335). Thus, articulation has the effect of provisionally composing relations among 
disparate and heterogeneous elements into something new. From this perspective, the 
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force of rhetoric is manifested most powerfully, then, not in the self-reflexive activities of 
deliberation and persuasion but instead in the prior and ongoing production of the very 
rhetors who understand themselves to be certain kinds of beings and the contexts in 
which they dwell. 
Rhetorics form assemblages. They perform the doubled function that DeLuca 
(1999a, 335) outlines: on the one hand, rhetorics “speak forth,” or enunciate, potential 
connections among elements and, on the other hand, rhetorics “link” those elements into 
assemblages. In one and the same stroke, rhetorics operate symbolically and materially: 
their material-symbolic force is always already an intertwined set of forces. Rhetorics are, 
thus, not simply epistemological but are, rather, ontological. They help us understand the 
world, that is, they furnish an understanding of the world, but they also participate in the 
production of that world. “An assemblage,” argues Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 22–23), 
“in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows 
simultaneously.” These flows, or forces, are entangled at every level with rhetoric. 
Deleuze and Guattari again: “There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of 
reality [...] and a field of representation [...] and a field of subjectivity” (23). These fields 
flow into one another in the contingent form of every assemblage. For instance, the body-
formaldehyde-casket-vault-earth assemblage of conventional burial in the United States 
collapses reality, representation, and subjectivity by gathering together heterogeneous 
materials into something that simultaneously carries material and symbolic loads and that 
really impacts the composition of other assemblages within ecosystems. 
As compositional forces in the world, rhetorics also call on actors to respond to 
these gatherings in different ways. Rhetorics, in other words, produce response-abilities, 
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or capacities to act in and on the world. These response-abilities are nothing other than 
the (re)production of (other) assemblages, gatherings which have certain functions and 
exert particular kinds of force. To cite a now-familiar example, the body-formaldehyde-
casket-vault-earth assemblage is first of all rhetorically articulated to the concept of the 
dignity of the deceased. Conventional burial makes sense in relation to this conceptual 
background of dignity which must be sustained through what Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) call a “collective assemblage of enunciation,” a discursive apparatus that makes 
this assemblage sensible. Within this assemblage of enunciation, as authors like Mitford 
(2000) and Roach (2003) have demonstrated, the dead body is rhetorically imbued with 
significance and, thus, demands respect in the form of lavish displays of postmortem love 
and devotion. The resulting assemblage, what John Troyer (2007) calls the “post-mortem 
subject,” is treated as both dead and alive, simultaneously a corpse and a subject. As this 
example highlights, rhetorics are often invoked to shore up the boundaries of the human. 
There is an entire anthropocentric rhetorical history waiting to be written that would 
attest to the anxieties driving human efforts to position themselves outside of and apart 
from the more-than-human world. 
In Mortal Assemblages, I turn away from the sorts of postmortem assemblages 
which have long held sway in the United States to extensively grapple with emergent 
ecological discourses of death and deathcare, as well as with the assemblages they are 
composing. In tracing the rhetorical articulation of mortal assemblages—conservation 
burial, human composting, and consumptive reciprocity—I am also tracking modes of 
resistance that cut across and transform our sense of what it means to be human and to be 
always already enmeshed in ecosystems. In this sense, I willingly embrace the mantle of 
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critical rhetoric as distilled by Barbara Biesecker (1992, 361): “the task,” she writes, “is 
to trace new lines of making sense by taking hold of the sign whose reference has been 
destabilized by and through practices of resistance, lines that cut diagonally across and, 
thus disrupt, the social weave.” Following the transversal lines furrowed out by creative, 
alternative practices is a means of making sense of the world not as it is but as it might 
be, of grasping assemblages still in the making, and of rendering sensible the forms of 
response that reveal themselves in the wake of novel postmortem gatherings. Thus, in 
tracing the composition of these other assemblages, I am tracing as well the articulation 
of emergent forms of rhetorical response-ability that will help to shape our capacities for 
and modes of ecological coexistence.  
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Non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari,  
sed intelligere. (Not to laugh, not to lament, not to curse, 
but to understand.) 
 
— Baruch Spinoza (2005), Political Treatise 
 
What, then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human 
relations which have been subjected to poetic and 
rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration, and 
which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a 
people as firmly established, canonical, and binding; truths 
are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are 
illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent 
use and have lost all sensuous vigour, coins which, having 
lost their stamp, are now regarded as metal and no longer 
as coins. 
 
— Friedrich Nietzsche (1999, 146),  




Mortal Assemblages is a sustained effort to think with and about emergent 
transformations to three interrelated domains—death, ecology, and the human. It is also a 
struggle to slow down and to grapple with what is animating those changes, with how 
they are being made to happen, and with what those alterations might mean for an 
ultimately unpredictable future. In particular, this dissertation deals with the rhetorical 
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force of heterogeneous textual fragments disseminating during the historical present, an 
enduring moment marked by ruptures of all sorts. Not only does Mortal Assemblages 
trace the intertwined rhetorics of death and ecology emanating out of entrepreneurial 
efforts to reimagine and remake deathcare practices, but it also performs ruptures of its 
own. Pushing rhetorical theory, throughout this dissertation I create several concepts to 
help explain how rhetorics mediate relationships among human and more-than-human 
actants in complex and ever-changing ecosystems.  
Method is a simultaneously common and terrifying word in rhetorical circles, for 
it connotes something both ambiguous and precise about the ways in which we perform 
our labor as critics and theorists. The English word method has its etymological roots in 
the Greek µέθοδος, meaning “pursuit of knowledge” or “mode of investigation” and in 
the Latin methodus, which means “mode of proceeding.” Beginning in the 16th century, 
variations of the word method were incorporated into most of the Romance languages 
and became associated with logical, rational, and, eventually, scientific procedures 
designed to yield factual knowledge (“Method, N.” 2016). The legacy of these lexical 
shifts is felt today in several sedimented ideas of the “scientific method,” which was 
systematically outlined and made popular by 17th-century thinkers Francis Bacon and 
René Descartes but which has a much longer history spanning multiple continents and 
centuries. While testing hypotheses via experiments remains a privileged methodology 
throughout much of the academy, qualitative and humanistic scholars in numerous 
disciplines have developed methods of their own to study and better understand their 
objects of inquiry.  
Contemporary rhetorical scholars employ a diverse range of methods, including 
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close reading (Leff and Sachs 1990), contextualization (McGee 1990), philosophical 
analysis (Biesecker 1992a), ideological criticism (Cloud 1994), iconic analysis (Hariman 
and Lucaites 2007), historicism (Finnegan 2008), content analysis (Friedman, Gorney, 
and Egolf 1987), media studies (DeLuca 1999b), ethnography (Pezzullo 2007), and field 
research (Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres 2011), to name only a few. Each of these 
methods highlights certain aspects of rhetoric while downplaying others. Rather than 
being hemmed in by only one or two methodological practices, rhetorical scholars are 
increasingly fashioning themselves as great importers and practitioners of manifold 
methods. Such methodological pluralism has its advantages and disadvantages, not least 
of which is a somewhat persistent ambiguity about precisely how rhetorical scholars 
come to certain conclusions. Yet, we do not need to embrace the notion of method 
embedded within the scientific method in order to perform rigorous and precise research. 
Returning to the Greek and Latin understandings of method as a “mode of investigation” 
or, more to my liking, a “mode of proceeding,” methods are perhaps better 
conceptualized for our purposes as the various practices we engage as we do our work. In 
this sense, rhetorical methods need not be oriented toward making truth claims but, 
instead, toward helping us understand how and why particular textual fragments might be 
impacting social relations. Scholars have an obligation to their readers to make those 
modes of proceeding evident. 
Thus, in the remainder of Chapter Two I offer a brief accounting of my own 
“modes of proceeding.” I begin with the question of beginnings, with the points of 
departure that have animated Mortal Assemblages. From there, I make explicit some of 
the more significant theoretical and methodological inheritances that have given this 
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dissertation its particular shape and style. I do this as a way of marking my debts. I then 
explain more specifically how I approached the multimedia rhetorical fragments that 
animate the central chapters. I close by describing the practice and products of conceptual 
creation, which I suspect might be the most enduring aspects of this dissertation. These 
meditations are offered not as a prescription for future projects (though they will perhaps 
inspire others to make their own methods more explicit), but, rather, as an explanation of 
the various kinds of labor that have gone into the production of the text you are now 
reading. 
 
Ruptures: Points of Departure 
To proceed is to set out from some where or some thing. Setting out in several 
directions, Mortal Assemblages is concerned with ruptures of many kinds and on multiple 
scales. The ruptures that motivate this project are simultaneously practical, political, and 
philosophical; they revolve around how we (Homo sapiens in the global West) think 
about and respond to our own embodiment, mortality, and enmeshment in broader 
ecosystems. They demand our attention to the extent that they entail radical alterations in 
how we compose ourselves in relation to the more-than-human world that both threatens 
and sustains us. They force us to think of our bodies variously as ecologically enmeshed, 
as compostable, and as edible. In doing do, they rupture presumptions of individuality, 
autonomy, identity, and boundedness that have been linked to the figure of the human 
throughout much of Western thinking. 
Such ruptures induce thinking. In his magnum opus, Difference and Repetition, 
Gilles Deleuze (1994, 139) compellingly contends that, “Something in the world forces 
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us to think.” Compelled by the intensity of something in the world, we are made to think, 
made to slow down and to contemplate sets of relationships that challenge whatever we 
have henceforth taken for granted. As Deleuze contends, thinking always takes off from 
somewhere as a result of an encounter with something which cannot be easily 
understood, assimilated, or passed over. Only when challenged in or by an encounter do 
we respond with thought. Indeed, most of us move through daily life, Deleuze suggests, 
in a habitually unthinking way. It is only when “the claws of absolute necessity” impose 
upon us, Deleuze contends, that we begin to think (139). Unless or until we are forced to 
think about something, say, how we deal with our own and others’ dead bodies, we are 
likely to proceed without giving that which otherwise might induce consideration much 
thought at all. In everyday life, convention and tradition substitute for serious thought. 
Serious inquiry always begins with an eruptive force that demands thinking. 
Given that the textual fragments I grapple with throughout this dissertation deal 
with relationships among humans, death, and ecology, the forces which have compelled 
me to think have often taken on an undeniably visceral, bodily dimension. For example 
while I was a master’s student at Indiana University, I came across the Infinity Burial 
Project in the form of a filmed TED Talk given by the project’s founder, Jae Rhim Lee 
(2011). In that video, which I discuss in detail in Chapter Five, Lee talks of feeding bits 
and pieces of her body to flesh-eating mushrooms as she stands on stage clothed in a 
head-to-toe “mushroom death suit.” Shielded by age and circumstance from any serious 
engagement with mortality, I was taken aback by Lee’s proposition to turn dead human 
bodies into food for mushrooms. Spurred by Lee’s descriptions of what that process 
might look like, I imagined my own corpse being consumed by mushrooms (a kind of 
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edible matter I detested in 2011 but have since come to enjoy in small doses). A bit 
sickened by this thought, I put the Infinity Burial Project mostly out of mind for a year 
before—goaded by a haunting sense of responsibility to think with and through what 
disgusts—I returned to the image of the corpse as edible matter in a more hospitable 
mood/mode. I was learning how, as Julia Kristeva (1982, 3) writes in Powers of Horror, 
“corpses show [us] what [we] permanently thrust aside in order to live” by placing each 
of us “at the border of [our] condition as a living being.” 
Many of the textual fragments I think with in Mortal Assemblages also enact 
ruptures by opening onto questions that bring broader ecological networks into view. For 
instance, the Urban Death Project, which I take up extensively in Chapter Four, did not 
force me to think simply because it proposes to transform dead human bodies into soil via 
a large-scale composting system. It also fundamentally ruptures the way that we 
conceptualize the human body by disintegrating the boundaries among multiple human 
bodies comingling and decomposing alongside one another. Individuals quickly become 
multiplicities. And as soon as the human body is no longer discussed in its singularity, it 
is not long before interconnectivity and interdependency enter into and forcefully 
impinge upon the scene of thought. Not only does the Urban Death Project’s insistence 
on composting humans allegorically call up images of mass graves in Nazi Germany but 
it also surges forth as an immanent image of ecological enmeshment. As such, it conjures 
what Timothy Morton (2010) has called “the ecological thought,” which is a thinking of 
interconnectedness. As Morton writes, however, “Interconnectedness isn’t snug and cozy. 
There is intimacy [...] but not predictable, warm fuzziness” (31). Thus, part of the force 
of the textual fragments assembled together and studied throughout this dissertation 
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emerges out of their capacity not only to surprise or to startle at a visceral level but also 
to make us think in extrapolative ways, in ways that start with micropolitical practices 
taking place on (literally) the ground and that then radiate outward to articulate 
connections and compose relations that cause us to pause, to contemplate, and, 
potentially, to inhabit the world differently. 
  
Inheritances: Gifts for Thought 
Though ruptures of several sorts have forced me to think again and again, I did 
not encounter such ruptures ab nihilo, as if from nowhere. Every breach, no matter how 
eruptive, always takes place in and on a background that has never quite worked itself 
out, that is, within a scene both already established and yet open to transformations. In 
For What Tomorrow ... A Dialogue, Derrida (2004) likens this intellectual background to 
an “inheritance,” insisting that all thought is possible only insofar as one has inherited 
concepts, theories, even ways of writing from other thinkers who always already come 
before and who we, therefore, follow. “It is true,” Derrida tells Elizabeth Roudinesco, 
“whether it’s a question of life or work or thought, that I have always recognized myself 
in the figure of the heir—and more and more so, in a way that is more and more 
deliberate, and often happy” (3). Derrida was incessantly aware that he was an heir to the 
works of, for example, predecessors like Nietzsche, Husserl, Hegel, and (most of all) 
Heidegger, but also to contemporaries such as Foucault, Deleuze, Barthes, and others 
(Derrida 2001). As original as Derrida’s thought might have been, it only made sense 
against the background of these others. Recognizing oneself as an heir in work, thought, 
and life entails an acknowledgement of one’s place within a heritage and along a lineage. 
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It entails a destabilization of the myths of unity and genius often circulating around the 
figure of the critic, for the critic is always working after, and thus following, others—
human and more-than-human alike (Derrida 2008). From a methodological perspective, 
the point is to recognize that we are all in some significant sense heirs to intellectual and 
practical traditions not of our own choosing. 
Although it would be impossible to comprehensively enumerate every intellectual 
inheritance that has impacted my own modes of proceeding (there are some, no doubt, 
about which even I am unaware), I nevertheless want to highlight some of the key 
influences that have shaped my treatment of the issues animating Mortal Assemblages. I 
am an heir, first of all, to the rhetorical tradition as it has been taken up and transformed 
by thinkers like Michael Calvin McGee, Barbara Ann Biesecker, and Kevin Michael 
DeLuca, each of whom has created concepts of rhetoric that attempt to explain how 
symbolic action changes the world. From McGee (1980a; 1980b; 1990), I have inherited 
the idea that our task as rhetorical scholars is to trace the movement of the social by 
locating textual fragments that demonstrate shifts in thinking and action. McGee 
implored rhetorical scholars to find evidence for their claims that particular texts have 
force in the world. From Biesecker (1989; 1992b), I have received the Derridean and 
Foucaultian gifts of a doubled wariness—on the one hand, a skepticism of efforts to 
recover origins and, on the other hand, an avoidance of placing rhetoric in the service of a 
transparent, teleological path towards something called Progress. And from DeLuca 
(1999a; 1999b), I have received three enduring gifts: first, an ontological understanding 
of rhetoric; second, an appreciation of the ways in which media impact on audience’s 
encounters, interpretations, and responses to rhetoric; and, third, a willingness to see that 
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moralism and criticism can and ought to be kept separate, at least for a while. Rhetorics 
mediate the world in all sorts of ways, DeLuca contends, and the rhetorical scholar’s task 
is to understand how those rhetorics are functioning without subjecting them first to a test 
of morality. My approach to rhetoric is deeply indebted to these thinkers who, on the 
whole, have showed me how to treat textual fragments not merely as more or less 
accurate re-presentations of social relations but, more significantly, as immanent forces in 
contingent and always unraveling worlds composed of human and more-than-human 
actants struggling for coexistence. 
I am heir as well to works by a growing and interdisciplinary assemblage of 
scholars concerned with the ways in which rhetorics mediate manifold forms of 
ecological relationality. I have experienced texts by too many thinkers to name—though 
the writings of Edward Abbey (1968), David Abram (1996), Stacy Alaimo (2010), Jane 
Bennett (2010), Robert Bullard (1993), Judith Butler (2004; 2009) Donal Carbaugh 
(1999), Mel Chen (2012), William Cronon (1996), Kevin DeLuca (1999b; 1999c; 2001; 
2005; 2007), Danielle Endres (2013), Neil Evernden (1992), Donna Haraway (1990; 
2008), Debra Hawhee (2011), Nathan Hodges (2015), Aldo Leopold (1949), Lynn 
Margulis (1998), Doreen Massey (2005), Carolyn Merchant (1983), Timothy Morton 
(2007; 2010), Jennifer Peeples (2011; 2013), Phaedra Pezzullo (2007), Val Plumwood 
(1999), Richard Rogers (1998), Julie “Madrone” Schutten (2008), Natasha Seegert 
(2014), Michel Serres (1995; 2011), Gary Snyder (1969), and Walt Whitman (1855) have 
had too strong an impact to go unnamed—as gifts for my own thinking so that it is now 
difficult to parse the individual effects these texts have had on my thought. Nevertheless, 
the collective impact of this vast inheritance has been a more insistent and nuanced 
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appreciation throughout my own scholarship of the forms of interconnection and 
interdependency that link human and more-than-human actants in webs of relation and 
responsibility. Not only do these thinkers teach us that humans are deeply and 
inextricably intertwined with what is not human, but they also insist on the mediating 
force that rhetorics have on these complex relationships. They demonstrate how symbolic 
action impacts upon our understandings and experiences of our earthly cohabitants and of 
the so-called natural world. 
Significantly, this inheritance includes a somewhat transgressive concept of the 
human, which foregrounds corporeality rather than cognition as the primary, even 
primordial, force shaping what it means to be human. Historically, philosophers have 
tended to privilege the mind over the body, often equating what is distinctly human with 
our capacity for thought.1 In contrast with these prevailing views, I have inherited a way 
of thinking that focuses on and even privileges the body as the foundational aspect of 
what it means to be human. As such, in my work I ask not what makes humans different 
from or better than but, rather, what connects us to the more-than-human actants with 
which we incessantly and unwittingly interact. Thus, I am less interested in analysis 
(taking apart) than in synthesis (bringing together). On this point, I take cues from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Standard interpretations of several major philosophical projects tend to find that 
thinkers as wide-ranging as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant have privileged the 
mind over the body in their conceptualizations of human being. In some significant sense 
Plato’s foundational distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds set this 
series of analyses into motion. Aristotle also defined humans as the “rational animal,” 
arguing that what sets humans apart from other living beings is a capacity for rational 
activity that exceeds the nutritive and instinctual drives of plants and other animals. René 
Descartes, for his part, reified this view of humanity by contending that the mind and the 
body are really distinct from one another and that, properly speaking, it is the mind that 
defines what it means to be human. And Immanuel Kant’s notion of the a priori forms 
motivating mind and body holds that forces exterior to the phenomenal world impinge 
upon normal existence. 
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thinkers like Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, Timothy Morton, and Stacy Alaimo, each of 
whom has developed theories of the human that are more about embodied entanglement 
than they are about distinguishing different kinds of bodies from one another. Alaimo 
(2010), for instance, put forth the notion of “trans-corporeality” to designate forms of 
relationality that bind human and more-than-human. Over and against capacities for 
cognition and rationality, Alaimo’s view of the human takes into consideration the 
multiple relations that establish the human at a material level. Throughout my work, I 
take seriously the forms of relationality that establish, sustain, and threaten the human, as 
well as the ways in which rhetorics mediate those relationships (e.g., Barnett 2015; 2016; 
2017). What constitutes the human cannot be taken for granted but must, rather, be 
constantly situated within the shifting material-symbolic assemblages that compose it. 
Much of the work that I have just mentioned is indebted implicitly or explicitly to 
the eruptive force of poststructuralism. In particular, the work of Derrida animates a great 
deal of contemporary thought about the entanglement of human and more-than-human 
actants. Derrida’s thought also plays across Mortal Assemblages, sometimes openly but 
more often implicitly. Throughout his oeuvre, Derrida routinely muddles the boundary 
between inside and outside as a means of demonstrating how the presumed purity of one 
element (for example, the human) is predicated on its having always already been 
contaminated by others. In discussing the subject, for instance, Derrida (1982, 134) writes 
that, “Man, since always, is his proper end, that is, the end of his proper. Being, since 
always, is its proper end, that is, the end of its proper.” In this somewhat quizzical pair of 
sentences, Derrida underlines the extent to which “Man,” or the subject of modernity, is 
irreducibly in touch with what is outside itself. The subject is not self-enclosed, but is 
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radically open to the world. Indeed, the subject cannot take shape without what is outside 
itself, that is, with its “end” understood as a kind of permeable boundary. Derrida 
routinely demonstrates how the seeming purity of the human depends upon a more 
fundamental contamination. In The Animal That Therefore I Am, a text largely 
responsible for the development of the field of critical animal studies, Derrida (2008) 
more explicitly argues for a view of the human as enmeshed in ecological networks and, 
indeed, as always “following” the more-than-human animals that much of philosophy has 
excluded. By figuring the human as both constitutively exposed to what is not human and 
as part of a lineage that includes nonhuman animals, Derrida lays an important 
foundation for the work of this dissertation. Following Derrida, I take seriously the ways 
in which the human is always already enmeshed in ecosystems and how this fundamental 
entanglement opens onto significant transformations in modes of ecological inhabitance 
and earthly coexistence. 
There are no doubt other inheritances that could be mentioned here. Certainly, 
other theoretical lineages and commitments will become evident throughout the 
following pages. In recognizing myself in “the figure of the heir,” however, have I not 
relinquished control over “my own” text, given it over (or given it back) to those who 
came before me? Just the opposite, rather. I give it over to those who will, I hope, come 
after, who will follow this text and who will make something of/with it. This dissertation, 
like all other texts, disseminates (Barthes 1977; Derrida 1981). It scatters without 
guaranteeing. As soon as I write it, I have already lost control. To write is to be always in 
the process of giving up and giving over certain kinds of power to others whom one 
cannot control. This is why Derrida (as well as Barthes, for that matter) routinely likens 
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writing to death (e.g., Derrida 2007). “Only a finite being,” Derrida writes, “inherits, and 
his finitude obliges him. It obliges him to receive what is larger and older and more 
powerful and more durable than he. But the same obliges one to choose, to prefer, to 
sacrifice, to exclude, to let go and leave behind” (2004, 5). This sense of obligation, to be 
simultaneously faithful to one’s masters and to push them to their limits, to be faithful to 
a certain infidelity, emerges again in my relationships with various rhetorical fragments, 
a set of relationships to which I now turn. 
 
Rhetorics: Openings for Extrapolation 
Throughout Mortal Assemblages I work on and with dozens of rhetorical 
fragments drawn from an emergent movement towards more ecological deathcare 
practices. These fragments, I argue, are not only contributing to a shift away from some 
of the environmentally damaging forms of interment described in Chapter One but they 
are also transforming the way that we think about what it means to be human and to be 
enmeshed in ecosystems at the beginning of the 21st century. Without these rhetorical 
fragments—among them websites, documentaries, images, news stories, YouTube 
videos, books, works of history, philosophy, and poetry, as well as bodily practices of 
various sorts—this dissertation could not exist. These rhetorical practices and objects are 
no less than the ruptures that gave rise to this project in the first place, and they are the 
conditions of possibility for my own thinking about the radical transformations currently 
underway not only in the modern deathcare industry but also in our collective 
understandings of ecology and of humanity, of the inextricable forms of interconnectivity 
and interdependency of which we all are inextricably a part. Hence, I want to explain 
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here both how I think about and treat the rhetorical fragments that animate this project. 
Over and against the colloquial sense in which rhetoric is routinely framed—
typically as “mere” rhetoric or as a degraded form of public discourse not totally distinct 
from propaganda—I treat rhetoric as an ontological force in the world. By this I mean 
that rhetoric is not limited in scope or function to simply re-presenting social relations in 
more or less accurate terms (though it certainly also does this). Rather, rhetorics 
compose, decompose, and recompose social relations in real time. Rhetoric, as DeLuca 
defines it, is “the mobilization of signs for the articulation of identities, ideologies, 
consciousnesses, communities, publics, and cultures” (1999a, 346). According to this 
definition, rhetorics play a crucial role in the production and maintenance of social 
relations: rhetorics “articulate” (or link together) multiple elements into something that 
occasionally congeals into a temporary form of reality. Social realities, DeLuca suggests, 
can take the form of a felt sense of identity (insofar as an “I” is brought into existence by 
particular rhetorics); of a politically charged association and outlook, that is, of an 
ideology; or even of a kind of consciousness, a way of thinking about one’s relation to 
the world. I am particularly interested in this dissertation with the impacts that rhetorics 
might have on ways of thinking about the relationships among human and more-than-
human actants in complex and shifting ecosystems. 
Embedded within DeLuca’s (1999a) concept of rhetoric is a notion of 
consciousness that radically departs from more commonsense understandings of that 
term, which tend to locate consciousness in the psyche of an individual person. In 
numerous of his texts, Derrida compellingly challenged this conceptualization of 
consciousness on the grounds that it relies on a troubled notion of presence. Especially 
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within Speech and Phenomena, Derrida (1973) demonstrates how something like 
consciousness is an effect of a more general form of writing, which means that 
consciousness emerges not from within an individual but, rather, from the outside. For 
example, Derrida begins by recounting that for Edmund Husserl consciousness manifests 
in the so-called “phenomenological voice,” or the purely internal dialogue one has with 
oneself. In the Husserlian version, one is conscious insofar as one is present to oneself in 
the act of speaking to oneself, or carrying on a conversation with oneself that remains 
entirely interior. Thus, consciousness as self-presence takes the form of an inner 
soliloquy. Yet, as Derrida contends, there is a serious problem with Husserl’s theory of 
consciousness. The language in which one speaks to oneself comes from elsewhere. 
Thus, the phenomenological voice is always already conditioned (or contaminated) by a 
language not of one’s own creation; one can only speak to oneself in a voice that is 
legible because it is conventional, intelligible because it is socially shared. The outside 
(the system of language) has therefore always already penetrated the inside, which means 
that the inside (consciousness, self-presence) is only possible because of what exceeds it. 
Consciousness, then, is the effect rather than the cause of social realities produced and 
sustained by publicly circulating rhetorics. 
Since consciousness emerges not out of an isolated or solipsistic “I” that predates 
rhetoric but out of rhetoric itself, students of rhetoric are uniquely positioned to trace 
shifts in consciousness. Decentered from individual psyches and distributed throughout 
the social, evidence of various consciousnesses can be found in texts. Writing on the 
heels of the significant social movements of the 1960s and 1970s—the Civil Rights, 
women’s, and environmental movements key among them—McGee advised rhetorical 
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scholars to trace the movement of the social (as opposed to studying “social movements”) 
by locating in publicly disseminating textual fragments evidence that thinking has 
changed or is in the process of changing. Imploring scholars to see social movement as 
intimately intertwined with consciousness, McGee (1980a) wrote: 
“Social movement” ought not to be a premise with which we begin 
research, defining what we want to see and, lo and behold, finding it. 
Rather, “social movement” ought to be a conclusion, a carefully 
considered and well-argued inference that changes in human 
consciousness are of such a nature that “social movement” has occurred, 
or that the rhetorical activity of a group of human beings would produce 
“social movement” if it were effective. Theoretical descriptions of “social 
movement(s),” in other words, ought to make questions of consciousness 
“come first,” focusing on the fact of collectivity and not on the accident of 
an allegedly pre-existing phenomenon. (244) 
 
If social movement is not a starting point for research, the burden of proof is in some 
significant sense in the hands of scholars who are in a position to trace whether and how 
social movement is or is not occurring (see also Latour 2007). McGee includes a clause 
in this injunction which is important for rhetoricians: not only can we infer that changes 
in consciousness have taken place by studying texts but we can also speculate about when 
“the rhetorical activity of a group of human beings would produce ‘social movement’ if it 
were effective” (244, emphasis mine). That is, it is sometimes the case that one can 
reasonably demonstrate that consciousness has, indeed, shifted. At other times, doing so 
is a much more difficult or even impossible task. Especially in the case of emergent 
rhetorics, scholars may be limited to showing how consciousness would likely shift if the 
assumptions and practices embedded within particular forms of rhetorical activity were 
taken up and adopted by audiences. In any case, it is both actual and potential changes in 
consciousness regarding the relationships among death, ecology, and the human which 
concern me throughout this dissertation. 
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In order to track changes in consciousness, throughout Mortal Assemblages I 
grapple with dozens of rhetorical texts and practices. Not only are ways of thinking 
sometimes explicitly articulated in language, but they are also embedded within 
entrenched and emergent modes of bodily comportment. Hence, I read everything from 
promotional videos to bodily performances as rhetorical practices which offer clues into 
the contours of shifting social consciousnesses. Following McGee, I have assembled a 
diverse array of rhetorical fragments together in order to support two kinds of claims. On 
the one hand, in the case of more established practices like conservation burial, I have 
selected examples of rhetoric that show demonstrable changes in thinking about the 
human and ecological relationality. Given that conservation burial has now been 
available in the United States since 1998, I aim to explain some of the ways in which 
consciousness has shifted in the wake of its popularization. On the other hand, in the case 
of more emergent practices such as human composting, I have had to work in a more 
speculative mode with texts and practices that suggest but cannot confirm that social 
consciousness has occurred. In this case, I flesh out some of the ways in which thinking 
might shift should rhetorics of human decomposition become effective by unpacking the 
underlying assumptions about death, ecology, and humanity that animate efforts like the 
Urban Death Project. By assembling multiple fragments together, and reading them 
alongside and against one another a la McGee (1990), I am not only able to provide 
readers with a sense of how ideas like conservation burial, human composting, and 
human edibility are disseminating across contexts but I am also able to better account for 
the force that these rhetorics are having or might have on social relations. 
Thus, the rhetorical texts and practices that I grapple with throughout the central 
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chapters of this dissertation are openings for what we might call, following Steven 
Shaviro (2016), “extrapolation.” I prefer the term extrapolation to alternatives such as 
criticism, interpretation, and analysis since “extrapolation” focuses our attention on the 
possibilities of inference that mark every encounter with rhetorics. Unlike criticism, 
extrapolation does not set out with a predetermined moral objective in mind and then 
subject texts to its moralizing gaze. Unlike interpretation, extrapolation does not seek 
simply to offer up a creative, inventive reading of texts. And unlike analysis, 
extrapolation does not proceed by way of slicing texts up into smaller, and thus more 
manageable, pieces of discourse.  
Rather, extrapolation sets out from the specificity of given texts and practices and 
then radiates outward to articulate connections among multiple fragments and to build up 
a more robust understanding of how rhetorics are impinging upon social relations. “We 
must begin,” writes Derrida, “wherever we are [...] Wherever we are: in a text where we 
already believe ourselves to be” (1976, 162). Proceeding from those texts and practices 
that disrupt our ways of thinking about the world, extrapolation dwells in the openings 
these ruptures produce but also, and importantly, follows their fissures as they move 
outward from the initial scene of encounter. Indeed, the fissures become indications of 
shifts in consciousness that exceed the merely eccentric or local. A rupture is only a 
rupture if it is felt in more than one place by more than one person, that is, if it exerts 
force by causing damage. Eruptive rhetorics do a kind of violence to taken-for-granted 
truths (e.g., Abel 1999). Fissures in the ground of the taken for granted are a means of 
sizing up that damage, of tracing the force of rhetorics as they shift ways of thinking 
about and inhabiting the world. Working by extrapolation is a means of moving from 
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moments of intense rupture through to the residual impacts that take shape as rhetorics 
break with and move across contexts. It is also a means of beginning with something 
small—say, an image of mushrooms consuming a human corpse—and working through 
(inferring) what that might mean and do in the world as it shifts from the virtual to the 
actual as an emergent practice of everyday life. 
  
Assemblages: Causes for Conceptual Creation 
As a mode of proceeding, extrapolation leads to conceptual creation. Concepts are 
the contingent products of extrapolation: they are the most extreme form of inference, a 
leap of faith from the smallness of a case to the bigness of practices and processes that 
cannot be easily apprehended. As such, the concepts presented throughout the chapters 
that follow—key among them are rhetorics of dispersal, decompositional rhetorics, and 
rhetorical digestion—are my own attempts to explain how different rhetorical texts and 
practices are working in the world. Concepts, according to Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(1994, 5), “are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven 
for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing 
without their creator’s signature.” Drawing on the work of Nietzsche (1968), who argued 
in The Will to Power that philosophers must not take others’ concepts for granted but 
create concepts of their own, Deleuze and Guattari call on scholars (and particularly 
philosophers) to engage in the difficult but rewarding work of creating concepts: 
The concept is the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event 
to come. Concepts in this sense belong to philosophy by right, because it 
is philosophy that creates them and never stops creating them. The concept 
is obviously knowledge—but knowledge of itself, and what it knows is the 
pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it 
is embodied. The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is 
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always to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event 
from things and beings, always to give them a new event: space, time, 
matter, thought, the possible as events. (32-33) 
 
Conceptual creation is the productive element of rhetorical scholarship. Creating 
concepts from the materials of the world is a way of making the world in new ways, of 
composing new forms of relationality. In this sense, conceptual creation challenges the 
lauded place of moralism and condemnation within critical rhetorical studies. Concepts 
are useful not because they tell us how to live our lives or how to pass judgment, but, on 
the contrary, because they help us make sense of how rhetorics are working in the world. 
Moreover, the concepts we create as scholars also become forces in the world.2 
Hence, I create concepts because they help me to understand how different 
rhetorics function and with what consequences they disseminate across contexts. The 
concepts I create in the following pages are condensations of years of thought and 
intellectual experimentation. These concepts are simultaneously subjective and objective. 
On the one hand, every concept is created by someone, a specific intellectual working on 
and with a particular set of problems and artifacts. Every concept is signed by its creator 
and remains tethered to its source in this way. On the other hand, concepts are objective 
in the sense that they are created with elements taken from the world, not created out of 
thin air. Concepts are always down to earth. Made from and for the earth, concepts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Not every concept can change the world. But some do. As one recent example, 
Judith Butler’s (1990) writings on the performativity of gender have widely shaped 
discussions of gender and sexuality across the past two-and-a-half decades. The idea that 
gender is not an immutable, essential, unchanging element of personal identity is more or 
less accepted by many groups today. In New York Magazine, for instance, Molly Fischer 
(2016) wonders, “What sage could have predicted that heteronormativity would 
eventually make its way into the vocabulary of teen magazines and shareable web 
content? Only, perhaps, the queer theorist Judith Butler.” Butler’s work anticipated the 
popular deconstruction of gender by inaugurating the conceptual maneuvers necessary for 
such transformations.  
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account for and are accountable to cohabitants making ways of coexistence. Creating 
concepts is related to cultivating knowledge:  
you will know nothing through concepts unless you have first created 
them—that is, constructed them in an intuition specific to them: a field, a 
plane, and a ground that must not be confused with them but that shelters 
their seeds and the personae who cultivate them. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 7)  
 
Creating concepts is about understanding things on their own terms, about giving 
theoretical shape to complex processes that evade simple explanations. Yet, concepts also 
create paths for response. “All concepts,” Deleuze and Guattari write, “are connected to 
problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be 
isolated or understood as their solution emerges” (16). The concepts I create are offered, 
then, not only as supplements for thinking about and understanding the world but also as 
provocations for inhabiting it differently. 
Most of the concepts I create in this dissertation are responses to emergent 
assemblages that are generating relationships among death, ecology, and what it means to 
be human. Human deaths in the United States are always scenes of assembly which bring 
together bodies of several sorts; material contraptions and technologies; places and 
geologic/atmospheric forces; laws and mores; myths, narratives, and cultural lore; 
corporations and capitalism. Rhetorics cut across and invade all elements of assemblages, 
giving shape, meaning, and force to the contingent relationships among the multiple 
elements composing an assemblage. Thus, accounting for death is also always accounting 
for strange forms of assemblage. Death does not isolate but, rather, brings together. In A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 71) write that, “an assemblage is 
necessary for organisms to be caught within and permeated by a social field that utilizes 
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them.” That is, the field of the social is itself always already an assemblage of 
multiplicities: “I” is already “we,” one is always many. When one element in the 
assemblage shifts, all other elements are impacted. When, for example, one technological 
implement is substituted for another or when one way of framing death replaces another, 
the whole assemblage becomes something different. Throughout Mortal Assemblages I 
create concepts to explain the emergent assemblages taking shape in the wake of radical 
transformations in deathcare practices. I focus on the rhetorical dimensions of these 
assemblages as a way of making sense of how those new assemblages might be 
understood. 
Creating concepts is a means of condensing multiple elements of an assemblage 
into something sensible, of giving shape in writing to relationships that pass under our 
usual modes of human perception. “There are no simple concepts,” Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994, 15) write, and this is so because every concept, like the assemblages they 
approximate, are composed of multiplicities. Indeed, “each concept will therefore be 
considered as the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of its own 
components” (20). Concepts are themselves assemblages; they are comings-together, 
syntheses of heterogeneous but necessary elements. Creating concepts, then, is a mode of 
composing: a productive activity defined by its relation to the available, to the materials 
that are accessible and with which one can work. As it is practiced here, conceptual 
creation is a way of moving beyond textual extrapolation to account for the assemblages 




A Note To Readers 
I began this chapter with a sentence taken from Nietzsche’s (1999) provocative, 
posthumously published essay “On Truth and Lying in Nonmoral Sense.” In that 
prescient essay, Nietzsche contends that what we call “truth” is in fact dependent on a 
concatenation of lies, falsehoods, and acts of deception. Truths are indistinguishable from 
lies because, as Nietzsche argues, every word is itself an illusion, a metaphor that we 
have mistaken for truth. Since this is the case, the “drive to truth” implicit in philosophy 
and in scholarship more generally begins to look somewhat dubious. If our objects of 
study are only arbitrarily related to truth, then our studies of material-symbolic texts and 
practices also correspond to truths only in an arbitrary way. By acknowledging that our 
objects of inquiry make the world rather than reflect it, that they compose truths rather 
than index them, we must also admit that our work, the texts that we write, also help to 
produce the world. 
Since Mortal Assemblages is, like the texts and practices I discuss throughout 
these pages, a productive intervention in the world, the practices of textual extrapolation 
and conceptual creation undertaken throughout this project do not lend themselves in any 
simple way to tests of veracity. While I have done my best to exercise a form of fidelity 
to the texts and practices I have studied, I no doubt have occasionally strayed in order to 
make sense of what these texts are doing in the world and how. The rhetorical force of 
these textual fragments will only be apprehended in retrospect: the game is too early to 
call. What I am able to offer here, then, is not an exhaustive account of the rhetoric of 
ecological deathcare but, rather, a series of provocations for thinking about the 
relationships that accrue among rhetoric, death, and ecology. These provocations emerge 
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out of intimate encounters with densely woven rhetorical acts; they are rooted in texts and 
practices which have force in the world. 
While I am too convinced by Derrida’s (1981) argument about the impossibility 
of securing a meaning or outcome to suggest that readers will find this text satisfying, I 
hope that the reader will approach this text along the lines laid out by Brian Massumi 
(1987, xv) in his “Translator’s Forward” to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) A Thousand 
Plateaus: “The question is not: is it true? But: does it work? What new thoughts does it 
make it possible to think? What new emotions does it make it possible to feel? What new 
sensations and perceptions does it open in the body?” By evacuating the question “is it 
true?” I hope that readers will be free to think with the concepts mobilized throughout 
Mortal Assemblages.3 If this project makes it possible to think and feel the world anew, 
even if only slightly, then it will have been a “success.” If it does not make these things 
possible for you, worry little and toss it onto the compost pile. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In their discussion of Descartes’ concepts, Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 27) write 
that, “There is no point in wondering whether Descartes was right or wrong. Are implicit 
and subjective presuppositions more valid than explicit objective presuppositions? Is it 
necessary ‘to begin,’ and, if so, is it necessary to start from the point of view of a 
subjective certainty? Can thought as such be the verb of an I? There is no direct answer. 
Cartesian concepts can only be assessed as a function of their problems and their plane.” 
Put differently, Descartes’ work must be assessed not in terms of its veracity but, rather, 
as a specific response to a set of problems that confronted Descartes. The question is 
what Descartes’ concepts made possible in relation to those problems, namely, the 
problems of cognition, knowledge, and subject-object relations. 
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One’s death should mean something. One should try to 
have a good death, just as one tries to have a good life. 
  
 — Edward Abbey with Jack Loeffler (1989, 18) 
 
I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love, 
If you want me again look for me under your boot-soles. 
  




Along the banks of a meandering mountain stream in the hills and valleys near 
Westminster, South Carolina, sits Ramsey Creek Preserve. Scattered throughout old-
growth forest, sheltered by abundant yellow and short-leaf pine, eastern hemlock, river 
alder, sedge, and other native flora, concealed by brown, decaying leaves and a thick 
layer of rich, pungent humus, and in ear shot of the nearby creek rambling over rock 
shoals, are the mostly unmarked graves of human beings who, for one reason or another, 
have been lowered into the South Carolina soil without the trappings of a “conventional” 
burial. Embalming fluids are not permitted at the Preserve, the first “natural” burial 
ground established in the United States, and caskets (if used at all) must be composed of 
biodegradable materials like wood or cardboard. You will find neither concrete vault nor 
elaborate headstone here, yet small, flat rocks taken from the area, engraved with names, 
   74 
dates, and epitaphs appear to the discerning eye. Describing the Preserve, Mark Harris 
(2007, 160) writes, “its grounds are so natural, so free of the usual funereal structures that 
you could wander into it by chance on an afternoon hike through these hills and never 
even know you’ve strayed into a graveyard.” Dirt trails wind through these dense woods, 
delivering pedestrians not only to where the bodies of friends, family, and strangers have 
been reunited with the damp, animate earth but also to scenes and sites where the living 
might sit and reflect, watch for birds, coyotes, and even the occasional black bear, where 
they might enjoy the sights and sounds of the stream, study the hundreds of species of 
flowers and plants that grow wild on the Preserve’s grounds, pick a spot where they or 
someone they know could one day be buried, or watch as a corpse is covered with dirt. 
Established in 1998 by Dr. William “Billy” Campbell and Kimberley Campbell, 
Ramsey Creek Preserve was the first conservation burial ground of its kind in the United 
States, thus setting the standard for other “green” burial operations throughout the 
country. Confronted with the death of his father, Billy found himself uncomfortable with 
the American funeral industry (Harris 2007). Channeling his frustrations with Big 
Funeral in what he thought was a productive direction, he turned toward “his dream of 
conservation burial” (“Bios” 2016), which he had cultivated while still in medical school. 
Since Ramsey Creek opened for business, about 300 other certified providers of “green 
burials” throughout North America have followed its lead (“Find a Provider” 2016). The 
Green Burial Council’s list of standards are based on the practices that take place at 
Ramsey Creek, making it not only a leader in conservation burial but also placing it on 
the cutting edge of an emergent movement towards ecological deathcare practices. What 
sets Ramsey Creek apart from most conventional and even green burial grounds, 
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however, is its commitment to long-term conservation and ecological biodiversity. When 
the Preserve opened it comprised 33 acres and a quarter mile of Ramsey Creek frontage; 
in 2006, the protected area expanded to include an additional 38 acres upstream (“About” 
2016). The Green Burial Council, of which the Preserve is a key member, has plans to 
conserve millions of acres by designating them as burial grounds. 
At Ramsey Creek, not only are corpses buried without formaldehyde and heavy 
caskets, thus eliminating much of the ecological burden of conventional burials, but the 
buried bodies also ensure that the land will be indefinitely free from development. The 
Preserve collaborated with Upstate Forever, a conservation organization that works with 
private land owners to protect South Carolina’s Upstate area, to create a conservation 
agreement in 2006 that permanently restricts the kinds of activities and development that 
can take place on the land (“Ramsey Creek Preserve” 2014). And, in many states, there 
are already established laws governing how burial grounds can and cannot be put to use 
for other purposes. In general, it is difficult to repurpose lands that have historically been 
used for interring human bodies. Throughout its nearly 20 years of existence, Ramsey 
Creek has facilitated the natural burials of more than 100 people, a practice that helps 
ensure that its 71-acre slice of upstate South Carolina will not become a site of future 
development. 
Unsurprisingly, the owners of Ramsey Creek Preserve and advocates of 
conservation burial tout this model of land conservation as a beacon of pragmatic 
ecological stewardship. As Billy Campbell (2013) said in a TED Talk entitled “Saving 
One Million Acres for Two Thousand Years,” the ultimate goal of places like the 
Preserve is not to protect just a few parcels of property here and there but to shield 
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several million acres of land from future development. Citing Aldo Leopold’s (1949) 
“land ethic,” Campbell argued that conservation practices ought to be both holistic and 
reciprocal. Humans, he suggested, must do more than reap the rewards of undeveloped 
land; we must also be willing to give our bodies over to the land as a form of sustenance. 
Indeed, Campbell suggested that we conceive of our flesh as a gift to the earth, a parting 
present to the world that sustained our bodies in life. This language of the gift resonates 
with Walt Whitman’s (1855, 54) “Song of Myself,” where he wrote, “I bequeath myself 
to the dirt to grow from the grass I love.” In Whitman’s as in Campbell’s words, giving 
one’s body to the earth is positioned as a means of giving back to the land-community a 
portion of what one has received. Within the logic of conservation burial outlined by 
Campbell, the human body becomes a material-symbolic apparatus for securing the land 
ethic, for ensuring that ecosystems will be kept intact. Bequeathed as a gift to the land, 
buried in the earth without the toxic and resource-intensive accouterments of 
conventional burial, the human body disperses throughout the ecosystem, making it 
possible to protect the place from residential, commercial, and industrial encroachment 
into perpetuity. 
Practices of conservation burial, I suggest throughout this chapter, exert force 
through a counter-hegemonic rhetoric of bodily dispersal. Against the backdrop of 
continued industrialization and sprawling development, as well as the historical and 
contemporary practices of the mainstream funeral industry, conservation burial offers a 
significantly alternative means of both interment and land conservation. Moreover, in 
contrast with the “American way of death” lamented by Jessica Mitford (2000), 
conservation burial marshals arguments about the sanctity of the human body not to 
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perpetuate a myth of bodily autonomy and control but to radically decompose the 
prevailing sense of the human subject as a self-contained, coherent, bounded, and 
privileged kind of being. Indeed, the practice of conservation burial subverts the logic of 
anthropocentric interment by refiguring the human body as not itself something to be 
permanently protected but, on the contrary, as a means of securing ecological stability 
over and against any particular human’s desires for bodily preservation. Instead, it is 
precisely a lack of corporeal coherency (via bodily dispersal) upon which conservation 
burial’s force depends. 
As a form of body rhetoric, conservation burial works through dispersal. In 
contrast to the prevailing discourse of “disposal” common among deathcare practitioners 
and scholars, the notion of “dispersal” acknowledges the processual and fragmenting 
force of ecological death practices. Whereas disposal connotes a kind of final disposition, 
dispersal suggests an ongoing activity, something unfolding long after the body is buried. 
Dispersal, as deathcare scholars Hannah Rumble, John Troyer, Tony Walter, and Kate 
Woodthorpe (2014, 253) argue, “celebrates kinship with the natural world” by 
underlining the ways in which human bodies can, under the right circumstances, actually 
provide sustenance for other actors within the ecosystem. When materialized in burial 
practices, dispersal entails the physical decomposition and mobilization of the human 
body. As the body loses its form and becomes otherwise, its fragments are taken up and 
moved throughout the ecosystem by various kinds of actors. In this sense, the human 
body diffuses and infuses the land-community. Over time, the process of dispersal 
becomes so thorough that it no longer makes sense to talk about the human body, but, 
rather, about the biotic assemblages in which it has been variously incorporated. This is, 
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in fact, the function of conservation burial: through dispersal the human body loses its 
seemingly singular form and becomes more fully integrated into the ecosystem where it 
can not only materially nourish other beings but symbolically and legally make a claim 
on the land. 
To put it differently, conservation burial is a certain way of writing on the land, a 
process of disseminating traces that promise but cannot guarantee conservation. In 
Derrida’s (1976, 158) somewhat enigmatic words, “There is nothing outside of the text” 
(emphasis in original). Conservation burial figures the land itself as a textual weave upon 
and through which traces might be added like so many supplemental threads. The porous 
earth waits not only to be read, to be interpreted by wanderers, but to be written upon, to 
be inscribed. Certainly, as Michel Serres (1995; 2011) forcefully argues, many modes of 
marking the land (demarcating lines of property and power) do more damage than good: 
they appropriate in the style of the parasite by taking without reserve (Serres 2007). Yet, 
not all modes of inscription necessarily appropriate via depreciation. Conservation burial 
puts forth another option, a way of writing the land that adds to rather than subtracts from 
ecological stability and biodiversity. The human body, fragmented and decaying, 
becomes a medium of dispersal, furrowing pathways through the ecosystem as bits of 
organic matter pass from decomposing corpses throughout the land-community, 
traversing the boundaries of other kinds of beings. Dispersal, then, is a play of absence 
and presence in which the human body itself decomposes and becomes otherwise. Bodily 
traces disseminate, deteriorate, disperse. 
In the remainder of Chapter Three, I conceptualize a rhetoric of dispersal as one 
in which the dissemination of bodily traces throughout the land-community works to 
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secure the stability and sustainability of the ecosystem. Toward that end, I oscillate 
between acts of textual extrapolation focused on the burial practices at the Preserve and 
conceptual creation surrounding the relationships among human bodies, ecosystems, and 
rhetoric. Next, I begin to trace the ways in which bodily dispersal is articulated on the 
Preserve’s website, paying particular attention to how the relationship among bodies and 
broader ecosystems is conceptualized both verbally and visually. Having sampled the 
practice of bodily dispersal, I then dwell on the performative rhetorical force of the 
human body. From there, I set my sights on A Will for the Woods (Browne et al. 2014), a 
documentary that tracks the death and burial of one Dr. Clark Wang, a terminally ill 
physician who chose conservation burial. Along the way, the film intermittently treks 
through the Preserve and demonstrates the force of bodily dispersal on/in a local 
ecosystem. Then, I meditate again on the rhetorical force of the human body, this time 
arguing that bodily dispersal is a mode of writing upon the land in which the 
disseminating traces of the body disperse through the land-community, suturing the 
sanctity of the (fragmented) human body to the larger biotic community. Here, I think 
with Leopold, Serres, and Derrida to suggest that writing the land is a means of 
transforming the way that humans engage in practices of coexistence (Morton 2010). 
These practices of writing the land might move us, as Val Plumwood (2008, 75) argues, 
to “revere the burial place as a site of union with the prior sacred presences of earth rather 
than as set apart from it [and] honour the dissolution of the human into the more-than-
human flux.” I close this chapter with a meditation on the “gift.” Weaving together 
Derrida’s concept of the gift with representations of conservation burial as a means of 
bequeathing bodies to the earth, I suggest that the human body’s carnal claim to the land 
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disrupts deep-seated forms of humanism and anthropocentrism by figuring the body itself 
as radically incoherent, fragmented, and dispersible. 
  
Initial Encounters with Dispersal 
Opening Ramsey Creek Preserve’s website, one is met with a mélange of white, 
green, and brown hues, visual resonances of its rural, woodland setting and the burial 
practices that take place in those South Carolina woods (“Welcome” n.d.). Photographs 
of the shoals at Ramsey Creek, an unfolding burial service, kids playing in the stream, 
and a moth flank the site’s left and right sides, while a few paragraphs of text inhabit the 
center of the screen. Rather basic in its layout and simple in its functionality, the site 
features the usual array of navigation tools, which point the visitor to other pages with 
titles like “About Us,” “Conservation Burial,” “F.A.Q.s,” “Visit our Photo Gallery,” and 
“Review our Current Price List.” Just as Harris (2007) notes that it is difficult on first 
glance to realize one has entered a graveyard when crossing into Ramsey Creek Preserve, 
so too with their website. The visitor must read the site, enter into its weave, to get a 
sense of what takes place on the banks of the mountain stream pictured at the top of this 
homepage. 
The Preserve’s homepage begins to articulate the concept of conservation burial 
to bodily dispersal by referencing the Christian eschatological vision of the body’s return 
to the earth. In the center of the homepage, in a prominent sage green color block, one 
encounters these perhaps familiar words: “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till 
thou return to the earth out of which thou wast taken: for dust thou art, and into dust thou 
shalt return. – Genesis 3:19.” Often shortened to “from dust to dust” or “from ashes to 
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ashes,” this familiar adage conjures a vision of the human body as a temporarily stable 
entity, one which emerges from and returns to an earthen community. In the sense of 
embodiment captured by this Biblical passage, dispersal is not optional. It is an 
eventuality, one that can be neither avoided nor abandoned. Within the context of modern 
burial practices, which delay decay and forestall a return to the earth, this invocation of 
the cycles of birth and death, of reincorporation into the earth, forcefully reminds the 
visitor of their corporeality. Indeed, the image of becoming-dust conjured by this Biblical 
decree underlines the extent to which the human and the more-than-human are 
fundamentally and inextricably intertwined: the human makes sense, as David Abram 
(1996) notes, only in relation to the more-than-human. Dust—that all too malleable and 
mobile category of particulates—becomes in Genesis and, by extension, on the 
Preserve’s homepage not simply a metaphor but a metonymy for the human body’s 
contingency, precariousness, and dispersibility. 
The link between bodily dispersal and conservation is made clearer still as one 
reads down the website. In the “Welcome” text on the homepage, the Preserve lays out its 
understanding of what happens at and because of a conservation burial ground. What 
takes place, the Preserve contends, is first of all a reciprocal exchange between ecological 
and economic forces. By “harness[ing] the funeral industry,” which is to say, by engaging 
in established market practices through offering products and services to bereaved 
families, the Preserve is able to protect and restore parcels of land. Challenging the too 
easy elision of the economic as a means of changing ecological relations for the better, 
Ramsey Creek articulates a symbiotic relationship between capitalism and conservation. 
Offering burials enables the land conservation practices because it generates income, 
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which in turn enables the Preserve to purchase and preserve land. Moreover, this 
ecological work enables Ramsey Creek to “fund non-profits, education, the arts [sic] and 
scientific research.” The flow of income provided by ecological practices furnishes 
resources not only for conservation, then, but also for the auxiliary programs that make 
conservation (burial) both thinkable and doable. 
Building on the play of economic and ecological forces central to the Preserve’s 
practice, its website also links conservation burial to ritual and to heritage. The Preserve 
argues that it is able to “provide a less expensive and more meaningful burial option.” 
While they do not—indeed, cannot—extract themselves from the market, they 
nonetheless propose another alternative. Integrating ecological work into deathcare 
practices not only renders burial “less expensive,” thus trimming the income stream 
lining the pockets of funeral industry tycoons, but conservation burial also offers 
consumers a form of ecological purchasing power, a means of spending their money on 
something “more meaningful” than heavy coffins and concrete vaults, both of which 
stave off the inevitable—bodily decay and dispersal within an ecosystem. Hence, the 
Preserve enthymematically frames itself as “less” economically driven and as “more” 
ecologically attuned than other kinds of burial operations, a way of tapping into and 
exploiting an environmental discourse that is largely built upon an oppositional stance 
vis-à-vis economic calculation. 
This link between environmentalism and capitalism is not new (e.g., DeLuca 
2001). With conservation burial, however, consumers’ money is ostensibly used to secure 
ecological stability and sustainability. The Preserve frames conservation burial as a form 
of consumer activism, a means of putting one’s money where one’s mouth is. As Phaedra 
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Pezzullo (2011) argues, while consumer activism is not ideal (and it is definitely not 
“pure”), it is better than nothing and can, in fact, serve as a material force that, over time, 
shifts the status quo. At Ramsey Creek, a financial investment in conservation burial is 
positioned against more damaging economic and industrial practices. Within the context 
of the funeral industry, which is led largely by a few key companies like Service 
Corporation International (SCI),1 trading with a small, grassroots outfit functions 
implicitly as a means of critique. “More than impacting merely the bottom line of 
corporations through free market capitalism,” Pezzullo contends,  
these [consumer-advocacy] campaigns aim to challenge our alienation 
from material ecological conditions, as well as transform cultural and 
economic relations between consumers, distributors, producers, and 
laborers. Although they do not overthrow the logic of free market 
capitalism, they do have significant impacts. (138) 
 
While we can and should debate what constitutes “significant impacts” when it comes to 
consumer activism, it is fair to say that consumer choices can effect changes at least on 
the small scale. Rhetorically, Ramsey Creek locates in conservation burial a means of 
undermining the hegemony of major funeral corporations by reinstating a hyperlocal, 
grounded, ecological practice of human interment that attempts to extricate itself from the 
rapidly expanding international funeral conglomerates such as SCI. It would be easy to 
charge that the Preserve is only different from the funeral industry by degree, yet this 
would ignore the material differences produced by different kinds of human interment 
(Olson 2014). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In its 2015 annual report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Committee, 
Service Corporation International touted itself as “North America’s largest provider of 
deathcare products and services, with a network of funeral service locations and 
cemeteries unequaled in geographic scale and reach.” Service Corporation International 
reported revenues of more than $2.9 billion in 2015. It is but one of several companies 
that dominate the funeral industry in the United States. 
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Thus, the Preserve renders conservation burial appealing to certain audiences on 
the grounds that this kind of consumption is actually a means of contributing to practices 
that might subvert the wheels of progress powered by capitalism. With this in mind, the 
upshot of conservation burial is rhetorically situated as one of bolstering relationships 
among humans and the more-than-human world. Rather than distancing humans from 
ecosystems and from the inevitability of their own decomposition (both things that, 
arguably, conventional burial accomplishes), Ramsey Creek promises to bridge the divide 
between humans and the more-than-human world. Indeed, on its homepage the Preserve 
promises to “foster closer ties between human communities and the natural communities 
that they depend on.” Not only, then, does conservation burial offer an alternative to 
conventional, resource-intensive and potentially toxic forms of human interment, but it is 
positioned as a means of coming closer to the “natural” world. Notably, the Preserve does 
not question the concept of “nature” but relies on its enthymematic plenitude as a means 
of attracting potential customers with the allure of a deeper connection with the land-
community. This connection can be established, of course, by simply visiting the 
Preserve, walking along its trails, sitting by its stream, taking stock of the native flora and 
fauna, and by burying one’s loved one in the soil on which it sits. These activities offer 
visitors an opportunity to synesthetically encounter the more-than-human world and, 
perhaps, to establish a stronger connection with the South Carolina ecosystem. 
Though it relies on and reifies a much problematized sense of Nature (e.g., 
Morton 2007; 2010), the Preserve’s website also makes clear that the human and the 
more-than-human are inextricably intertwined in webs of interconnection and 
interdependency. Indeed, what it promises clients is the opportunity to establish “closer 
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ties” (that is, to strengthen existing connections rather than to create new ones) with “the 
natural communities that they depend on” (which is to say, biotic communities they are 
already enmeshed in). This notion of dependence is decisive since it recognizes the 
extent to which humans rely on what is not human for their very existence. Humans 
depend upon a livable world, that is, a world capable of sustaining them (Butler 2004). 
This entails, over and against the anthropocentric wish for an autonomous and extra-
dependent human, an ecologically stable and sustainable world. It is a recognition of the 
deep entanglement of the human and the more-than-human, an affirmation of the 
undeniable (yet uncomfortable) fact that ecology is an ontological issue to which we must 
attend. Thus, beyond facile forms of “green washing” that predominate in rhetorics of 
consumer activism (Corbett 2006), the Preserve does in fact make possible alternative, 
ecological forms of connection with the more-than-human world. 
This deeper connection is attained most forcefully through bodily dispersal in the 
form of burial. While the Preserve neither uses the language of dispersal nor outwardly 
discusses the decomposition of human bodies on its homepage, the concept and process 
of dispersal are embedded within Ramsey Creek’s understanding of burial’s relation to 
conservation. As the Preserve’s homepage puts it, “Through becoming members of the 
preserve during life, and choosing burial in the preserve after, our clients leave a 
permanent legacy for their families, their communities and the natural world” (emphasis 
mine). On its face, this statement seems paradoxical since natural burial moves away 
from a focus on permanent bodily integrity promised by the funeral industry. Indeed, 
natural burial obfuscates the various products and practices designed precisely to shore 
up the dead human body, what deathcare scholar John Troyer (2007) has called the 
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“postmortem subject.” A counter-hegemonic rhetoric is at work here. By avoiding toxic 
embalming fluids and funereal mediation, the Preserve’s story goes, natural burial 
secures a “permanent legacy” by suturing the body itself to the “natural world.” Natural 
burial’s seeming immediacy makes possible a lasting legacy that stands to impact future 
generations and the land-community itself. This corporeal connection with the earth 
secures permanence through dispersal: integrated into the land-community, the body 
becomes part of and inseparable from the ecosystem. Thus incorporated, the body need 
not remain stable or coherent in order to continue exerting force. Rather, the trans-
corporeal body becomes consubstantial with the land and so indistinguishable from it 
(Alaimo 2010). Thus, the “permanent legacy” promised by the Preserve and by 
conservation burial more generally depends upon a recognition that bodies are re-
assembled rather than annihilated when they enter into the “more-than-human flux” 
(Plumwood 2008, 75). 
Dispersed throughout the ecosystem, the human body transforms the land-
community. To capture this transformation, in A Brief History of Death, Douglas Davies 
(2005) coined the term “ecological immortality.” Against the backdrop of bodily integrity 
promoted by conventional funeral and burial practices, the notion of ecological 
immortality recognizes “the intrinsic relationship between the human body and the world 
as a natural system within which the ongoingness of life is grounded in the successive life 
and death of individual animals and plants, indeed, of all things” (Davies 2005, 86-87). 
Put otherwise, the idea of ecological immortality takes seriously the fact that human 
bodies will eventually decompose, thus losing their form and even their recognizability as 
bodies as such. Our conventional sense of, and even desire for, immortality would imply 
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that the body or soul itself possessed some permanence. Yet, appending the word 
“ecological” to our concept of immortality shifts this dimension considerably: it is not the 
body itself, as a temporarily bounded being, that exerts force perpetually but the mortal 
materiality of the body, fragmented and dispersed, that endlessly moves through time and 
space even as it transforms. Form changes: the body decomposes, is consumed, and 
transmogrifies. It becomes otherwise and, in doing so, ensures a “permanent legacy” 
through the incessant modification of form. 
On its website, Ramsey Creek Preserve also includes an extensive photo gallery, 
which comprises images of the grounds, the stream, and burial services, as well as visual 
catalogues of the many species of flora and fauna that inhabit the land-community. I read 
the hundreds of photographs of plants, flowers, mushrooms, fungi, and insects included 
on the Preserve’s website as an illustration of the multiple becomings made possible 
through bodily dispersal. For instance, in the album named “Flowers and Other Plants of 
Ramsey Creek,” one visually encounters full-color, close-up photographs of Black-Eyed 
Susan, Carolina Elephant’s Foot, Dwarf Buckeye, Lyre-Leaf Sage, Paw Paw, Trout Lily, 
and Wild Quinine, to name just a few (“Ramsey Creek Gallery” n.d.). Although these 
images certainly demonstrate the plethora of plants on the grounds of Ramsey Creek 
Preserve, they also do more than this. These photographs also visualize the products of 
dispersal, that is, the outcomes of decay and decomposition. Flowers and plants depend 
on rich soil, which is itself the product of multiple kinds of organisms decaying and 
comingling with other organic and inorganic materials. Dirt blurs the boundaries between 
entities, often to the point of illegibility. At the Preserve, human bodies intimately 
intertwine with the soil and, by extension, become (one with) the dirt into which they are 
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laid. Over time, the human body becomes less and less distinct from the land-community. 
And, eventually, it becomes impossible to recognize the body as such. What is left are 
traces of the body (and others) in the form of new life. 
Without recourse to the body as such, the “permanent legacy” promised by the 
Preserve or the sense of “ecological immortality” described by Davies might be visually 
apprehended in the whole of the biotic community. Flora and fauna that inhabit the land 
function not as direct re-presentations of any individual’s heritage, but, rather, as 
potential traces of the dispersed body. Every flower, shrub, tree, insect, or animal that 
makes a home in and around the Preserve might be a visual-material trace of a body 
buried in the earth. The Preserve becomes an exemplar of Heraclitus’ insight that things 
are always changing and becoming otherwise. Just as a river is always in flux, so too is 
the human body always transforming in its composition in other assemblages, including 
postmortem gatherings of human and more-than-human materialities. 
From death, fertility. From decay, fecundity. Out of sight but not out of mind, the 
buried bodies at Ramsey Creek Preserve articulate a carnal claim to the land. Drawing 
nutrients from the soil, which is itself enriched by buried human remains, the entire biotic 
community—from the soil’s smallest microorganisms to the area’s charismatic 
megafauna (in the body of the routine deer and occasional black bear)—inherits the 
dispersed bodies of the dead, fragment by fragment, bit by bit, cell by cell. Withering 
away underfoot, this flesh fortifies rhetorical demands to delay development, to halt the 
wheels of progress, to conserve the land. 
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Carnal Claims, Part One: Performative Body Rhetorics 
What I am suggesting is that the human bodies buried and decomposing in the 
damp earth at Ramsey Creek Preserve do rhetorical work. These bodies, exposed as they 
are to the deteriorating force of the land-community, articulate a claim even as they lie 
silently in the earth beneath several feet of soil. Seemingly voiceless, apparently 
motionless, these decaying corpses in fact lay claim to the biotic community. To grasp 
the rhetorical force of the decomposing human body, it is necessary to put aside theories 
of rhetoric that depend upon a living, breathing, speaking subject (e.g., R. E. McKerrow 
1993). In its place, we must install a theory of rhetoric that is attuned to the carnal claims 
put forth by all bodies, one that acknowledges and can account for the effectivity of 
fleshly assemblages that exert force not by articulating claims in a legible language but, 
on the contrary, by formulating demands through performative practices. 
The idea of performativity deployed here stems from J. L. Austin’s (1962) How 
To Do Things With Words, a series of lectures delivered at various universities from 1951 
to 1955, in which he described a form of communication that functions not by describing 
or representing a particular relationship but by constituting, through the enactment of an 
utterance within a certain context, the relationship itself. In contrast with a descriptive 
utterance, which can in some sense be evaluated regarding its veracity, a performative 
utterance has no content that could be judged on these grounds. Performative utterances, 
Austin wrote, “do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or 
false.’” In contrast with a descriptive statement—It is currently raining outside, for 
instance, which at this moment of writing is not quite a true statement—performative 
utterances do not convey anything about the world as it is. Rather, as Austin argued, “the 
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uttering of the [performative] sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action” (5). 
Thus, performative utterances do things—they make things happen, set relationships into 
motion, carry out some function. They are effective in the sense that they induce rather 
than describe a state of affairs.  
To illustrate the ubiquity and force of performative utterances, Austin offered 
several examples. In a wedding ceremony, for instance, when the two people getting 
hitched say “I do” they are not so much describing their willingness and intention to get 
married as they are, in that particular moment and context, suturing themselves one to the 
other in a legal contract. Or, for example, when two friends say to one another “I bet you 
twenty dollars that the Georgia Bulldogs will win tomorrow’s football game,” and do so 
in good faith and with the capacity to make good on that bet should they lose, they do not 
so much describe a fiduciary responsibility as they bring one into existence. Nominalism 
is also often performative. Whether naming a ship or a child or a species of rodent, the 
act of naming depends upon a performative utterance: “I name this child, my child, 
Judith.” Under the appropriate conditions, this act of naming makes it so. 
As each of these examples drawn from Austin’s initial formulation make clear, 
performative utterances seem to be limited and conditioned by context. A friend and I 
cannot legally marry just by saying “I do” in the company of one another. Nor can I name 
something that does not in some sense belong to me or over which I do not have a certain 
kind of legal power. Rather, it would seem, performative utterances exert force only in 
combination with a number of other necessary contextual elements, discursive and 
otherwise. As Austin (1962, 8) argued,  
it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are 
uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very 
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commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons 
should also perform certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ 
actions or even acts of uttering further words. 
 
Thus, for a performative utterance to be effective, an entire assemblage of elements must 
be properly in order. To this end, Austin distinguished between felicitous and infelicitous 
contexts. Performatives only “work” to the extent that they are uttered in felicitous, or 
“happy,” situations. Hence, Austin noted, there must be an established convention carried 
out by actors who are in the right mental state of mind and who intend to carry out the 
effect of the performative. Moreover, these actors must comply correctly and completely 
with the convention. All of this must take place as well in the appropriate circumstances. 
If all of these conditions are met, then and only then do performative utterances have a 
chance of exerting force. 
To get a sense of how decomposing bodies are performative, it is useful to get 
beyond Austin’s (1962) initial formulation since it retains and even requires the presence 
of a living, breathing, speaking subject who is motivated, intentional, and mentally 
capable of making decisions about its future actions. In critiques of Austin, Derrida 
(1982; 1988) pushed the concept of performativity in several productive directions. 
Especially in “Signature Event Context,” Derrida applauds Austin’s efforts to detach 
communication from the transmission of a stabilized meaning but also questions whether 
the formulation of performativity in How To Do Things With Words goes far enough in 
theorizing how communication functions more generally. Whereas Austin limited 
performative utterances to determinable contexts, Derrida suggested that all 
communication might operate less as the transmission of meaning and more as the 
movement of force. From this perspective, communication in general can be seen as a 
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kind of performativity to the extent that all communicative acts risk doing things in the 
world. 
Derrida’s criticism of Austin hinges on three related problems. First, Derrida puts 
under pressure the limitations that Austin initially imposed on performativity. In 
particular, he argued, the issue of context is more complex and indeterminate than Austin 
suggested. For Derrida (1982, 310), “a context is never absolutely determinable,” which 
implies that one cannot know for sure whether one is acting within a felicitous or 
infelicitous context, nor can one be sure at the moment of uttering what will happen. We 
can never exhaust the elements of a context since there is always the possibility that some 
new, unexpected element might emerge to disrupt or destabilize the circumstances within 
which we find ourselves.  
Second, if context cannot be determined in the way that Austin suggested (i.e., by 
checking to see if a certain number of requirements have been met), it is possible that all 
performative utterances might break with their designated contexts. Austin admits as 
much when he writes that apparently performative language may appear outside 
felicitous contexts (as in the case of actors who “play” on stage). Derrida stressed this 
point by claiming that in order to operate at all a performative utterance must cite other 
communicative acts that took place in other contexts, which means that every 
performative utterance is by definition capable of exceeding what for Austin (1962, 22) 
were “ordinary circumstances.” In other words, in order for a performative utterance to 
be intelligible at all it must form part of an iterative structure; “I do” only makes sense if 
it repeats (and in this sense it is not all that different from acting) other “I dos” that were 
said in other contexts and by other actors. 
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Third, and most important for the work of this chapter, Derrida pushed 
performativity outside the domain of spoken language and plunged it into the deeper well 
of embodied communication. In doing so, he further detached communication from the 
transmission of meaning and related it to the production and dissemination of forces. “To 
the semantic field of the word communication,” he argued, “belongs the fact that it also 
designates nonsemantic movements” (Derrida 1982, 309). The body itself, even before or 
without speaking, communicates. One may, Derrida argued, “communicate a movement” 
(309), which is to say that the body exerts forces that exceed linguistic and semiotic 
meaning. A gesture, a look, or even an odor is enough to signal something to audiences 
(e.g., Seegert 2014). A rolling eye, an upturned nose, a cold shoulder, an intense stare: 
these embodied forms of communication make a difference. “What happens in this case, 
what is transmitted or communicated, are not phenomena of meaning or signification,” 
Derrida writes (309). Rather, these are material forces which are communicated by and 
through the body. 
Since performativity is less hemmed in than Austin (1962) might originally have 
surmised, Derrida’s deconstruction makes it possible to consider a wider range of 
practices than those few spoken utterances that seem to do more than they describe. Since 
Austin put forth his theory of performativity, the concept itself has taken on a life of its 
own as scholars across the disciplines have sought out ways to render its explanatory 
power simultaneously more legible and more expansive. Perhaps more than anyone else, 
Judith Butler popularized the notion of performativity through her philosophical 
consideration of the social construction of gender. In Gender Trouble, Butler (1990) 
argued that over and against a biological conception of gender, we need to account for the 
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performative practices that produce gender as such. Regardless of one’s genitals, she 
contended, gender is made in the ritualized daily practices of dress, speech, and gesture 
that one enacts wittingly or unwittingly, more or less in accordance with culturally 
established norms. The sureness of one’s gender, Butler contended, is relative only to the 
consistency with which one performs according to one or another style—masculinity or 
femininity. There is, then, no essential or originary gender but, rather, only repetitions or 
iterations—we might say citations—of other performances of gender. Little “girls” 
become “women” by reproducing on and through their bodies a set of stylistic acts we 
conventionally call “feminine.” The accumulated effects of these movements are what we 
call genders. What Butler’s work demonstrates is the extent to which the body itself, far 
from being a transparent and essential material object, is enrolled in the rhetorical 
constitution of gender: through the embodied repetition of certain norms, gender is 
stabilized and comes to seem essential. Yet, because there is no originary gender to which 
all of these stylistic efforts ultimately refer, the norms can be ruptured through alternative 
performative repertoires that challenge and even parody the norm (drag, for example). 
There are, of course, significant social and political ramifications that might emerge once 
gender is understood not as a biological given but as a social production, not least of 
which is a renewed sense of what the human body can do. 
Importantly, the human body is neither only nor simply an effect of 
performativity. The body is always excessive. Following up on complaints that her work 
about the performativity of gender ignored the materiality of the body, in a book called 
Bodies That Matter Butler (1993, xi) argues that,  
surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain, pleasure; endure illness 
and violence; and these ‘facts’ one might skeptically proclaim, cannot be 
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dismissed as mere construction. Surely there must be some necessity that 
accompanies these primary and irrefutable experiences. And surely there 
is. (emphasis mine) 
 
Death, as Butler suggests here, recalls the body’s extra-discursive dimension since death 
happens to the body both within and without discourses on death, dying, and deathcare. 
Death happens, to be sure, within discourses: we understand and respond to death 
differentially, as Derrida (1993) demonstrates, depending on the “cultures of death” that 
we variously inhabit and animate. Rituals and traditions are discursively produced and 
sustained ways of relating to death. Telling certain kinds of stories about the dead and 
enacting particular rites on and around dead bodies are discursively sedimented acts, 
which provide grieving survivors with a language and a grammar for responding to death. 
Yet, death also exceeds discourse: it is the material effect of material processes that 
cannot, in any sure sense, be hastened or delayed by the intervention of discursive 
mediation. The experience of death, an experience limited by its force of 
individualization, defies the power of language to encapsulate or to represent precisely 
what it is (e.g., Scarry 1985). It is irreducible to discourse, or even to an effect of 
discourse. Rather, when death happens it exceeds the meaningful and forceful dimensions 
of language and of discourse more generally. It is the violent surging forth of a 
materiality that cannot be subsumed. 
The notion of bodily performativity found in Butler’s work on gender strongly 
resonates with the concept of “body rhetoric” that has proliferated within rhetorical 
studies in recent decades. Though, as Debra Hawhee (2006, 155) argues, “rhetoric, from 
its inception, was and is a bodily art,” the field of rhetorical studies is still grappling with 
how to bring the body more fully into its purview. Recent scholars have nevertheless 
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pursued the rhetorical dimensions of embodiment from a number of different vantage 
points.2 Kevin DeLuca’s (1999) concept of body rhetoric in particular goes a long way 
toward comprehending the rhetorical force of the human body in contexts of social 
movement. Against the dominant focus in rhetoric on speech and language, DeLuca 
(1999, 10) argued that in some instances “bodies […] become […] the site and substance 
of the argument itself.” For example, activists marching through streets and blocking 
traffic can temporarily rupture the taken-for-granted flow of people, machines, goods, 
and services in a given area. Environmental activists who bury themselves, all but their 
heads, in logging roads or who live in trees slated to be cut down can similarly delay 
damaging deforestation from taking place. While these activists and the organizations 
they work with almost always also speak or write, it is their bodies that exert material 
force and that contingently shape social relations. 
Body rhetorics work in large part because they expose the vulnerability and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A brief survey of recent work demonstrates the extent to which human bodies 
are central to contemporary theoretical and methodological approaches in the study of 
rhetoric. The arguments are expansive. There are those who contend that the critic’s body 
is central to the act of criticism and, therefore, that we need to consider our embodiment 
as we work with artifacts (Condit 2013; McHendry et al. 2014; R. McKerrow 1989; M. 
K. Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres 2011; M. Middleton et al. 2015; Pezzullo 2007). 
There are also those who focus on the ways in which bodily relations are represented and 
recomposed in and by rhetorical texts (Barnett 2015a; Barnett 2015b; Barnett 2016; 
Barnett 2017; C. L. Harold 1999; C. Harold 2000; C. Harold and DeLuca 2005; Landau 
2012; Morris and Sloop 2006; Rogers 1998; Schutten 2008). And then there are those 
who study how audiences’ bodies are impinged upon by different kinds of rhetorics 
(Barnett 2017; Carbaugh 1999; Cram 2012; Pezzullo 2003; Pezzullo 2007). Others deal 
more rigorously with the affective and emotional dimensions of discourse (DeLuca 2006; 
Edbauer Rice 2008; Gregg and Seigworth 2010; Gruber 2014; Gunn 2012; Gunn and 
Rice 2009; Landau 2016; Ott 2010; Ott and Keeling 2011). What these and other scholars 
recognize is the extent to which the human body is bound up with and inextricable from 
rhetorical practice and reception. For these scholars, the human body is endlessly 
entangled in rhetorical encounters: as rhetor, as medium, as content, and as audience, the 
human body pervades rhetoric. 	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precarity of the human body. When environmental activists bury themselves in logging 
roads or live in trees, they put themselves in harm’s way. It is always possible, after all, 
that the logging trucks will continue down the road and nothing necessarily prevents men 
armed with chainsaws from cutting down trees, even those with human bodies suspended 
amongst their branches. Thus, DeLuca (1999, 11) contends that these forms of embodied 
activism “have challenged and changed the meanings of the world not through good 
reasons but through vulnerable bodies, not through rational arguments but through bodies 
at risk” (emphasis mine). The vulnerable and at-risk bodies of activists demand attention 
precisely because they highlight the interdependency of the human and, in some cases, 
the more-than-human world. Exposed to the elements, incapable of performing certain 
tasks for themselves, these bodies compel audiences to respond in ways that are 
sustaining rather than destructive. In her work on environmental justice activism, 
Pezzullo (2007) comes to a similar conclusion when she suggests that toxic tours work in 
part because they render the bodies of tourists vulnerable to debilitating forms of toxic 
pollution. Both rhetors and audiences are potentially moved by the vulnerability of their 
own bodies and others’ bodies. 
The notion of body rhetoric deployed by DeLuca does not assume an originary 
body that is in and of itself—that is, by itself—capable of making an argument. Rather, 
for DeLuca (1999, 12), “There are no a priori bodies. Bodies are enmeshed in a turbulent 
stream of multiple and conflictual discourses that shape what they mean in particular 
contexts.” Within a particular discursive matrix, one in which the human body is valued 
and in which life is privileged over death, the vulnerable human body not only draws 
attention to itself but also powerfully demands care and support. This is a familiar 
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discourse in the United States where a form of anthropocentrism privileges the human 
above all else. Yet, as DeLuca (1999, 13) argues, embodied environmental activism often 
exploits this point in order to articulate an ecological ethic:  
In refuting human-centered worldviews, the protestors’ bodies give 
presence to the proposition that humans are not apart from the natural 
world but a part of it. They disclose the possibility of an ecocentric world.  
 
In other words, by physically entangling themselves in broader ecosystems, the at-risk 
bodies of environmental activists also might create a space for thinking about the forms 
of care and support demanded by the land-community itself. As Mark Smith (1998, 5) 
defines it, “Ecocentrism places human beings in a different relationship to the natural 
environment,” which “means that human beings are part of a more complex system and 
no longer sit at the top of the ethical hierarchy.” Thus, part of the performative force of 
embodied environmental activism—of what DeLuca calls body rhetoric—is the creation 
of an ecocentric discourse in which the entire ecosystem comes to be seen as in need of 
the same attention and care that individual human beings warrant. Indistinguishable one 
from the other, both the human body and the body of the land demand support. 
  
Oscillation: Bodily Dispersal in A Will for the Woods 
In 2014, directors Amy Browne, Tony Hale, Jeremy Kaplan, and Brian Wilson 
(2014) released A Will for the Woods, a documentary which traces the emergence of the 
idea and practice of conservation burial in the United States and the struggles that make 
alternative burial options possible. The film’s website asks, “What if our last act could be 
a gift to the planet?” This sense that burial offers an opportunity to transform “our last 
act” into “a gift” becomes more salient as the film unfolds and viewers are brought into 
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intimate contact with one family’s efforts to transform burial practices in their 
community. According to one New York Times critic, “The film shows how funeral 
planning can be a palliative [...] and an opportunity to shape a legacy” (Kenigsberg 
2014). Some critics worry that the film missed out on a chance to take the modern funeral 
industry to task for its ecologically unsustainable ways: “A Will for the Woods is more 
contemplative than preachy. This spirit might, ironically, limit its audience more than if it 
had drawn a harder and angrier line” (“Film Review: A Will for the Woods” 2014). 
Despite receiving somewhat mixed reviews, A Will for the Woods was recognized with 
nine awards from various film festivals, including four audience awards (“About the 
Film” 2016), has been purchased on the streaming website Vimeo more than 16,000 
times, and has aired several times on the American Public Broadcasting Corporation 
channel and the World channel. 
At an hour-and-a-half long, A Will for the Woods tracks three unfolding stories: 
the life and death of the terminally ill Dr. Clark Wang, whose struggle with cancer leads 
him to seek out a more meaningful death; the establishment of a green burial cemetery at 
Pine Forest Memorial Gardens in Wake Forest, North Carolina, where Clark’s body is 
buried; and the development of the Green Burial Council, the nongovernmental 
organization that both sets the standards for and certifies green burial operations in the 
United States. Interweaving these three interrelated stories, the film draws on a number of 
conventional documentary techniques, such as personal interviews, in situ shots of 
relevant places and processes, and the inclusion of found footage and audio. A Will for 
the Woods not only features people who verbally articulate the potential force of bodily 
dispersal at work in conservation burial but also, through its oscillatory form, invites 
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audiences to consider the ways in which the human body is always already entangled in 
ecosystems and how it can be enrolled to secure ecological stability. 
In this section, I show how the film articulates connections between the human 
body and the more-than-human world on three scales, beginning with the micro-level of a 
single life. A Will for the Woods introduces audiences to Clark by way of an oscillatory 
aesthetic that moves back and forth between images of his animate body and images of 
the animate earth. At the beginning of the film, after an introductory segment that shows 
an unknown person’s natural burial unfolding in a snow-covered field, the documentary 
presents Clark’s story to audiences through archival footage. The grainy, saturated film 
fills the entirety of the screen, surrounded by a dark black border characteristic of older 
forms of film technology. In the found recordings, Clark is shown taking part in a number 
of activities, mostly musical performances and dances, activities that, as the film 
proceeds, we learn are integral to his sense of identity. We watch as he plays the cello 
(Figure 1) and the bagpipe, and as he dances excitedly with others to the sounds of 
traditional music. This found footage is intercut with close-up, macro shots of plants, 
flowers, and soil. Blades of grass (Figure 2) and sprouting flowers punctuate the moving 
images of Clark’s vibrant life. Two forms of vitality are depicted in these images: a 
human life shown in retrospect and plant life budding on the forest floor.  
The documentary’s oscillatory aesthetic begins to articulate a sense of bodily 
dispersal by optically intermingling the human and the more-than-human. By intercutting 
the footage of Clark’s life with macro shots of flora, these multiple kinds of vitality (and 
thus mortality) are articulated to one another, depicted as interconnected in some way. 
The effervescence of Clark’s life is akin to the vibrancy of life on the forest floor. As he 
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Figure 2 A blade of grass. Screenshot from A Will for the Woods. 
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moves, so too do the plants. As he grows and changes in the found footage, so too do the 
flora transform. Fragmentary, both the found footage and the images of plant life suggest 
an incoherent yet inescapable form of relationality. The intercutting is offered without 
verbal explanation; thus, it is up to audiences to make sense of the movement back and 
forth between human and more-than-human life.  
As noted above, body rhetorics often rely on the force of the vulnerable body to 
not only draw attention to arguments but to also make demands of their own for certain 
kinds of care and support, for infrastructures that muffle rather than amplify precarity. 
Visually, vulnerable bodies can be a compelling form of rhetorical activity—on display, 
such bodies invite audiences to respond to their precarity (e.g., see Barnett 2015b; C. 
Harold and DeLuca 2005; Murray Yang 2011; Zelizer 2010). In the film’s beginning 
sequences vulnerability is imaged as entanglement, as a kind of inextricable connection. 
Indeed, the movement between images of Clark’s body and the body of land sutures the 
one to the other in a collective, cross-species claim: perhaps we are not that different, 
perhaps there is continuity in life. Both similarity and difference come out in these 
oscillating images. Like a connective tissue, the images bind human and more-than-
human not as identical but as interrelated, interdependent, and differential kinds of beings 
caught up in ways that cannot be easily separated. 
By establishing a tie among the human and the more-than-human, the 
documentary produces at least two kinds of demands: on the one hand, if Clark’s life is 
similar to plant life, it must be seen as precarious and as exposed to harm. Plants are not 
without defenses of their own, yet by and large plants are easily destroyed by human and 
nonhuman animals. They can be cut down, harvested, trampled, eaten, or poisoned. And, 
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on the other hand, if plant life is similar to Clark’s life, it must be seen as valuable and as 
worthy of protection. While not all human lives are equally valued (Butler 2009), 
generally speaking human life is seen as something to be cared for, something to be 
supported. By intercutting images of Clark with those of flora, the documentary 
demonstrates the extent to which both humans and more-than-human beings share (or 
could share) these qualities of vulnerability induced by mortality. 
The interconnection of human and more-than-human forms of life is further 
articulated by an aural consistency in these opening, oscillatory scenes. As the film cuts 
between images of Clark and images of plants, the background music remains the same. 
Sampled from the video recordings of Clark playing various instruments, both solo and in 
concert with others, the music for this oscillatory scene establishes a sense of continuity. 
As the images shift between Clark and the plants, the music ties the images together, 
sonically expressing a sense that the forms of life shown in these images are not alien to 
one another but rather alike in important ways. Since music is often used in films to 
demarcate scenes or to differentiate among actors, it is important that in A Will for the 
Woods the same music serves as background for depictions of multiple species. Even as 
the images oscillate, the aural connects. Without flattening the human into the vegetal, or 
the vegetal to the human, the soundtrack suggests a sense of solidarity.  
The visual movement betwixt and between images of human and more-than-
human life continues in A Will for the Woods, scaling up from the micro-level of Clark’s 
singular life to a more general form of interconnection among human and more-than-
human beings. At various points in the documentary, scenes are intercut with a recurring 
image of an opening in a forest (Figure 3), presumably at Ramsey Creek Preserve or 
   104 
 
Figure 3 Recurring scene of an opening in the forest. Screenshot from A Will for the 
Woods. 
 
Pine Forest Memorial Gardens, though the locale is never specified. The image shows a 
lush, verdant woodland forest, with tall, leafy trees stretching upward toward the sky. In 
the center of the image there appears to be a clearing in the trees, perhaps a road or path 
down which bodies are driven or carried to their graves. Dirt and decaying leaves give the 
opening a dark brown hue, contrasting with the greenness of the leafy foliage on either 
side. 
Repeated throughout the film, this recurring image of the forest serves a similar 
function as those close-up shots of plant life that are interspersed with images of Clark at 
the beginning of the film. The repetition of this image importantly reminds viewers that 
what is at stake in discussions of natural burial are precisely ecosystems, not just 
individual people. While the humans who are depicted in the film—Clark and his partner 
Jane Ezzard; the director of Pine Forest Memorial Gardens, the founders of Ramsey 
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Creek Preserve, and the director of the Green Burial Council, among others—take part in 
cultural transformations, this image draws viewers’ attention back to the larger land-
community toward which these efforts are directed and upon which they will impact. 
Indeed, this image of a verdant forest, while perhaps drawing on a pastoral repertoire, 
functions in the documentary as a way of linking the cultural practices of deathcare to the 
broader question of ecosystem sustainability. Whereas conventional burial often does 
harm to the land-community by denuding it and then filling it with toxins, conservation 
burial is linked here with a world less spoiled by human hubris and intervention. In its 
repetitious invocation of what appear to be natural settings, A Will for the Woods asserts 
that bodily dispersal (in the form of conservation burial) is good for ecological relations, 
that it is a means of securing stability and sustainability. 
The last third of the film sutures the practice of bodily dispersal to land 
conservation by focusing on Clark’s death and interment at the newly established 
conservation burial area at Pine Forest Memorial Gardens. Clark’s body, delivered to 
North Carolina in a refrigerated container, is kept in his and Jane’s home for several days 
to facilitate visitations and final preparations. Moving from the brightly lit, sterile space 
of the hospital room to the dark, homey scene of Clark and Jane’s house, the film 
articulates a sense of return: a retreat from the modern miracle of medicine and a return to 
the warmth and comforts of home. Family, friends, and natural deathcare specialists 
gather round Clark’s body to wash it, to anoint it with oils, and to watch over it before yet 
another return—to the soil. When it comes time to bury Clark, friends and family lift his 
simple wooden coffin into the back of a pickup truck and transport it to the gravesite 
where they again lift it and then lower it into the red North Carolina soil. Guests speak, 
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throw magnolia branches into Clark’s grave, hold one another tightly, and then help 
cover his grave by hand. The cemetery director tells guests that they can always bring out 
the machines to do this labor, but reminds them that they “know what Clark would think 
about that.”  
A Will for the Woods comes to a close, as one might expect, amongst the trees. 
Once Clark’s grave is completely covered and adorned with greenery (Figure 4), guests 
trickle off back to their cars and their lives. Clark, body firmly planted several feet down 
in the damp Carolina clay, is there to stay, there in the forest surrounded by flora and 
fauna that will soon be benefiting from the new energy he adds to the ecosystem in the 
form of his flesh. Out of sight, incorporated into the earth, Clark’s body joins a new 




Figure 4 Dr. Clark Wang’s covered grave. Screenshot from A Will for the Woods. 
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Carnal Claims, Part Two: Dispersing Bodily Traces 
This concept of the land-community undergirds the work of Ramsey Creek 
Preserve, and is rooted in Aldo Leopold’s (1949) pathbreaking A Sand County Almanac, 
in which he articulates “the land ethic.” The land ethic calls for a reconceptualization of 
what constitutes “community” by including the more-than-human world within its 
purview. Although some critics contend that Leopold’s ethical program is too vague or 
wide-sweeping to be put into practice in any rigorous way, its broadest maxims remain 
touchstones in ecological thinking and conservation work. In brief, Leopold argued that 
an ecological ethic should both account for and be responsible to the more-than-human 
world, thereby expanding who counts as a member of the ethical community.  
Opening ethical relations up to “soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: 
the land,” Leopold suggested, is necessary in mending the onslaught of human-induced 
ecological damage that threatens continued earthly coexistence (239). When the interests 
of ecosystems, which Leopold sometimes called “land-communities,” are considered in 
ethical decisions, it is more difficult to make choices that will further deteriorate 
ecological stability. This is so, according to the author of “The Land Ethic,” because as 
ecological consciousness grows people begin to see themselves as intricately bound up 
with and in the biotic assemblages they depend upon. From an ecological perspective, it 
is impossible to see oneself as somehow outside of or beyond the land-community. 
Hence, Leopold prescribed the following broad axiom: “A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise” (262).
Leopold’s land ethic not only makes clear that humans are part and parcel of 
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ecosystems but also that we bear an ethical responsibility to our fellow human beings 
and all the other creatures with whom we coexist on Earth. Doing so requires, however, 
that we recuperate from the Industrial Revolution, which transformed the relationship 
among human beings and broader ecosystems. As Carolyn Merchant (1983) argues, prior 
to the Industrial Revolution (which began in the mid-1700s), an organismic metaphor 
shaped most thinking about humanity’s place within the environment. Earth was seen as 
an organism composed of many parts. The health of the whole Earth depended on the 
health of its constituent elements. But as machine technologies replaced human and 
more-than-human labor (the horse-drawn carriage, for instance), as the steam engine 
ostensibly chugged towards something called “Progress,” the West adopted a 
mechanistic metaphor that not only transformed the everyday lives of humans but also 
greatly diminished our connections with the animate earth. For many thinkers this 
transformation in thought marked a crucial turning point in human-ecology relations, 
heralding unprecedented exploitation and destruction of the Earth’s natural resources. 
The mechanistic view implied that the parts, while not unimportant, were at the very 
least interchangeable and replaceable. As a result, less care was given to the vulnerable 
and finite land-community. As Lynn White (1967, 1204) suggested, “surely no creature 
other than man has ever managed to foul its nest in such short order.” We are faced 
today, in the form of the cumulative results of hundreds of years of industrialization and 
development, with a startling reminder of our entanglement with ecosystems: climate 
chaos. As our current predicament makes clear: we are inescapably part of—and, 
therefore, responsible for and susceptible to—earth. It is our “nest.” 
 Since our capacity as human beings to transform and, therefore, damage 
   109 
ecosystems is in some sense unmatched by other species, so too, Leopold contends, must 
our commitment to protect the more-than-human world be courageous and capacious. 
This requires a shift in thinking and practice: “a land ethic changes the role of Homo 
sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it” 
(Leopold 1949, 240). Human beings, like tigers and deer and oak and sagebrush and ants 
and horseflies, are one among many species vying for a hospitable habitat. As Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1999, 141) reminds us, humans tend to think that we are central when in 
reality we are but one among countless creatures: “if we could communicate with a 
midge,” he wrote, “we would hear that it too floats through the air with the very same 
pathos, feeling that it too contains within itself the flying centre of this world.” Yet, 
hubris and technology for too long have enabled we humans to see ourselves as distinct 
from and better than our fellow creatures.  
The land ethic attempts to bring us back down to earth: ecology is an earthbound 
way of thinking. From its point of view, all transcendentalisms are suspicious. From our 
bipedal position, feet firmly on solid ground, stripped of all technological apparatuses 
(perhaps, especially, shoes and clothing), it quickly becomes clear that we lack, at a 
fundamental level, much advantage over those with whom we coexist (cf. Abram 1996; 
Kohák 1987; Uexküll 1957). The challenge of the land ethic is not to rid ourselves of all 
such technologies, not to enact a naïve version of deep ecology’s return to nature, but, 
rather, to live as though we are part of, not apart from, ecosystems. In Leopold’s as in 
Latour’s (2007) work, then, we encounter a flattening of sorts. Within ecosystems, 
humans act but so too do many other actants—living, animate, vital, or otherwise. The 
water cycle impacts humans, for example, even as humans impinge upon it. Embracing 
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our role as “plain member and citizen” of the land-community is a means of grappling 
with this flat ontology. Moreover, it is a way of respecting the many actors, our fellow 
creatures, with whom we continuously must learn to coexist. 
It would be tempting at this point to rehearse a common refrain in ecological 
circles, namely, that the best way for humans to make amends with the land is to get our 
greedy hands off the steering wheel, to let ecosystems be, to “become one” with the earth 
instead of mastering it (cf. Abram 1996; Kohák 1987; White 1967). It is easy to make 
such claims, but much harder to live them out. So, I want to stick close to Leopold’s land 
ethic, which asks not that humans extract themselves from ecological relations—as if that 
were possible—but instead that we thoughtfully and caringly engage with other 
ecological actors in ways that are mutually beneficial. In other words, the land ethic calls 
on us to engage in symbiotic relations. For example, the land ethic does not nihilistically 
advise that humans attempt to survive without earth’s “resources,” but rather proposes 
that humans live in relation to the earth without ruining it for ourselves and others in the 
process. “An ethic, ecologically,” Leopold (1949, 238) wrote, “is a limitation on freedom 
of action in the struggle for existence [...] the tendency of interdependent individuals or 
groups to evolve modes of cooperation. The ecologist calls these symbioses.” Symbiosis 
implies getting on together, living and dying in the company of others. Symbiotic 
relationships are not pure. Partners in symbiosis take and receive in different ways. The 
challenge is not to learn how to give without taking but to learn to take without 
becoming, as Serres (2007) put it, a parasite on our earthen host. For Homo sapiens, this 
means learning to inhabit the earth without gluttonously using up more of its resources 
than we need and being mindful of the overall biome’s health, not just our own gustatory 
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satisfaction. 
Burial and cremation are resource- and energy-intensive practices that enroll 
humans in ethical relation with the more-than-human world. In particular, conventional 
burial requires the use of millions of tons of material resources annually and consumes 
space within land-communities indefinitely. Thus, burial practices raise significant 
questions about property. In several poignant texts, Serres (1995; 2007; 2011) challenges 
anthropocentrism by pointing to the problem of private property across heterogeneous 
times and places. Throughout Malfeasance, Serres discusses several practices of marking 
property that humans have historically engaged. Like many other animals, he argues, 
humans have found ways of claiming things as their own by making a mark, by leaving a 
trace that defines this or that object as a particular individual’s belonging. The origin of 
private property, Serres (2011, 12) speculates, lies not in “some convention or positive 
right” but, rather, in practices of marking territory with “urine, blood, excretions, rotting 
corpses.” By emitting various excrements or wastes upon the land, humans have secured 
for ourselves the power of inhabitation while excluding possible cohabitants. It is not 
difficult to extrapolate from here: erecting buildings; paving parking lots and roads; 
spewing emissions into the air; and dumping trash into the oceans and onto massive 
garbage heaps are all ways of demarcating human territory. Serres (1995, 33) condemns 
humans for marking the earth in these and other ways, lamenting that, “the sullied world 
reveals the mark of humanity, the mark of its dominators, the foul stamp of their hold and 
their appropriation.” 
By marking the earth with various forms of excrement, including corpses, humans 
appropriate the world for themselves. By establishing lines of private property, by 
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communicating to others that “this land is our land,” as one song goes, we appropriate via 
pollution. By tarnishing the world, we make it our own. Spit in the soup, Serres says, and 
suddenly the entire pot is yours alone. Indeed, we have reached a point at which it is 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between what is pure and what is contaminated. 
Pollution has so thoroughly overtaken the world—in the form of what he calls “hard” 
(physical) and “soft” (symbolic) contaminants—that the entire world now seems sullied. 
Whereas this could be seen as debilitating, in Serres’s (2011, 71) work this becomes the 
condition of transforming the world: “by generalizing or globalizing dirt and so erasing 
the borders where polluting starts or stops, and hence appropriation, the right to property 
suddenly reaches an intolerable threshold and becomes literally unbearable.” In other 
words, once the mark of humanity, of private property, becomes generalized it becomes 
untenable. If everything is marked by humanity, we will eventually come to detest the 
nest that we have fouled. We will be moved by our own pollution to change our ways. 
Serres, perhaps sardonically, concludes that, “We must therefore rethink this right, 
meaning go beyond its present status where it still resembles animal behaviors. One more 
step must be taken on the difficult road toward hominization” (71). 
To counteract the ecological damages incurred as a result of marking the land, 
Serres advocates that humans enter into a “natural contract” with one another and with 
the earth itself. This idea of the natural contract emerges at a moment when, as Serres 
understands it, humans have so changed the earth that the earth now threatens human 
existence. No longer at war with other human beings (following the World Wars), we are 
now at war with the earth itself. Like the “social contract,” which some thinkers use as a 
means of describing the development of civil societies and the avoidance of war of all 
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against all, Serres positions the natural contract as a way of making peace with the earth. 
“We must make a new pact,” he writes, “a new preliminary agreement with the objective 
enemy of the human world: the world as such” (Serres 1995, 15). In Malfeasance, Serres 
(2011, 78–79) describes some of what might be involved in such an agreement: 
I suggest we free ourselves from all these conducts and constraints of 
appropriation, that we get rid of all these excrements. I suggest that, in one 
and the same move repeated everywhere, we free the earth from the 
sacred, from blood, sacrifice, war; the soil from death, corpses, tombs, 
and cemeteries; the women and children from sexual and genital 
appropriation and subjection; space and our perception from advertising 
appropriation; and finally the planet from the dirty bomb of property. Have 
I finally discovered the new name of freedom? Leasing, libertarian 
freedom. (bolded emphases mine) 
 
Thus, the natural contract imagined by Serres involves two forms of liberation. On the 
one hand, it is humans who would be liberated. Detaching ourselves from the pull of 
private property, we would be free to live like travellers, roaming without owning, 
leasing without buying. On the other hand, it is the earth as such that would be liberated. 
As humans detach themselves from the drive to create private property, so Serres’s 
argument goes, the earth benefits from the reduced focus on marking the land, of carving 
up private property. With the natural contract, the earth is no longer seen as a resource to 
be mined, to be exploited, to be owned, but rather a space of cohabitation and coexistence 
within which we must learn to get along with others without the reassurance of 
ownership, control, or mastery. 
Embedded within Serres’s notion of the natural contract is a concept of writing 
that I would like to elaborate here via a final detour through Derridean thought. For 
Derrida, the concept of writing is not limited to the conventional sense in which marks 
are inscribed upon some surface. In Of Grammatology, Derrida (1976, 44) invites us to 
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think of “the world as space of inscription.” If the “world” is a scene of “inscription,” of 
writing in a general sense, it is possible to think of the physical world—“the land,” to 
remain within Leopold’s idiom—neither as a tabula rasa nor as an overdetermined space, 
but rather as a densely woven text upon which some inscriptions have already been 
carved and upon which others will be placed. Indeed, Derrida proposes that the concept 
of writing can “disturb” the “opposition of nature and institution” (44). Writing is 
typically only associated with the institution of culture, which is to say, with what is 
properly human. Yet, for Derrida writing itself shows the limitations of such a 
delimitation since it is only through writing that something like “culture” and “nature” 
can make any sense. Derrida finds writing everywhere, not just in cultural institutions and 
conventions but in the “world” itself, in that space seemingly beyond the horizon of the 
human. 
Elaborating on the pervasiveness of writing, Derrida suggested that it is in fact 
impossible to escape the reach of written inscriptions. Hence Derrida’s (1976, 158) oft 
misunderstood remark: “There is nothing outside the text.” If there is nothing outside the 
text, this is not so because phonetic writing is itself all pervasive, nor is it because there 
are nothing but “texts” in the commonsense notion of the word, but rather because the 
entire “world” can be understood as a textual weave. Nothing escapes textuality because 
everything functions as a text—as a scene of various kinds of inscription. Derrida is clear 
that he is talking not only about phonetic writing but about something much more 
expansive. For him, “the [written] trace […] is not more natural […] than cultural, not 
more physical than psychical, biological than spiritual” (Derrida 1976, 47–48). Traces are 
all of these things—they are words on the page but also tracks in the dirt, pictures on 
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paper but also images in the mind, tattoos on bodies but also bodies in the earth. In other 
words, we should not draw hard distinctions between what can and cannot constitute 
writing. Rather, the “biological” itself might even be a kind of writing. Moreover, such 
traces “are themselves not only human.” (Derrida 1991, 116). 
When, in the preceding passage, Serres (2011, 79) suggests that “we free […] the 
soil from death, corpses, tombs, and cemeteries,” he is not simply suggesting that humans 
ought to engage in other interment practices but, at a more fundamental level, that we 
stop writing on the earth, that we stop leaving traces behind. His concept of “leasing” 
indeed suggests this withdrawal from the trace, this retraction of the mark. Yet, from a 
Derridean perspective, this withdrawal or retraction is impossible since we are embedded 
within a general economy of writing, a general writing from which we cannot extract 
ourselves.  
Thus, the political and ethical question facing humans is neither whether we will 
write on the land nor whether we will engage in practices of marking and demarcating, 
but rather what sorts of traces we will disseminate and with what kinds of force they will 
exert in the world. For too long, a Western obsession with material immortality has led 
humans to engage in deathcare practices that not only delay the inevitable but that also do 
damage to the land-community. Owing to conventional burial practices, massive amounts 
of resources are buried in the earth: in addition to some 800,000 gallons of formaldehyde, 
“approximately 30 million board feet of hardwoods, 2,700 tons of copper and bronze, 
104,272 tons of steel, and 1,636,000 tons of reinforced concrete” are interred along with 
human bodies each year in the United States (Harker 2012, 151). These are, I suspect, the 
kinds of practices Serres had in mind when he called for humans to stop burying our 
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corpses in the soil, when he advised us to withdraw from the ancient practice of burial. 
Yet, as Ramsey Creek and other conservation burial grounds demonstrate, burial does not 
inherently necessitate the massive outpouring of resources and consumption of land that 
conventional burial demands. What Ramsey Creek designates as conservation burial is 
not, in fact, a new practice. On the contrary, what counts as conservation, green, or 
natural burial are practices that have been part of various cultures for centuries (cf. 
Laqueur 2015). In the United States, then, practices that promote conservation via the 
body’s carnal claim to the land are in the process not only of writing the land differently 
but also of revising cultural relations to ecology and to death in the image of ancient 
deathcare practices.  
Conservation burial, I have argued, offers both the living and the dead an 
alternative means of writing on the land. Since we cannot dispose of human bodies 
without in some sense leaving a trace (cremation not only uses energy but also emits 
greenhouse gases), conservation burial is a way of writing akin to what Derrida calls 
“sous rature.” By way of analogy, I would like to suggest that conservation burial enables 
us to write on the land with pencil rather than pen or, better yet, as if with stick in soil 
instead of chisel on stone. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1976) writes in her preface to 
Of Grammatology, Derrida often wrote sous rature or “under erasure” whenever a 
word—usually a metaphysical one—seemed inaccurate yet necessary. She explains: 
“This is to write a word, cross it out, and then print both word and deletion. (Since the 
word is inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since it is necessary, it remains legible.)” (xiv). 
Conservation burial operates by way of a similar movement. Disposing of human remains 
by way of burial is both “inaccurate” or, for my purposes, unacceptable (in its 
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conventional guises) but also “necessary.” Burial is something we must live with, but we 
need not accept it naively. Hence, conservation burial acknowledges the troubles with 
burial and so transforms (or reverts) the practices into something less damaging than it 
otherwise would be. Moreover, if we conceive of the body itself as a mark, conservation 
burial renders it erasable. Indeed, decomposition works to erase the body as such. Its 
remains remain, so to speak, but they do so not in the fixed and stabilized position of a 
body pumped full of formaldehyde and enclosed in a concrete vault. Rather, the interred 
bodies of those buried in conservation burial grounds are dispersed throughout the 
ecosystem and incorporated into other assemblages. 
To summarize: carnal claims are performatively enacted when human bodies are 
buried in ways that enable the energy contained within them to disperse within a land-
community. When this happens at places designated as conservation burial grounds, and 
especially at places where conservation agreements have been entered into, the material 
traces of the human body function to secure ecological stability and sustainability. The 
buried body staves off development by infusing the biotic community with fragments of 
the privileged human corpus, which in many places is legally protected even after it has 
been interred. With conservation burial, marking the land with human bodies becomes a 
means not simply of appropriating the land for human use and exploitation but for the 
whole of the biotic community. This process I have designated as a form of writing on 
the land which exerts a performative force that impacts upon relationships among human 
and more-than-human, bringing the heterogeneous actors within those broad categories 
closer together, initiating an ethical bond. 
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Rhetorics of Dispersal: Or, the Gift of Death 
After Dr. Clark Wang’s body is carefully and lovingly lowered into the North 
Carolina soil, A Will for the Woods (Browne et al. 2014) shifts to the ceremony that 
followed. With notes in hand, a well-dressed man speaks graveside of Clark’s life and 
last wishes. Reminding the mourning crowd of the deceased’s close connection with the 
natural world, the officiant then reads words apparently inscribed by Clark before he 
died: 
I want my final legacy to be an environmental gift to all beings and all 
creatures that follow me, not a hazard to the earth. Spiritually, I believe 
green burial restores us to reusable materials, returning our nutrient 
signature to the cycle of life rather than being cut off from it. 
 
Echoing both Walt Whitman’s “Song of Myself” and Genesis 3:19, Clark’s written traces 
are mobilized to articulate a notion of the human body as a potential “gift,” rather than a 
“hazard,” to the earth. Unlike conventional burial, which risks doing further damage to 
both funeral workers and to the biotic community, Clark posits green burial as a 
restorative process, one that brings humans into close and necessary contact with the 
ecosystems to which they belong. Beyond rejecting the resource-intensive practices 
associated with conventional burial, going green is posited as a means of “returning our 
nutrient signature” to the larger “cycle of life.” The gift of death, then, is one of 
enrichment rather than degradation, one of sustenance rather than deterioration. And it 
begins with the trace, with bodily dispersal. 
Conceptualizing the human body as a gift is not altogether new, even in Western 
societies. Indeed, giving bodies for science or for medical purposes is a highly dignified 
route, which approximately 48 percent of Americans already pursue (“Organ Donation 
Statistics” n.d.). In the case of organ donation, entire bodies or specific parts might be 
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used for surgical training (including plastic surgeries), automobile crash testing, and 
transplants and other vital surgeries, to name just a few (Roach 2003). Making oneself 
useful after death, while not something everyone chooses or has chosen for them, is, thus, 
not a totally novel thing to do. Conservation (or “green”) burial, as Clark’s posthumously 
voiced words suggest, offers people an additional opportunity to make themselves useful. 
In their analysis of transformations in British burial practices, Rumble, Troyer, Walter, 
and Woodthorpe (2014, 244) note that the dead are  
decreasingly being disposed of somewhere out of sight in sequestered 
spaces and are instead increasingly becoming subject to a managed 
process of dispersal into environments inhabited by the living, in which—
via ecological and altruistic rhetoric—the dead are positioned as a gift to 
the living and to the planet.  
 
In the case of conservation burial, however, it is not only other human beings who benefit 
most or even most directly. Because the placement of human bodies in land designated 
for interment and especially conservation burial generally protects that area from future 
development, conservation  burial can actually preserve sizable portions of habitat for 
more-than-human actors, as well as generate green space for human beings. 
Thus, conservation burial offers those so inclined to pursue what the radical 
environmental activist and author Edward Abbey, in a conversation with Jack Loeffler, 
called “ a good death” (Loeffler 1989, 18). Abbey, whose own body was left to the 
elements in his old sleeping bag on the surface of the desert he so adored, challenged the 
anthropocentric longing for human immortality: “Which of us is worthy to live forever, 
eternally? Nobody I know” (17). Immortality, of course, is an impossibility, a dream not 
yet (and perhaps, hopefully, never) realized. Yet, conventional burial practices promise 
something akin to immortality—in the form of strong protections against the 
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deteriorating force of the world. Conventional burials attempt to keep the human body 
intact (for a while) and from returning to the biotic communities to which they belong. It 
is a way of cutting the human off from the earth. Undoubtedly conventional burial 
practices have accrued meanings of their own during the more than 150 years in which 
they have been exercised. Yet, in the context of increasing ecological awareness, its 
meaningfulness seems to be changing. Clark’s words, given voice by the officiant at his 
funeral, suggest that giving one’s body to the land-community might harbor new forms of 
meaning for those less intent on preserving their bodies. At the very least, Clark asserts, 
conservation burial helps to ensure that one’s “legacy” is not a “hazard to the earth,” a 
point that no doubt gives comfort to many who opt to be buried in the soil without the 
trappings of a modern, toxic, and resource-intensive funeral industry. As the Ramsey 
Creek Preserve website puts it, “Burial is not a waste of land, it protects and restores the 
land” (“Frequently Asked Questions” n.d.). 
Framing conservation burial as a “gift” as opposed to a “hazard” of conventional 
interment, Clark and other advocates articulate a linkage between this notion of the body 
as gift and a concept of responsibility. From within the logic of this frame, bequeathing 
one’s body to earth is a means of enacting a form of responsibility, that is, a form of 
responding to the troubled land-community. In light of this, I shall close with a brief 
meditation on Derrida’s understanding of the gift and of responsibility as a way of 
drawing out some of the implications of this rhetoric of dispersal. In The Gift of Death, 
Derrida (2008, 29) writes that, “there is no responsibility without a dissident and 
inventive rupture with respect to tradition, authority, orthodox, rule, or doctrine.” 
Responsibility, in other words, always functions as a departure from the already given, 
   121 
the taken-for-granted. One cannot properly be responsible if one simply repeats 
convention.  
This is why the sense of responsibility found in Derrida’s work is radically 
detached from deontological ethics, for example. Its operation is in this sense counter-
hegemonic to the extent that responsibility breaks with or makes tremble the conventions 
to which most of us have consented. The modern funeral industry in the United States has 
temporarily sutured the practices it promotes and proffers with a cultural ideal of 
deathcare—one that lavishes upon dead bodies a range of services and products that work 
to prevent the body from decomposing. Practices like embalming and products like 
expensive caskets and heavy concrete vaults are applied to corpses and framed not only 
as conventional but also as morally good (Mitford 2000). Conservation burial, on the 
contrary, breaks with convention and offers a means of embracing rather than denying the 
fact that someday we will die and decay, becoming part of the land-community in which 
we have nevertheless always already been enmeshed. Giving one’s body over to the land-
community in this way rips away the temporary suture that the modern funeral industry 
has been able to maintain for many years. 
In thinking about the “gift,” Derrida claims that in order for something to be a gift 
it must be given without any expectation that the donor will receive something in return. 
With the gift there can be no quid pro quo relationship. If something were to be expected 
in return, one leaves the realm of the gift and finds oneself back in the realms of 
exchange and economy. “One must,” Derrida (2008, 118) contends, “give without 
knowing, without knowledge or recognition, without thanks [remerciement]: without 
anything, or at least without an object.” The act of giving must exceed the horizon of 
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economic exchange and calculation. If something is truly to be given, it must be done 
with no strings attached.  
Given that Derrida’s concept of the gift remains confined to a specifically human, 
and therefore economic, context, he finds the gift a near impossibility. Within societies 
built on exchange, it can be difficult to locate instances where a gift is given without 
some expectation of repayment. Hence, Derrida suggests it may be better to think of the 
process of giving rather than the objects themselves. Yet, by thinking about the gift 
within an ecological rather than economic context (without for a second suggesting that 
the two can be rigorously distinguished), the possibility of the gift seems slightly nearer. 
When Clark avers that he wants to “give” his body to the earth as sustenance, as energy, 
as potential for new life, does he slip the binds of economic exchange? When Clark’s 
body is buried and disperses throughout the land-community, does it give itself over 
without taking something in return?  
Yes and no. On the one hand, it is impossible to extricate humans from their 
ecological entanglements. Living humans both give and take within the broader 
ecosystems to which they belong. We may take oxygen, for example, but we also supply 
carbon dioxide. We are linked to the trees in this way. From this perspective, 
conservation burial can be seen as a way of giving back to the land-community. On the 
other hand, a human corpse is perhaps a radically different kind of thing than a living, 
breathing human. We might say that the corpse can give absolutely with neither hope nor 
expectation that it will receive anything in return. In some significant sense, the 
dispersing human body is given over in full, without remainder. As soon as it begins to 
decompose, it is already something else entirely, becoming radically otherwise as “it” 
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(and now we must put the human body to which this “it” refers under erasure) diffuses 
into the ecosystem—into microorganisms and plant life that will be consumed by other 
animals, which will in turn die and be consumed as well. This is a way of giving over and 
giving in to the cycle of death and life. 
There are, of course, things to be gained whenever conservation burial is chosen. 
When the human body is placed in the earth within a plot of land designated for 
conservation burial, it performatively inaugurates a relationship in which the land-
community itself is shielded from certain kinds of future human development. This has 
benefits both for the many kinds of more-than-human actors within the ecosystem who 
rely upon undeveloped lands for their own survival, but humans also gain: there may be 
spiritual as well as physical gains. Visiting a conservation burial ground can be healing 
for grieving families and friends, a welcome alternative to the rows of standard 
headstones and fake flowers found in many conventional cemeteries. Moreover, however, 
the entire biotic community gains in the form of the energy added to the land by the 
nutritive human body.  
The performance of a rhetoric of dispersal enacted through bodily appropriation 
and framed as a gift in the context of conservation burial exceeds providing nutrients to 
the land-community. This rhetoric of dispersal performatively transforms dynamics in the 
land-community by recomposing the relationships among human and more-than-human 
actors. As the human body decomposes underfoot and is absorbed in the ecosystem by 
other organisms, it rhetorically transfers not only its energy but also its special status to 
the entirety of the biotic community. Dispersed throughout the ecosystem, the human 
body works to secure ecological stability and sustainability.  
   124 
Works Cited 
“About.” 2016. Memorial Ecosystem. Accessed August 25. 
http://www.memorialecosystems.com/Locations/RamseyCreekPreserve/tabid/58/
Default.aspx. 
“About the Film.” 2016. A Will for the Woods. Accessed September 12. 
http://www.awillforthewoods.com/about/#about-the-film. 
Abram, David. 1996. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-
than-Human World. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Alaimo, Stacy. 2010. Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things With Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Barnett, Joshua Trey. 2015a. “Fleshy Metamorphosis: Temporal Pedagogies of 
Transsexual Counterpublics.” In Transgender Communication Studies: Histories, 
Trends, and Trajectories, edited by Leland G. Spencer and Jamie Capuzza, 155–
69. Lanham, MD: Lexington Press. 
———. 2015b. “Toxic Portraits: Resisting Multiple Invisibilities in the Environmental 
Justice Movement.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 101 (2): 405–25. 
———. 2016. “Politics of Edibility: Reconceptualizing Ecological Relationality.” 
Environmental Communication, 1–14. 
———. 2017. “Impurities: Thinking Ecologically With Safe.” Communication, Culture 
& Critique 10: Forthcoming. 
“Bios.” 2016. Memorial Ecosystems. Accessed August 28. 
http://www.memorialecosystems.com/AboutUs/Bios/tabid/109/Default.aspx. 
Browne, Amy, Tony Hale, Jeremy Kaplan, and Brian Wilson. 2014. A Will for the 
Woods. Documentary. 
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New 
York: Routledge. 
———. 1993. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2004. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso. 
———. 2009. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London: Verso. 
   125 
Campbell, Billy. 2013. Saving One Million Acres for Two Thousand Years. 
TEDxGreenville. Greenville, SC. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OyA0VLzOPPA. 
Carbaugh, Donal. 1999. “‘Just Listen’: ‘Listening’ and Landscape Among the Blackfeet.” 
Western Journal of Communication 63 (3): 250–70. 
Condit, Celeste M. 2013. “Pathos in Criticism: Edwin Black’s Communism-as-Cancer 
Metaphor.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 99 (1): 1–26. 
Corbett, Julia B. 2006. Communicating Nature: How We Create and Understand 
Environmental Messages. Washington, D.C: Island Press. 
Cram, Emily Dianne. 2012. “‘Angie Was Our Sister:’ Witnessing the Trans-Formation of 
Disgust in the Citizenry of Photography.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 98 (4): 
411–38. 
Davies, Douglas J. 2005. A Brief History of Death. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
DeLuca, Kevin Michael. 1999. “Unruly Arguments: The Body Rhetoric of Earth First!, 
ACT UP, and Queer Nation.” Argumentation and Advocacy 36 (1): 9–21. 
———. 2001. “Trains in the Wilderness: The Corporate Roots of Environmentalism.” 
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4 (4): 633–52. 
———. 2006. “The Speed of Immanent Images: The Dangers of Reading Photographs.” 
In Visual Communication: Perception, Rhetoric, and Technology, edited by Diane 
S. Hope, 79–90. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1976. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
———. 1982. Margins of Philosophy. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
———. 1988. Limited Inc. Edited by Gerald Graff. Translated by Jeffrey Mehlman and 
Samuel Weber. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
———. 1991. “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with 
Jacques Derrida.” In Who Comes After the Subject?, edited by Eduardo Cadava, 
Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy, 96–119. New York: Routledge. 
———. 1993. Aporias. Translated by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
———. 2008. The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret. Translated by David Wills. 2nd 
ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
   126 
Edbauer Rice, Jenny. 2008. “The New ‘new’: Making a Case for Critical Affect Studies.” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 94 (2): 200–212.  
“Film Review: A Will for the Woods.” 2014. Film Journal International. August 15. 
http://www.filmjournal.com/content/film-review-will-woods. 
“Find a Provider.” 2016. Green Burial Council. Accessed August 23. 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1Pcse6ri92OlrhYDPr4DxcL_kOyI. 
“Frequently Asked Questions.” n.d. Memorial Ecosystems. 
http://memorialecosystems.com/FAQs/tabid/55/Default.aspx. 
Gregg, Melissa, and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds. 2010. The Affect Theory Reader. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Gruber, David R. 2014. “The (digital) Majesty of All under Heaven: Affective 
Constitutive Rhetoric at the Hong Kong Museum of History’s Multi-Media 
Exhibition of Terracotta Warriors.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 44 (2): 148–67.  
Gunn, Joshua. 2012. “Maranatha.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 98 (4): 359–85.  
Gunn, Joshua, and Jenny Edbauer Rice. 2009. “About Face/Stuttering Discipline.” 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 6 (2): 215–19.  
Harker, Alexandra. 2012. “Landscapes of the Dead: An Argument for Conservation 
Burial.” Berkeley Planning Journal 25 (1): 150–59. 
Harold, Christine. 2000. “The Rhetorical Function of the Abject Body: Transgressive 
Corporeality in ‘Trainspotting.’” JAC: Journal of Advanced Composition 20 (4): 
865–87. 
Harold, Christine, and Kevin Michael DeLuca. 2005. “Behold the Corpse: Violent 
Images and the Case of Emmett Till.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8 (2): 263–86. 
Harold, Christine L. 1999. “Tracking Heroine Chic: The Abject Body Reconfigures the 
Rational Argument.” Argumentation & Advocacy 36: 65–76. 
Harris, Mark. 2007. Grave Matters: A Journey through the Modern Funeral Industry to a 
Natural Way of Burial. New York: Scribner. 
Hawhee, Debra. 2006. “Rhetorics, Bodies, and Everyday Life.” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 36 (2): 155–64.  
Kenigsberg, Ben. 2014. “‘A Will for the Woods,’ a Documentary About Natural Burial.” 
The New York Times, August 14. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/movies/a-
will-for-the-woods-a-documentary-about-natural-burial.html. 
   127 
Kohák, Erazim. 1987. The Embers and the Stars: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Moral 
Sense of Nature. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
Landau, Jamie. 2012. “Reproducing and Transgressing Masculinity: A Rhetorical 
Analysis of Women Interacting With Digital Photographs of Thomas Beatie.” 
Women’s Studies in Communication 35 (2): 178–203. 
———. 2016. “Feeling Rhetorical Critics: Another Affective-Emotional Field Method 
for Rhetorical Studies.” In Text + Field, edited by Rob Asen and Karma R. 
Chávez. State College, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Laqueur, Thomas W. 2015. The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal 
Remains. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Latour, Bruno. 2007. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leopold, Aldo. 1949. A Sand County Almanac. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Loeffler, Jack. 1989. Headed Upstream: Interviews with Iconoclasts. Harbinger House. 
McHendry, George F., Michael K. Middleton, Danielle Endres, Samantha Senda-Cook, 
and Megan O’Byrne. 2014. “Rhetorical Critic(ism)’s Body: Affect and Fieldwork 
on a Plane of Immanence.” Southern Communication Journal 79 (4): 293–310.  
McKerrow, Raymie. 1989. “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis.” Communication 
Monographs 56: 91–111. 
McKerrow, Raymie E. 1993. “Critical Rhetoric and the Possibility of the Subject.” In The 
Critical Turn: Rhetoric and Philosophy in Postmodern Discourse, edited by Ian 
Angus and Lenore Langsdorf, 51–67. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University 
Press. 
Merchant, Carolyn. 1983. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific 
Revolution. New York: HarperOne. 
Middleton, Michael, Aaron Hess, Danielle Endres, and Samantha Senda-Cook. 2015. 
Participatory Critical Rhetoric: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations for 
Studying Rhetoric in Situ. New York: Lexington Books. 
Middleton, Michael K., Samantha Senda-Cook, and Danielle Endres. 2011. “Articulating 
Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and Tensions.” Western Journal of 
Communication 75 (4): 386–406. 
Mitford, Jessica. 2000. The American Way of Death Revisited. New York: Vintage. 
   128 
Morris, Charles E., and John M. Sloop. 2006. “‘What Lips These Lips Have Kissed’: 
Refiguring the Politics of Queer Public Kissing.” Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 3 (1): 1–26. 
Morton, Timothy. 2007. Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
———. 2010. The Ecological Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Murray Yang, Michelle. 2011. “Still Burning: Self-Immolation as Photographic Protest.” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 97 (1): 1–25. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1999. “On Truth and Lying in a Nonmoral Sense.” In The Birth of 
Tragedy and Other Writings, edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, 141–
53. Oxford: Cambridge University Press. 
Olson, Philip R. 2014. “Flush and Bone: Funeralizing Alkaline Hydrolysis in the United 
States.” Science, Technology & Human Values 39 (5): 666–93.  
“Organ Donation Statistics.” n.d. OrganDonor.gov. 
http://www.organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html. 
Ott, Brian L. 2010. “The Visceral Politics of V for Vendetta: On Political Affect in 
Cinema.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 27 (1): 39–54.  
Ott, Brian L., and Diana Marie Keeling. 2011. “Cinema and Choric Connection: Lost in 
Translation as Sensual Experience.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 97 (4): 363–86. 
Pezzullo, Phaedra C. 2003. “Touring ‘Cancer Alley,’ Louisiana: Performances of 
Community and Memory for Environmental Justice.” Text and Performance 
Quarterly 23 (3): 226–52. 
———. 2007. Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of Pollution, Travel, and Environmental Justice. 
Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. 
———. 2011. “Contextualizing Boycotts and Buycotts: The Impure Politics of 
Consumer-Based Advocacy in an Age of Global Ecological Crises.” 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 8 (2): 124–45.  
Plumwood, Val. 2008. “Tasteless: Towards a Food-Based Approach to Death.” PAN: 
Philosophy, Activism, Nature 5: 69–75. 
“Ramsey Creek Gallery.” n.d. Memorial Ecosystems. 
http://www.memorialecosystems.com/Locations/WestminsterSC/PhotoGallery/ta
bid/57/AlbumID/365-12/Default.aspx. 
“Ramsey Creek Preserve.” 2014. Upstate Forever. 
http://upstateforever.org/portfolios/ramsey-creek-preserve-public/. 
   129 
Roach, Mary. 2003. Stiff: The Curious Lives of Human Cadavers. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
Rogers, Richard A. 1998. “Overcoming the Objectification of Nature in Constitutive 
Theories: Toward a Transhuman, Materialist Theory of Communication.” 
Western Journal of Communication 62 (3): 244–72. 
Rumble, Hannah, John Troyer, Tony Walter, and Kate Woodthorpe. 2014. “Disposal or 
Dispersal? Environmentalism and Final Treatment of the British Dead.” Mortality 
19 (3): 243–60.  
Scarry, Elaine. 1985. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Schutten, Julie Kalil. 2008. “Chewing on the Grizzly Man: Getting to the Meat of the 
Matter.” Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture 2 (2): 
193–211.  
Seegert, Natasha. 2014. “Play of Sniffication: Coyotes Sing in the Margins.” Philosophy 
& Rhetoric 47 (2): 158–78. 
Serres, Michel. 1995. The Natural Contract. Translated by Elizabeth MacArthur and 
William Paulson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
———. 2007. The Parasite. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 2011. Malfeasance: Appropriation Through Pollution? Translated by Anne-
Marie Feenberg-Dibon. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Smith, Mark J. 1998. Ecologism: Towards Ecological Citizenship. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1976. “Translator’s Preface.” In Of Grammatology, by 
Jacques Derrida, ix – lxxxvii. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Troyer, John. 2007. “Embalmed Vision.” Mortality 12 (1): 22–47. 
Uexküll, Jakob von. 1957. “A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture 
Book of Invisible Worlds.” In Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a 
Modern Concept, translated by Claire H. Schiller. New York,: International 
University Press. 
“Welcome.” n.d. Memorial Ecosystems. http://www.memorialecosystems.com/. 
White, Lynn. 1967. “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis.” Science 155: 1203–
7. 
Whitman, Walt. 1855. Song of Myself. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. 
   130 
Zelizer, Barbie. 2010. About to Die: How News Images Move the Public. New York: 


















The chaos of death disturbs the peace of the living. Nothing 
represents this chaos more forcefully to human senses and 
the imagination than the biological process of bodily 
disintegration. This unsettling fact of life has proven to be a 
rich source of inspiration for human efforts to find order in 
disorder, meaning in suffering, eternity in finitude. 
 
— Gary Laderman (2003, xv), Rest in Peace 
 
Reflection on dirt involves reflection on the relation of 
order to disorder, being to non-being, form to formlessness, 
life to death. 
 




About 65 miles north of Ramsey Creek Preserve in Cullowhee, North Carolina, 
on a crisp mountain morning, an observant team of researchers and architects huddles 
over a raised, lumpy patch of dirt at an outdoor research facility aptly named FOREST. 
Someone pushes a long metal rod into the earth, taking the soil’s temperature and 
checking moisture levels, while others watch on and nosily sample the air for smells. The 
earth is warm; the air, piney, slightly putrescent. These researchers are checking compost 
piles for recent activity. There are no banana peels or apple cores here, though. Inside the 
132 
bulging dirt mounds are decomposing human bodies. 
In the winter of 2015, the research team covered two donated corpses with wood 
chips, hoping to better understand how human bodies decay. “To vary the conditions, 
alfalfa pellets and water were later added to one of the bodies” (Holcombe 2016). Like 
the bodies buried an hour’s drive southeast on the banks of Ramsey Creek, these 
decomposing corpses were laid into the ground without having been embalmed, placed 
directly into the earth, lacking any of the trappings of a conventional burial. Inside the 
piles, carbon-rich materials gradually reduce the body to all but the bones (eventually, 
those too will wear away). These bodies, like those at nearby natural burial grounds, will 
be integrated rather than separated from the ecosystem, reincorporated rather than 
segregated, as they decompose and transform into soil. Through experimentation, the 
researchers assembled in North Carolina hope to determine the most efficient means of 
turning a human body into compost. They hope to transform corpses into dirt. 
While it is not completely unheard of for human waste to be composted—“Turn 
your turds into tomatoes” one do-it-yourself website exclaims (Shaun 2011)—the idea of 
composting entire human bodies is a bold, if not controversial, move. This effort is being 
championed by the Urban Death Project (UDP), which is developing a technical system 
for composting human remains that it calls “recomposition.” Recomposition, according to 
the UDP, is decomposition that is oriented toward ecological and cultural renewal. 
Designed as an alternative for urban areas, where land for cemeteries is increasingly 
sparse, the UDP would provide a means of deathcare that uses very little of the already 
dwindling land in cities (Berridge 2002; Santora 2010); would challenge the toxic 
practices associated with conventional embalming and burial; and would transform 
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longstanding deathcare rituals. 
Conceptualized by Seattle-based architect Katrina Spade during a master’s 
program at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, the UDP proposes to “[utilize] the 
process of composting to safely and gently turn our deceased into soil-building material, 
creating a meaningful, equitable, and ecological urban alternative to existing options for 
the disposal of the dead” (Spade 2015a). As Spade (2015b) describes in the Huffington 
Post, “The Urban Death Project has designed a system where bodies are laid into a 
constantly replenished core filled with wood chips and sawdust, then covered with the 
same material and gently transformed into compost.” In other words, the UDP is 
developing a human composting system, not all that different from the backyard 
composters familiar to gardeners or, in fact, to “what's happening on the top six inches of 
the forest floor, as organic material breaks down to form precious topsoil” (Spade 
2015b). At the end of the process, at least according to plans laid out by the UDP, soil 
from the composting system will emerge from the bottom of the core ready to be used in 
flower and vegetable gardens throughout the city. 
Both the figure and practice of decomposition are at the center of the UDP’s 
efforts to transform deathcare practices in urban areas. As a physical practice, 
decomposition serves as an ecological alternative to conventional burial, which delays 
human decay and pollutes the soil, and cremation, which rapidly incinerates the body but 
returns little if any of its nutrients back to the larger biotic community and pollutes the 
air. Carefully managed inside the UDP’s concrete core, human decomposition will lead to 
the creation of rich soil that can be put to use throughout the city or taken away by 
survivors of those whose bodies have been composted. Like natural burial, the UDP 
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harnesses the productive force of decomposition to generate life-affirming and life-
supporting materials from death. The human body-become-soil becomes quite literally 
the grounds upon which new life might emerge. In this way, decomposition is a means of 
creative destruction: as the human body decays, it makes possible new forms of life. 
From mortality, vitality. 
As a figure, decomposition serves as a postmodern provocation to rethink both the 
human and ecological relationality. On the one hand, decomposition pushes us to rethink 
the human because it refuses to understand the human as a stable, bounded, impermeable 
being that ought to be preserved at all costs. All organic beings decompose, and so 
humans must also decompose. Decomposition embraces precisely the malleability and 
permeability of the human form and harnesses that openness to make new life. 
Decomposition is an enactment of human “trans-corporeality”: our bodies open onto 
rather than close us off from the outside world (Alaimo 2010). Thus, decomposition also 
forces us to reconsider ecological relationality insofar as it places humans amidst the 
messiness of mortal exchange. The UDP invites humans to see our bodies as part of 
larger cycles of life and death, and thus as irreducibly interdependent and interconnected 
within broader land-communities. In doing so, decomposition challenges the logic of the 
boundary. Dualisms of all sorts—life/death, whole/fragment, one/many—are troubled 
through the process of decomposition, as the lines between seemingly stable categories 
become blurry and even fall away. Especially when bodies decompose together, as they 
will in the UDP’s composting system, they become indistinguishable one from the other 
as they enter into another assemblage—dirt. And, as we will soon see, fostering processes 
where humans become dirt is a means of reordering the world, of transforming the 
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anthropocentric obsession with body preservation and its concomitant aversion to the 
abject (in the form of decaying bodies) into a more ecocentric concern with sustainable 
forms of relation. 
Decomposition, I argue, also furnishes significant conceptual resources for 
rhetorical theory and criticism. As I explain later, constitutive and articulatory theories of 
rhetoric have exerted considerable force on the field’s understanding of how rhetorics 
function (e.g., Charland 1987; DeLuca 1999). Both the constitutive and articulatory 
approaches focus mostly on the productive qualities of discourse, that is, on the ways in 
which rhetorics produce subject positions and establish certain kinds of relationships. 
Similarly, Bruno Latour’s (2010, 473–474) work on composition acknowledges that 
“things have to be put together […] while retaining their heterogeneity.” Constitutive 
rhetoric, articulation, and composition are all names for the generative force of discourse. 
This tradition recognizes, however, that what is produced by rhetoric is not always 
desirable. Sometimes the subject positions, relations, and objects made through rhetorical 
activity need to be taken apart and put to different uses. Decomposition serves in this 
chapter as a conceptual tool for thinking about what happens when rhetorics exert a 
deteriorating force in the world, that is, when rhetorics unmake the world as we know it, 
when they de-compose prior compositions and assemblages. Decomposition, however, is 
not the same as destruction. It is more akin to what Derrida (1976) calls deconstruction, 
the doubled act of reversal and displacement, of overturning and of recreating. As anyone 
who composts knows well, decomposition is a form of creative destruction: as one thing 
wears away another is made possible. Rhetorically, decomposition names those processes 
where certain traditions are undone and others are generated in their wake. 
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Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I consider the decompositional 
rhetorical force of the Urban Death Project. Before returning to the conceptual issues 
raised in the preceding pages, I briefly narrate a history of deathcare practices in urban 
areas. This background not only situates the specific acts advocated by the UDP in 
relation to historical practices, but also demonstrates the differences its focus on 
decomposition makes for our understanding of the relationships among humans and the 
more-than-human world. Having sketched this background, I then trace the development 
of constitutive rhetoric as it has played out in the field of rhetorical studies. Although 
scholars interested in the productive force of rhetoric often mention the deteriorating 
effects of rhetoric in passing, this function has not yet been thoroughly examined. Thus, 
in a final theoretical detour, I meditate on the connections among dirt, disorder, and 
decomposition. These three figures/objects/practices then inform my reading of both the 
UDP’s rhetorical practices as well as media coverage of the project. 
I read three sets of textual fragments: the master’s thesis in which Spade first 
developed the idea for the UDP, the project’s website, and the popular press coverage the 
project has received. Spade’s (2013) master’s thesis lays the theoretical and conceptual 
groundwork for the UDP and provides crucial background on the rhetorical tactics that 
permeate both the UDP’s official rhetoric as well as the reception it has received in the 
popular press. Importantly, Spade’s thesis became an inventional resource for the 
publicly circulating texts about the project. The second fragment is the UDP’s website, 
which, I argue, aestheticizes human decomposition by picturing it as a process that is 
both natural and beautiful. Indeed, the website models the processual, ritual potential of 
human composting. The website’s various modes of visualizing the human composting 
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process also work to rhetorically curtail the potential “ick” factor viewers might expect to 
experience when confronting the abject. Nevertheless, the UDP’s images productively 
decompose accepted understandings of the human body as a bounded entity, divisible 
from the ecosystems it inhabits. The images, in other words, “sneak” a rather radical 
bodily ontology into an otherwise banal depiction of human decomposition. Finally, an 
inkling of acceptance for the idea of human composting as an alternative to conventional 
burials and cremation can be glimpsed in an analysis of the news coverage paid to the 
UDP. From The New York Times to The Atlantic, from Slate to People Magazine, from 
The Independent to Smithsonian Magazine, from TreeHugger to The Telegraph, news 
coverage of the UDP has expressed both concern and excitement for the human 
composting system. In exploring media coverage of the project, I show how the UDP’s 
decompositional rhetoric is entering into and transforming public discourses about 
deathcare practices and ecological politics. 
 
A Very Short Overview of Urban Deathscapes in America 
For all their vitality, cities are also places of staggering numbers of deaths. In 
2014, for example, on average 404 people died each day in the state of New York alone. 
By the end of the year, 147,488 people had died in the Empire State (“Annual Report of 
Vital Statistics” 2016). In Manhattan, only one burial ground—Trinity Cemetery and 
Mausoleum—reportedly still has space available for new interments (Garrison 2014). All 
the others have, it seems, reached their carrying capacity. In October 2013, The New York 
Times published a sequence of short articles collectively titled “Too Many Bodies, Too 
Little Space” in which several experts commented on the future of deathcare in the city. 
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As Christopher Coutts (2013) put it in his response, “The increasing necessity of 
conserving space and environmental quality are slowly forcing a paradigm shift away 
from the ‘coffin in the cemetery’ approach and back to being wrapped in burlap and 
buried in the woods.” In places such as New York City, where population density and 
death rates outpace space for conventional burials, alternatives have been and continue to 
be pursued. Cremation is among the most popular options. This section glances back at 
urban deathcare practices, setting the stage for a later engagement with the Urban Death 
Project’s proposed human composting system. 
Prior to the American Civil War, deathcare in the United States was mostly a 
matter of family concern. Whenever someone died, writes the historian Gary Laderman 
(1996, 39), three practices were undertaken by the family and friends of the deceased: 
“cosmetic preparation at home, transportation to the grave site, and interment or 
entombment in a designated place.” It was standard practice for family members to take 
care of the corpse—to wash it and anoint it with oils, dress it, and ready it for guests who 
might drop by to see the body; to place it inside a simple wooden coffin they likely would 
have ordered from a local cabinetmaker; and to carry it to the site of its burial. For the 
most part, these practices were the same in both the city and the country. The funeral and 
mortuary industries had not yet solidified into the commonplaces they are today. Whether 
one lived on the bustling streets of an urban center or on a sleepy road in a country town, 
“death in early America retained for most of its citizens a largely spare, earthy, and 
family-centered focus” (Harris 2007, 42). 
Within urban areas, however, there were often striking differences in how bodies 
were disposed of. In cities, social hierarchies often determined the path one’s body would 
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take in the material world of the afterlife. Race and class, for example, impacted the kinds 
of rituals that were undertaken. “The embellishments of the funeral—the deathbed scene 
with family and friends, the spectacle of the procession, and the personalized grave—
were routinely denied the urban poor” (Laderman 1996, 41). In place of these so called 
“embellishments,” the bodies of both the poor and African Americans were often 
disposed of anonymously in graveyards, often in plots containing several other bodies. 
(Notably, this practice continues today at New York City’s Hart Island, where more than 
one million people have been buried anonymously in mass graves [Bernstein 2016].) 
That is, though the urban dead ultimately found a similar fate—burial—how their bodies 
got there, and with what fanfare and exuberance, could not be taken for granted. 
Nevertheless, Laderman writes, though some bodies would have been placed within 
individual or family tombs, “in most cases” the urban dead were simply placed “in the 
earth underneath ornate markers or monuments” (45). Neither the elaborate casket nor the 
secure vault had yet been established as a necessary part of burial practices. 
Things started to change during the American Civil War, though, as high rates of 
death rendered embalming standard practice. Family members in faraway cities and 
towns wanted their dead sons’ bodies returned home in good enough shape for a proper 
viewing and burial. As embalming became popular, an industry began to accumulate 
around the human dead. Thus, in the second half of the 19th century, the care of the dead 
was transferred from the family to a professional class of undertakers, a coterie of corpse 
handlers proffering products and services at a range of prices to meet the varying needs 
and desires of surviving family members. Deathcare was handed over nearly in toto to 
such professionals: in addition to cleaning and embalming bodies, undertakers were 
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called on, and paid, for 
providing ‘services’ at the home, notifying families and guests about the 
death and funeral, tolling the bell, supplying the pall, placing the corpse in 
the coffin, carrying the coffin to the hearse and from the hearse to the 
vault or grave, furnishing a horse or a number of horses for the funeral 
procession, and digging the grave or opening and closing the tomb. 
(Laderman 1996, 45) 
 
Though these services were offered in the country as well, cities were an appealing venue 
for such a business venture since in urban areas, then and now, someone always seems to 
be dying. Urban areas provided a constant stream of corpses upon which the funeral and 
mortuary trades could be plied at great expense to the families of the dead and for 
considerable profit to those professionals selling their products and services (Mitford 
2000).  
During this period of upheaval and transformation in deathcare practices, the 
scene of burial shifted as well. Until the mid-1800s, most bodies were buried in 
churchyards, normally where the deceased had worshipped or where their family attended 
services. Churches were not only scenes of religious congregation, but also of social 
gatherings and served as places of reflection on the major stages of life and death. With 
graves in the churchyard, regular congregants had an at least weekly opportunity to visit 
their deceased loved ones and to be reminded of their own impending deaths. Over the 
years, however, churchyards were inundated with dead bodies. As Patricia Finney (2012) 
notes, “Graves were laid facing east and west, with the head to the west; all available 
space was used, with burials very close together, and at times on top of each other.” This 
close proximity of bodies led many to an apparently unsavory but strikingly ecological 
view of the churchyard: “The buried dead as a giant compost heap was once a 
commonplace idea,” writes the historian Thomas Laqueur (2015, 222). As churchyards 
141 
hit their capacity for burials, and as concerns grew about the hygiene of such burial 
grounds, interment shifted from the centers of social life to the margins. Thus was born 
the “rural cemetery movement,” which saw cemeteries crop up just outside of urban areas 
where land was more plentiful and concerns about hygiene were fewer. 
Hence, out of the churchyard and into the cemetery did dead bodies go. On the 
edges of existing cities and towns, modern “lawn cemeteries” were established, often in 
open fields benefiting from the shade of just a few trees. With graves arranged in neat 
rows, headstones quickly populated the grassy cemetery grounds, indications that a life 
was lived and remembered. The new space for the urban dead promised to bring order 
and cleanliness to the disposal of the dead. No longer would the graveyard resemble a 
compost pile; the advent of the cemetery ushered in organization, sanitation, and, above 
all, a departure from the church’s yard. Whereas the “churchyard was meant to be 
ancient, to belong to its place,” Laqueur (2015, 272) notes, cemeteries “were meant to be 
radically novel: spaces that broke with historical past to restore an idyllic classical one or 
to create a marvelous, even utopian future.” Dislocated from the confines of the 
churchyard, the modern cemetery could be expansive. With seemingly never-ending 
space for additional bodies, every person could have their own plot of land, promised to 
them into perpetuity—for a fee. This view of the cemetery as a final, permanent resting 
place for the dead remains mostly intact today. 
The modern cemetery has some striking downsides from an ecological 
perspective. As noted in Chapter Three, the now-conventional American cemetery has 
become an underground storehouse for millions of gallons of toxic chemicals and tons of 
wood, metal, and concrete (Olson 2014). Aboveground, the pedicured lawns are often 
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decorated with non-native species or, in a gesture of longitudinal commitment or 
relinquishment, faux floral arrangements. Fake flowers last longer because they do not 
decompose. As Katrina Spade (2013) notes in her master’s thesis, the modern cemetery is 
an ultimately unsustainable part of contemporary deathcare practices. Committing a piece 
of land to a single person’s decomposing corpse for eternity not only means that the earth 
will continue to be filled with more funereal materials but also that, eventually, land for 
burials will become excessively expensive or altogether unavailable. In many American 
cities, space is already running low for new interments (Berridge 2002) and burial plots 
can easily cost $2,000 or more depending on the location. Responding to the dwindling 
room in urban cemeteries and bolstered by an increasing awareness of environmental 
crises and the important role that human beings play in transforming ecological relations, 
the UDP proposes to create an alternative to the modern cemetery. This entails, as the 
next two sections demonstrate, rhetorically decomposing these historically significant 
burial practices. 
 
Productive Rhetorics: Making Things With Words 
Rhetoric is often touted as a productive art. Rather than re-presenting the world, 
rhetorics bring worlds into being. In recent decades discussions of subjectivity within the 
field of rhetoric have largely centered on the discursive production and maintenance of 
subject positions. Setting out with Kenneth Burke’s (1950) notion of “identification” and 
Louis Althusser’s (1971) idea of “interpellation,” rhetorical theorist Maurice Charland 
(1987, 134) developed the concept of “constitutive rhetoric”—at its most basic, a form of 
rhetoric that “calls its audience into being.” Constitutive rhetoric begs the chicken-or-egg 
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question: which comes first, audience or rhetoric? Understanding rhetoric not as 
persuasion but as identification, Charland posits that at least some rhetorics function to 
conjure an audience. Much as Michael Calvin McGee (1975) argued that “the people” is 
a political myth created and sustained by rhetoric but with real consequences, so 
Charland suggested that constitutive rhetorics both call subject positions into being and 
exert real force on them once they have been established. Such rhetorics invite people to 
identify themselves in and with an ideological discourse. In recognizing oneself in the 
address of another, a person is transformed into a subject of that ideological apparatus. 
Herein lies the doubled meaning of subject found in Michel Foucault’s (1994) work: both 
subject of and subject to discourse. 
According to Charland (1987), constitutive rhetorics generate three key effects. 
First, they constitute a “collective subject,” or a group of individuals who together 
recognize themselves in an ideological discourse (139). Charland offers a “White Paper” 
published by the Quebec government in 1979, which outlined a new political order, as 
one example of how constitutive rhetorics function to create such a collective subject. 
The Quebec government’s “White Paper” established the peuple Québécois by asserting 
the prior existence of such a people, that is, by narrating a history of such a peuple and 
inviting audiences to identify with this history. This historical narrative produces a 
second effect: the constitution of a “transhistorical subject” (140), which is to say, a 
subject that seems to transcend political contingencies. By narrating the history of the 
collective subject it simultaneously calls into being, constitutive rhetorics invite people to 
recognize themselves in an ongoing story. In Quebec, the “White Paper” traced an 
ancestral lineage and asserted that those living in the province are both heirs to and part 
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of this long history. This leads to a third effect: constitutive rhetorics also create an 
“illusion of freedom” (141). Within the narrative of a constitutive rhetoric, subjects are 
positioned as agents with the capacity to move and act freely. Yet, as Charland notes, 
because the narrative has already in some sense been written, freedom is an illusion, an 
already inscribed and delimited form of “freedom,” not the kind of freedom associated 
with free will. As these three effects illustrate, constitutive rhetorics are not simply 
representational but also ontological. Constitutive rhetorics do not merely refer to a pre-
constituted world; they compose worlds and subjects as they disseminate. 
The constitutive approach to rhetoric has proven productive for a number of 
rhetorical scholars interested in the creation of subject positions. Several thinkers have 
applied Charland’s concept to additional case studies, thus demonstrating how different 
subjects have been produced by various rhetorical practices (Gruber 2014; Hayden 2011; 
Stein 2002; Sweet and McCue-Enser 2010). Other thinkers have riffed off of Charland’s 
opening movement to extend our theoretical understanding of rhetoric’s potential 
constitutive force. As Charland (1987) notes, not all (or even most) constitutive rhetorics 
are successful. Picking up on this point, Helen Tate (2005) and Kenneth Zagacki (2007) 
attend to examples of “failed” constitutive rhetorics in the contexts of feminism and U.S.-
Iraq relations, respectively. Tending to another of Charland’s minor points—namely, that 
any act of positive identification necessarily entails negative identification—Robert Mills 
(2014) explores the ways in which sovereignty is also constituted over and against its 
others, the figure of the “pirate” being key among them. 
Pushing against Charland’s impulse toward the productive aspects of rhetoric, 
Michael Vicaro (2016, 334) examines the “deconstitutive” force of rhetoric, tracing 
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instances in which rhetoric “undermines or dismantles the existing legal and/or political 
status of those to whom it refers.” As Vicaro demonstrates, rhetorics are not always 
enrolled to create subject positions with which audiences identify; in some cases, 
constitutive rhetorics actually retract certain elements of subjectivity without the consent 
or identification of the people they refer to. Vicaro conceptually clarifies the power of 
language not to invent but to destabilize identities. If the force of constitutive rhetorics 
hinges on an audiences’ willingness to locate themselves within a discursive regime as a 
certain kind of person, deconstitutive rhetorics operate without the consent of those to 
whom they refer. Examining the rhetoric of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
presidential administrations during the global “War on Terror,” Vicaro argues that many 
of their legal gestures had as their “aim” and “effect” the “destruction, rather than the 
constitution, of heretofore legally recognized identities—a deconstitution of political and 
legal identity that, notably, is not dependent on the addressee’s investment or consent” 
(335). As Vicaro demonstrates, rhetoric is not simply productive; rhetorics also 
sometimes undo relationships, destabilize subject positions, and deteriorate the status of 
political actors. 
Like the constitutive approach to rhetoric advanced by Charland and others, the 
turn to articulation in rhetorical theory is concerned with how discourse is enrolled to 
generate social realities. Drawing on the work of social theorists Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe (1985) in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Kevin DeLuca (1999) 
proposes a “detour” through articulation as a way to supplement rhetorical theory’s 
understanding of and relation to subjectivity. “Articulation,” he writes, “has two aspects: 
speaking forth elements and linking elements” (335). Elements “preexist articulation as 
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floating signifiers,” but are put together in the process of “speaking forth” (335). A way 
of connecting elements to one another to create something new, articulation describes the 
discursive creation of social reality. Elements might be articulated into something called 
“Marxism” or “capitalism,” “environmentalism” or “deep ecology.” Having linked 
different elements into a “temporary unity” (335), these articulations make sense of the 
world in different ways and thus partake in a “struggle to fix meanings and define reality 
temporarily” (334). Like constitutive rhetoric, articulation is a process of rhetorically 
producing positions from which subjects experience the world. 
Since articulation is a name for the struggle to define social reality, there are 
always competing discursive operations at work. Social realities rub against one another. 
Thus, just as social realities can be articulated, so too can they be re- or disarticulated. 
Disarticulation is a process of delinking elements that had previously been joined 
together in a discursive formation. Recently, Leland Spencer and Joshua Trey Barnett 
(2016) emphasized the rhetorical process of disarticulation in a study of mainstream 
media coverage of the Soulforce Equality Ride, which functioned to delink queerness 
from Christianity. Whereas members of Soulforce work to articulate a “queer Christian” 
subject position through protest work, face-to-face meetings with students and faculty at 
Christian colleges and universities, and blogging (Spencer and Barnett 2013), much 
media coverage of the activist organization implicitly or explicitly subverts that 
articulatory process by making queerness and Christianity seem incommensurable. This 
struggle exposes “the profoundly discursive grounds upon which any politics must 
proceed” (Spencer and Barnett 2016, 155). As this example suggests, disarticulation can 
be a means of propping up hegemony. Yet, as the remainder of this chapter will 
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demonstrate, disarticulating elements can also support counter-hegemonic forms of 
activism. 
I would like to point to one final theoretical example that demonstrates the 
linkages between rhetoric and the production of subjectivity and social reality. On the 
edge of the field of rhetorical theory sits Latour (2010) with his perhaps more expansive 
notion of “composition,” which encompasses not just the production of subjects but also 
of objects. Latour’s sense of composition reminds us that “things have to be put together 
[…] while retaining their heterogeneity” (474). Bypassing the question of whether 
something, including subjectivity, is rhetorically constructed, Latour’s notion of 
composition “draws attention away from the irrelevant difference between what is 
constructed and what is not constructed, toward the crucial difference between what is 
well or badly constructed, well or badly composed” (474). Composition—how things are 
formed from heterogeneous materials—is rhetorical through and through, and Latour’s 
emphasis on whether something is “well or badly composed” invites rhetorical scholars to 
think not only about how texts are made but also about what they do, what force they 
exert in the world, and how they might be changed. 
Just as Charland (1987) and DeLuca (1999) acknowledge that constitutive 
rhetorics and discursive articulations can be undone, Latour recognizes as well that 
compositions are never permanent. As Latour (2010, 478) put it, composition culls 
together both “immanence and truth” into the same approach, noting that although 
“nothing is beyond dispute […] closure has to be achieved.” As such, a compositionist 
sees things as provisional gatherings, which are always open to re- and decomposition. 
“What is to be composed may, at any point,” Latour writes, “be decomposed” (474). 
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While composition highlights the contingency of any given phenomenon it also attends to 
the relative duration that a concept, practice, or fact enjoys. Compositionism oscillates 
between deconstruction and defense by enabling scholars to show how, on the one hand, 
things are made in messy entanglements and, on the other, why some things enjoy more 
or less stability depending precisely on their composition. As this chapter deals with the 
decomposition of longstanding and deep-seated deathcare rituals, I turn now from the 
productive force of rhetoric to its role in undoing troubling relations. 
 
Dirt, Disorder, Disgust, Decomposition 
Dirt is a central figure in the UDP’s decompositional rhetoric, and for good 
reason. In the introduction to Purity and Danger, anthropologist Mary Douglas (1966) 
outlines the instrumental and expressive functions of what she calls “pollution ideas,” 
belief systems maintained by particular societies to both organize and give meaning to 
disparate, heterogeneous elements that nevertheless come into contact with one another. 
The instrumental force of pollution ideas, Douglas claimed, ensures that “certain moral 
values are upheld and certain social rules defined by beliefs in dangerous contagion” (4). 
By symbolically separating the pure from the impure, the clean from the unclean, the 
benign from the threatening, pollution ideas shape whether and how different kinds of 
elements interact. Since the end of the American Civil War, as noted above and reiterated 
by Laqueur (2015), a large portion of the American populace has been persuaded by the 
idea that dead human bodies ought not come into contact with the soil for risk of cross-
contamination: not only might soil destroy the flesh, we are told, but the flesh might also 
dirty the soil with disease. Maintained by the funeral industry, this idea has forcefully 
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shaped the deathcare choices of hundreds of millions of people to the tune of 
multibillion-dollar annual profits (Harris 2007; Mitford 2000). Demands to embalm, calls 
for heavy coffins, requirements for concrete vaults: these are some effects of pollution 
ideas that function instrumentally to keep things separate, to keep the body out of the 
damp earth, and to ensure the purity of nature and culture. 
Pollution ideas work as well on an expressive level, which is to say that they not 
only function as limits on action but on thought, too. They have a rhetorical force that 
impinges on the way we think about our bodies and our relationships with other objects, 
places, chemicals, and bodies. These pollution ideas regulate our beliefs and invite us to 
see certain relationships as benign and others as dangerous. As Douglas (1966, 4) put it, 
“the kind of contacts which are thought dangerous also carry a symbolic load” and, thus, 
“are used as analogies for expressing a general view of the social order.” In all cultures, 
ideas about the clean and the dirty, the pure and the impure, and the safe and the risky 
disseminate with consequences. Claiming that something is clean welcomes and 
encourages contact; on the contrary, claiming that something is dirty warrants distrust 
and discourages encounters. Drawing distinctions between the polluting and the non-
polluting is, thus, a rhetorical process that both reflects and creates values. In the United 
States, Jim Crow laws exemplify this discursive process: even as the legal rights of 
African Americans were affirmed, black bodies were framed as dirty and dangerous, 
something to be avoided. Framing something or someone as dangerous, as a social 
pollutant, suggests that it or they are less valuable than their more benign counterparts 
and, additionally, this process reifies arbitrary moral valuations. Thus, pollution ideas, 
though malleable and historically unstable, powerfully impact upon social relations and 
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give shape to a culture’s contours. 
“Dirt” is the name that Douglas gives to that shifting, variegated, and incoherent 
category of things that a culture defines for a time as polluting and dangerous. One could 
catalogue specific kinds of dirt in a given culture at a given time and thus have a sense of 
how that culture operates, what it values, what it abhors, what sorts of relations it fosters 
and what kinds it repudiates. In such a catalogue one would find all sorts of things: 
objects (refuse), substances (soil), chemicals (toxic), and animals (wild). People, too, are 
sometimes cast as pollutants, as the example of Jim Crow laws above demonstrates. 
Classifying dirt is in some significant sense a question of policing the domestic sphere. 
Cross thresholds and the catalogue changes. What is safe in one home, one culture, could 
be dangerous in another. Douglas (1966, 44) writes, “Dirt is the by-product of a 
systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting 
inappropriate elements.” Thus, whatever is rejected becomes dirt(y): excluded from the 
realm of the clean and pure, the good and benign, rejected elements function as negative 
terms in endless chains of symbolic-material orderings. Dirt is what is left over, the 
excremental remains, when people set about developing systems and structures: it 
accumulates wherever order is imposed. 
Dirt is also disarray. Once polluting ideas are established, dirt offends against the 
purity to which it has been opposed. “As we know it,” Douglas (1966, 2) contends, “dirt 
is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in the eye of the 
beholder.” Dirt haunts the background, giving shape to the foreground. Dirt is the messy 
canvas upon which a figure appears, the necessarily chaotic darkness from which light 
emerges. In Derridean terms, dirt is the devalued term in hierarchical dichotomies: what 
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writing is to speech, what the body is to the mind, what animals are to humans, what 
nature is to culture, et cetera. Such dichotomies, as Derrida (1976; 1982; 2008) teaches 
us, are arbitrarily imposed and support power relationships that privilege one term over 
another. As disarray and disorder, dirt defines the contours of the clean, the pure, the 
benign, and, ultimately, the good. From it, order emerges: out of chaos, clarity. Hence the 
strong attraction cross-culturally to various forms of pollution ideas. As Derrida (1981) 
makes clear, however, we should be suspicious any time one term is privileged over 
another, any time one thing is framed as more pure or more originary.  
Pervasive, actual dirt is everywhere and inescapable. Though moved to the 
margins, brushed out of sight, cleansed from domestic space, dirt nevertheless permeates 
everyday life. “Dirt, soil, earth, and dust,” Heather Sullivan (2012, 515) notes, “surround 
us at all scales: we find them on our shoes, bodies, and computer screens; in fields and 
forests, floating in the air.” It comes into our homes on the bottoms of our shoes, gets 
lodged under our fingernails, and discolors our clothing, but dirt also provides the firm 
ground upon which we move, provides nutrients for the foods we consume, filters the 
water that we drink, and nourishes a rich biotic community that normally remains out of 
sight and out of mind. Without dirt, there can be no life: none of us could survive without 
the vital soil. Actual dirt is an essential if enigmatic component of earthly coexistence. 
Dirt is also, in one way or another, that to which our bodies will eventually return. Dirt is 
the traditional resting place of human corpses, a place where human and more-than-
human mingle in the production of mortal assemblages.  
The relationship between dirt and corpses drives the UDP’s decompositional 
rhetoric. The corpse is precisely that which returns to dirt, becomes dirt, through the 
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process of decomposition. The corpse is, thus, dirt-y. And, in this way, the corpse is 
disgusting; it brings the beholder into intimate contact with the absolute other of the 
living, breathing human body. Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection is useful for 
understanding how corpses contaminate our sense of self by decomposing the border 
between subject and object. In Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Kristeva (1982, 
2) defines the abject as that which is  
radically excluded and [that] draws me toward the place where meaning 
collapses. [...] Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either. A ‘something’ 
that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of meaninglessness, about 
which there is nothing insignificant, and which crushes me.  
 
The abject is, then, what is cast out and evades meaning precisely in its movement away 
from the more comfortable scenes of subjectivity and objectivity. Neither subject nor 
object, both of which take on meanings, the abject defies conventional categorizations 
and refuses to make sense. How to classify the film that settles on the surface of warm 
milk, the acrid smell of decay, or the sight of rotting human flesh? These things provoke 
feelings of disgust, acts of repulsion, and sometimes even violent bodily convulsions in 
the form of vomiting, spitting, choking, or physically withdrawing. In response, we repel 
such abject things, move away from them, reject them. In doing so, in differentiating 
ourselves from the abject, we make ourselves. In other words, by casting certain things 
out, by repressing them in a primitive way, we become what we are. 
 Human corpses become in Kristeva’s work the exemplary form of the abject. 
Corpses are what we cannot tolerate as mortal beings: “The corpse (or cadaver: cadere, to 
fall), that which has irremediably come a cropper [fallen heavily], is cesspool, and death; 
it upsets even more violently the one who confronts it as the fragile and fallacious 
chance” (Kristeva 1982, 3). The corpse upsets because it is that which we cannot become 
153 
while still retaining the “who” of what we are. Corpses cannot, in other words, be 
assimilated. Encountering a corpse always entails making contact with the abject, coming 
into close proximity with that which we must thrust aside, ignore, forget, refuse. This is 
so because, as Kristeva contends, the corpse pushes us to our limits as mortal beings, to 
the border of what it means to be the kind of beings that we are. The corpse is finitude 
incarnate: the body of the dead. Importantly, this encounter with the corpse is marked not 
by meaning but by force: 
A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, 
does not signify death. In the presence of signified death—a flat 
encephalograph, for instance—I would understand, react, or accept. No, as 
in true theater, without makeup or masks, refuse and corpses show me 
what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body fluids, this 
defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on 
the part of death. There, I am at the border of my condition as a living 
being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, from that border. (3) 
 
In distinguishing signification from demonstration, Kristeva crucially highlights the 
difference between encountering a re-presentation of death and death itself, embodied 
here by the cadaver. The “flat encephalograph” signifies death in the form of linear 
movements—flatness denotes a lack of brain activity. In encountering this graphic 
representation of (a lack of) brain activity, we understand a body as living or dead. It 
rationalizes the encounter with death. In encountering a corpse, however, we confront in 
the fallen body not a sign or symbol of death but death itself.  
Corpses are, thus, a form of dirt in Douglas’s (1966) sense. We cast them out, 
banish them from view, avoid dealing with them, and, perhaps most of all, abstain from 
smelling them, precisely in order that we might understand ourselves as vital beings. “It 
is thus not,” Kristeva (1982, 4) writes, “lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection 
but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. 
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The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.” That is, corpses are rejected not because 
they are in fact dirty but because they offend against order. Corpses unsettle boundaries 
between the living and the dead by exposing in the cadaver the ways in which death 
already inhabits life. Kristeva continues: 
In that compelling, raw, insolent thing in the morgue’s full sunlight, in that 
thing that no longer matches and therefore no longer signifies anything, I 
behold the breaking down of a world that has erased its borders: fainting 
away. The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost 
of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. (4) 
 
Such encounters with that “compelling, raw, insolent thing,” the corpse, are themselves 
abjected because they open onto the possibility that we might recognize in the body of 
the dead something of ourselves. Corpses remind us of our mortal materiality, that we are 
finite creatures destined to become cadavers ourselves, that our bodies, too, will fall and 
become otherwise. Avoiding corpses is a form of what, in Chapter One, I called death 
denial, a form of repression in which mortality itself is avoided. Yet, Kristeva contends, 
abjection  
is experienced at the peak of its strength when that subject, weary of 
fruitless attempts to identify with something on the outside, finds the 
impossible within; when it finds that the impossible [death] constitutes its 
very being; that it is none other than abject. (5) 
 
We are what we detest, what we thrust aside. The very thing we cannot assimilate, the 
very border we cannot cross, we already are (becoming). We understand, as Derrida 
(1993) writes, only from our mortality. 
Whereas encountering corpses pushes us to our limits as mortal beings, forcing us 
to confront our own mortality, dirt brings us to the brink of our materiality by promising 
to decompose even our cadavers. Dirt decomposes boundaries, not least of which is the 
line between life and death. Dirt is deconstructive, reminding us that the boundaries 
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between the pure and the impure are fallible, that the relationship between the inside and 
the outside is porous, that the human subject is irreducibly enmeshed in ecosystems, that 
relations are made and remade in strange assemblages, that life and death cannot easily 
be separated. Thinking through some of these dirty lessons, Sullivan (2012, 515) 
proposes “‘dirt theory’ as an antidote to nostalgic views rendering nature a far away and 
‘clean’ site precisely in order to suggest that there is no ultimate boundary between us 
and nature. We are enmeshed within dirt in its many forms.” While Sullivan turns to the 
appearance of dirt in literature, I consider the relationship between death and dirt as 
articulated in the UDP’s rhetoric as a means of coming closer to an ecological view of 
both deathcare and human cohabitation of the land-community. Dirt’s decompositional 
force brings us to the brink of several Great Divides and makes it possible not only to 
peer into the abyss but to challenge the given orders we find in the depths of cultural and 
ecological relations. 
Decomposition has much in common with Derrida’s critical practice of 
deconstruction. These similarities bring out what I find especially interesting about the 
UDP’s efforts to reimagine and remake deathcare practices. For Derrida, deconstruction 
is a way of reading that simultaneously (a) takes the text seriously as a densely woven 
and dynamic object, (b) locates within the text a contradiction or blind spot, and (c) 
produces a displacement of the text’s founding assumptions. Thus, deconstruction is both 
unsettling and generative. As a way of reading, it challenges the undergirding order (the 
commonsense and unquestioned aspects) of a text but also, rather than simply destroying 
the text, uses the text to make something new. Decomposition enacts a similar operation. 
In the soil, organic materials are broken down by microorganisms, fungi, and scavengers. 
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This organic material is not simply destroyed, however. As it disintegrates, it becomes 
the condition for the creation of something new. Some organisms depend upon the 
decomposing body for sustenance. Thus, new life emerges out of death. As one thing 
wears away, another is born. 
Deconstruction proceeds along two lines. First, deconstruction disables 
dichotomous and hierarchical thinking, the kind of thinking that positions certain entities 
at odds with one another (human versus nature) and proposes that one of the entities is 
superior to the other (humans are better than nature). Although hierarchical dichotomies 
have guided much philosophical thought, Derrida urges that we dispense with them. For 
Derrida, differences are always constructed through the general structure of writing, 
which extends well beyond the practice of writing itself to include all activity. Hence, his 
celebrated but often misunderstood assertion that, “There is nothing outside the text” 
(Derrida 1976, 158, emphasis in original). In order to realize its full force, Derrida’s 
claim must be understood not as a withdrawal into textuality, but rather as a reminder that 
the ontological play of differences enacted in texts extends to the world more generally. 
The constant production of differences at work in texts is also at work in everyday life. 
For example, the production of the dichotomy between mind and body can be traced 
through philosophical discourses, with high points in both Plato and Descartes, as well as 
in everyday life and practice. Thus, the first effect of deconstruction is to make visible the 
play of differences that is constitutive of “texts” in both the narrow and broad senses of 
this term. 
Deconstruction has as its second effect the production of something new. In 
addition to making the production of difference visible, deconstruction always leaves 
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something else in its wake through a process of displacement. Thus, deconstruction is a 
creative practice, always productive of a new signifying structure. As Derrida (1976, 158) 
puts it, “To produce this signifying structure obviously cannot consist of reproducing, by 
the effaced and respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, voluntary, intentional 
relationship that the writer institutes.” Put another way, deconstruction neither merely 
reproduces the text along the lines intended by its author(s), nor demystifies a text’s real 
or true meaning, nor gets to the root of a text’s origins. For Derrida, all of this is 
impossible. Deconstruction instead yields a reading of the text against itself, against the 
signifying structures that are latent within it, and that, therefore, obscure the artificiality 
of its founding assumptions. It is in this sense that Derrida’s (2002) deconstruction of 
Western philosophy’s relation to “the Animal” produces another relation with animals, 
one characterized not by domination but by simultaneous heterogeneity and response-
ability (cf. Haraway 2008). Even the philosopher is utterly transformed in the process: 
Derrida replaces the Cartesian cogito ergo sum with “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” 
simultaneously reversing and disintegrating the human/animal dichotomy. 
My point in the following pages is not to perform a deconstructive reading of the 
UDP. Rather, by reading Spade’s (2013) master’s thesis, the Project’s website, and 
mainstream media coverage of the UDP, I suggest that there is a practical form of 
deconstruction already at work through the mobilization of the figures of dirt and 
decomposition. The UDP, in other words, performs a deconstructive operation on the 
rhetoric of deathcare by highlighting the productivity of decomposition, by reimagining 
burial as a transient, ephemeral, and generative process, as opposed to a simple endpoint. 
Harnessing the rhetorical force of decomposition, the UDP de- and recomposes 
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ecological forms of relationality over and against a facile call for environmental harmony 
or even the withdrawal of human forces altogether. Human composting generates not 
harmony but cooperation, not annihilation but creative destruction.  
Decomposition, therefore, is at work on at least two levels in the case of the UDP. 
On one level, the rhetoric surrounding the Project functions to decompose some of the 
taken-for-granted assumptions about both the (category of the) human and ecosystems. 
By rhetorically returning the human to cycles of death, decomposition, and life, the UDP 
challenges forms of human exceptionalism that work to separate the human body from 
the deteriorating force of the world. Against the dominant deathcare rhetorics of the past 
150 years (Mitford 2000), the UDP promotes entanglement rather than sequestration. The 
rotting corpse functions as a way into forms of entanglement that produce alternative 
mortal assemblages. On another level, the process of human composting imagined by the 
UDP also decomposes how we think about environmental activism. Rather than simply 
making something new, human composting radically unmakes one kind of thing in order 
to make space for another. Thus, human composting disrupts the never-ending cycles of 
production and consumption. In response to massive human consumption, human 
composting recognizes the potential energy in human bodies that is typically diverted 
from ecosystems. Its force is rooted in an understanding of decomposition as essential, 
inevitable, cyclical, and collaborative. As the human body decomposes, it enters into 
alternative consumptive streams: it becomes useful in the production of new soil material, 
thus making new life possible.  
Composting has a history in ecological activism. Some have used composting as a 
means of intervening in the world. As environmental communication scholars Janet 
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Donoghue and Alison Fisher (2008, 232) compellingly explain: 
Compost is movement. It requires action to elicit the transformative 
process in either decomposing or nurturing. It requires collecting, 
emptying, turning and spreading. Compost stagnates. It just sits in the 
kitchen and sometimes the banana peel looks just like it did the day 
before, perhaps just a little browner. Compost is slow and inconvenient. It 
is incremental and you have to be methodical at the expense of 
convenience. Compost is transformation. A banana peel becomes fuel for 
a tomato plant. Compost is hard work. It requires daily commitment. 
Compost is gratifyingly radical. The same nutrients that nurture us also 
nurture the soil we use, denying the landfill, disrupting the norm. Compost 
is rich. Gardeners call it liquid gold. Compost is simple. Use your kitchen 
waste with yard clippings and produce the best possible fertilizer. 
Compost is complex. It is amorphous in nature; everything decays in its 
own time. Compost is personal. Its ingredients have all been touched by 
our hands if not used by our body. Compost is political. It is a system. 
Sometimes it is slippery or dirty, but it can have huge potential. Compost 
is good for the environment. It reduces waste, landfill space, and CO2. The 
soil utilizes carbon in a way that the atmosphere can no longer hold. 
Compost is postmodern. It is composed of many things, defying science to 
duplicate it in the exact way. Compost is modern. The instructions are 
simple. Compost is death, forcing us to face the inevitability of our own 
decay. Compost is life. It is living matter that nurtures and purposefully 
encourages other living matter. It is generational, simultaneously dying 
and thriving. 
 
As Donoghue and Fisher make clear, composting is a transformative process. It troubles 
many of the conceptual distinctions inherent in human exceptionalism and 
anthropocentrism. In the next three sections, I look closely at the ways in which 
decomposition and dirt figure in the rhetoric of the UDP, as well as at how mainstream 
media are grappling with this nonanthropocentric intervention into deathcare practices 
and ecological politics. 
 
Groundwork: Cultivating Ground for Human Composting 
Articulating composting as “dying and thriving,” as Donoghue and Fisher put it, 
is at the core the Urban Death Project’s efforts to recompose deathcare practices. While 
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studying architecture at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Spade wrote a 
master’s thesis on the challenges faced by the “urban dead,” which culminated in the 
initial proposal for the UDP. Spade’s (2013) thesis, “Of Dirt and Decomposition: 
Proposing a Resting Place for the Urban Dead,” rhetorically shifts the ground upon which 
readers might think about and respond to death, decomposition, and the land-
communities in which they are enmeshed. “There is a design solution,” she writes, 
“which would bring the cycles of nature into the city in a deep and meaningful way, so 
much so that to end up there would be divine” (4). The thesis works up to offering human 
composting as a “design solution,” grappling in the process with issues such as dirt’s 
essential role in ecosystems, the fear of bodily decay, and ecology’s place within the 
cityscape. Since Spade’s thesis offers a theoretical justification for the project, and since 
journalists writing about the project often cite it, it provides access to the kind of 
conceptual labor involved in reimagining the world that normally passes out of sight. It is 
precisely to this groundwork—the rhetorical cultivation of new ground, new conditions 
of possibility—that I now turn. 
The “ground” is often invoked to suggest that certain kinds of action and inaction 
are made more and less possible depending on where one finds oneself, that is, on the 
specific contours of one’s social location. In her thesis, Spade invites readers to consider 
the ground beneath their feet as a vital starting point for rethinking death, dying, and 
ecology. “Needless to say,” Spade (2013) says anyways, “without dirt, humans wouldn’t 
exist. Everything we depend on—from our food to our building foundations to the 
microbes in our guts—comes from this incredible stuff” (5). Dirt is the ground upon 
which we walk, a fundamental element in the human experience, but it also is the 
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foundation of various networks that sustain biological, social, and economic life. This 
should be common knowledge (“Needless to say…”), yet it must be said, recalled, 
reinforced in order to make sense as a point of departure for action. By saying what need 
not be said, Spade reminds readers to remember what they already know but have 
presumably forgotten—that the ground upon which they tread is not merely metaphorical. 
Spade reminds readers, as Abram (1996, 273) puts it, “to feel the soil beneath the 
pavement.” Dirt is transformed from the banal to the extraordinary, from the taken-for-
granted to the “incredible.” We walk on the ground, to be sure, but we also “depend” 
upon it in ways that point to our inextricable interconnectedness within the ecosystems to 
which we belong.  
This earthen ground must be defended since, as Spade (2013, 5) contends, “we are 
violently mistreating the dirt beneath our feet through our agricultural, logging and 
development methods.” Indeed, for Spade, the way humans treat soil is symptomatic of 
broader forms of mistreatment that extend to entire ecosystems. “This is not the place to 
make the claim,” she notes, “that humans continue to destroy the world around us; we 
will take that for granted here” (5). Spade thus reverses what can be presumed: of course 
humans are violently mistreating the earth. What cannot be presumed, however, is the 
ground upon which this abuse occurs. Dirt is not the inanimate a priori of life, but is 
itself lively. “An acre of soil may contain up to 900 pounds of earthworms, 2400 pounds 
of fungi, 1500 pounds of bacteria, 133 pounds of protozoa, and 890 pounds of arthropods 
and algae,” she writes (6). Far from being merely anything, soil is full of life. By 
demonstrating how dirt is earth’s “living breathing skin,” Spade begins to cultivate a 
reason for its defense (5). As Judith Butler (2009, 25) argues, since life is “by definition 
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precarious” it must be cared for, tended to, taken seriously. By infusing dirt with vitality, 
Spade brings dirt into the realm of the living and so places it within the ethical domain. If 
dirt is living, she argues, this may be reason enough to care for it. 
And yet, however lively dirt may be, it is also where decay and decomposition 
occur. No matter what else dirt may be, it is where dead things go to rot. This poses a 
problem for defending and embracing dirt because, as Spade (2013, 10–11) points out, 
“our society is deathly afraid of decay.” Or, to put it differently, many people are deathly 
afraid of death itself, which is inextricably linked to decay and decomposition. Since it is 
linked with death, dirt disgusts. We abject it. We develop all sorts of technologies and 
techniques to avoid dirt: brooms, vacuums, paved streets, sidewalks, and ground 
coverings are each examples of the ways that we try to overcome dirt. Contemporary 
Western burial practices also materially attest to our aversion to dirt and its effects on the 
human body. As Val Plumwood (1999) writes, “the strong coffin, conventionally buried 
well below the level of soil fauna activity, and the slab over the grave to prevent any 
other things from digging us up, keeps the Western human body from becoming food for 
other species.” This fear of dirt, which is also a fear of death, is grounded in the idea that 
wholeness, unity, and continuity are universal goods, that even dead human corpses 
ought to be preserved from the deteriorating effects of the earth for as long as possible. 
Indeed, as Douglas (1966, 2) has argued, “Dirt offends against order.” It is the ordering 
of the pure (the human) and the impure (the natural) that is at stake in burial practices. 
While Spade admits that humans’ fear of decay “makes sense,” since they “remind us of 
death,” she also cautions that, “our reaction to this fear is definitely not natural” (14). 
Indeed, worrying about decay “leads us to create all sorts of chemicals, plastics, and 
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polymers to keep things from falling down or getting stinky” (14). Precisely because dirt 
is synonymous with decay and decomposition, Spade contends, cultural practices attempt 
to bring order to what is inherently disorderly. Put differently, deathcare practices are a 
means of dealing with the doubly abjected: dirt and corpses. Conventional burial 
manages the abject, keeps it at a distance from survivors, tempers it, makes it palatable by 
keeping it out of sight and out of mind. Is it any wonder that funeral workers cover the 
broken earth with AstroTurf? 
Dirt causes so much concern and evokes so much effort because it is the locus 
where the living and the dead comingle, a space wherein humans and nature cannot help 
but impinge upon one another. Dirt blurs boundaries; dirt is messy. In her thesis Spade 
reconciles these issues by placing death and decomposition within broader natural cycles 
and arguing for an embrace, rather than a rejection, of what those cycles mean for 
humans. “Embalming and casketing practices,” she contends, “are specifically formulated 
to defend against natural processes which are ultimately inevitable” (2013, 15, emphasis 
mine). Challenging human dominance over nature and natural processes, Spade instead 
works to incorporate humans into inevitable cycles that are bound to happen no matter 
how hard humans try to stop them. As Julie Schutten (2008, 209) avers, “Moving to an 
ethic of environmental sustainability involves considerable relinquishing of control and a 
heightened vulnerability of humans to other-than-human forces.” Embracing an 
ecological perspective implies, in other words, giving up the ideals of purity that drive 
humans to forestall the inevitable—decomposition. To highlight this point, Spade 
compares her own embrace of decay to modern burial practices, which rely on 
embalming fluids to preserve dead bodies: “as nonsensical as the processes sound, they 
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are preferred by many to the idea of a loved one decomposing; our society’s fear of 
decay is that deep” (15). The physical and metaphorical messiness of decomposition will 
eventually win out, Spade argues, yet embracing the disorderliness of decomposition 
remains a key challenge for ecological politics. It is a question of displacing the feelings 
of disgust with which we so typically confront (the idea of) rotting corpses. 
Politically, the UDP’s embrace of decomposition also works against current 
corporate-driven models of disposing our deceased. To be sure, the UDP does not avoid 
commodification altogether, but it does shift the grounds on which death practices are 
carried out. Spade demonstrates the difference by critiquing the funeral industry in the 
United States, which is predicated on modes of burial that harm both the earth and funeral 
workers in its efforts to preserve the human body. As Spade (2013, 14–15) argues, 
Embalming fluid is comprised primarily of formaldehyde, which has been 
proven to cause cancer, and although manufacturers have started 
marketing embalming fluids that are less toxic, the funeral industry has 
deemed these products to be less effective overall and avoided their use. 
  
By forestalling decay and decomposition, that is, the funeral industry inevitably 
disseminates toxins for the sake of making dead human bodies look alive, a process that 
dates back to the American Civil War (Spade 2013, 14). Still, Spade suggests that there 
are other reasons to be skeptical of the funeral industry’s practices. “Casket choice,” she 
argues, “further illustrates our society’s fear of decay, and the irrational notion that we 
might prevent our bodies from it […] the more you pay, the more protected your loved 
one will be” (15-16). Given Western aversion to decay, it is not surprising that people 
pay between $500 and $10,000 for such caskets. Moreover, Spade notes, “The process of 
embalming has taken the task of dealing with dead bodies away from the families of the 
deceased, and turned it over to an $11 billion funeral industry” (16). By turning death 
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practices into primarily a commodity, and by wresting control over dead bodies from 
ordinary people, the funeral industry generates boundaries between the living and the 
dead, supports the idea that death and decomposition can be managed (read: forestalled) 
through ever more advanced technologies, and reaps enormous financial benefits from 
those who are grieving the loss of a loved one. From this perspective, the modern funeral 
industry is a complex assemblage of practices that negotiate our relationships with the 
abject. Professional undertakers bear the burden of intimately grappling with corpses, of 
placing bodies into the earth, so that the rest of us will not have to. 
Radically relinquishing control over the human body, Spade advances human 
composting as a tactical response to the ecological and spatial challenges posed by the 
urban dead. Human composting is thus positioned as an ecologically sensitive response to 
traditional burials that, Spade notes, “actually harm the earth” (21). Indeed, whereas 
conventional burial, including embalming the corpse, tends to be thought of as more 
sterile than natural burials, Spade paints a different picture:  
At six feet under, the decomposition of the body is slowed by a lack of 
microorganisms (which live primarily towards the surface of the soil). 
Couple that with an air-tight casket and a few gallons of formaldehyde, 
and the end result (it may take a few years, but rest assured it will happen), 
is not rich organic material but rather a soup of putrefied toxic liquid. (21)  
 
Having turned conventional burials into a grotesque process (who among us wants to 
imagine their loved one becoming a “soup of putrefied toxic liquid”?), Spade offers 
natural burials as a more desirable comparison case. Spade frames conventional burial as 
a disgusting process, one that leads not to the preservation of the body but, rather, to the 
slow but inevitable fate of becoming “toxic liquid.” In a natural burial by contrast, “The 
physical remains are taken in [by the earth] as nourishment for this tree, or that grove of 
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wildflowers, and when those plants die back they too will become nourishment for 
another” (22). The ecological perspective offered by Spade adheres to what Philip Olson 
(2014, 677) calls the “nutritive conception of the dead body,” in which the human body is 
seen as fodder for the ecosystem. Even if it does not completely overcome our cultural 
aversion to corpses and decomposition, it suggests that natural burial is at least less 
disgusting than what happens in funeral homes and conventional burial grounds. Indeed, 
by showing the differences in traditional and natural burials in this light, Spade makes 
decomposition the more desirable option since it turns human remains into nourishment 
rather than “toxic soup.” For city dwellers, the idea of toxins may already be a pressing 
threat, so nourishing plant life (trees, groves of wildflowers) may appear as welcome 
additions to the cityscape. 
Having introduced readers to the concept of human decomposition, Spade turns 
explicitly to her proposed process for human composting at the UDP. The first step, she 
notes, would be both ceremonial and inaugural: “Friends and family ‘lay in’ the body of 
the deceased at the top of the core, and cover it with carbon-rich material such as wood 
chips and sawdust” (2013, 45). Although the UDP facilities would be located in urban 
centers, the space itself would contain a large “core” of carbon-rich materials not unlike 
those found on the forest floor. “As the body decomposes,” Spade imagines, “it settles 
lower into the core, and new material and bodies are layered on top” (45). That is, the 
body slowly becomes indistinguishable from the earth, fully reintegrated as nourishing 
soil. After 18 months, the human body will have fully decomposed and settled to the 
bottom of the core, mingling not only with the carbon-rich material but with other bodies 
as well. Fully decomposed, the new soil would emerge through a passageway at the base 
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of the core, where loved ones can return to “visit” with the deceased. “This exterior 
compost space is designed as a place where mourners and visitors may stop and reflect” 
(45). Moreover, the “compost may also be taken away for use by members of the 
community, utilized for urban gardens” (45). In other words, the UDP would transform 
human bodies into rich, soil-building material that would nourish the earth rather than 
forestall the inevitable, and natural, cycles of decay and decomposition.  
To preemptively counter those critics who might deplore the UDP’s insistence on 
human composting for being too vulgar or gross (e.g., Lean 2015), as a too-close 
encounter with the abject corpse, Spade infuses a spiritual, ceremonial element into the 
process of decomposition. “The event of death,” she writes, “is so grand, so final, that it 
begs ceremony” (19). In her thesis, Spade imagines that friends and loved ones would 
enter the UDP’s interior and ascend up a four-story, slightly inclined ramp that circles 
around the core in which bodies are decomposing. As they make their ascent, mourners 
would meet up with the body of the deceased on the third level of the ramp and carry it to 
the top where they would lay it into the core. “Without romanticizing the past,” Spade 
argues, “it’s worth considering how the heart-wrenching acts of cleaning the body, 
digging a hole in the earth, and lowering the body into the ground, would be an important 
part of the grieving process” (16). Having lowered their loved one into the core, friends 
and family would emerge from the core into a “light-filled space” and then descend into 
the lobby “where a memorial service can be held, a celebration of the loved one’s life” 
(51-52). By constructing a simple ceremony to facilitate grieving and to initiate 
decomposition, Spade anticipates critiques that human composting is a grotesque 
aberration, perhaps even reminiscent of the mass burials so associated with war crimes, 
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Nazism, and genocide. Unlike those mass graves, Spade conceptualizes the UDP as a 
space where friends and family will lovingly place the deceased into the earth as a final 
act of solidarity with the ecosystems to which they belong. 
As I have suggested in the preceding pages, Spade’s thesis rhetorically shifts the 
ground upon which readers might think about and relate to death, decomposition, and 
ecological politics. “Among the millions of complicated relationships that make up our 
cultural experience,” Spade argues, “the cycle of birth-death-decomposition-growth is 
refreshingly straightforward” (56). Spade’s thesis cultivates new ground so that readers 
might embrace, rather than reject, these natural cycles of the earth. By highlighting the 
ground itself—dirt—as an incredible, life-sustaining force this thesis plunges readers into 
a web of ecological interrelationality that they are nevertheless already a part of. 
Embracing decomposition, Spade’s thesis deconstructs the liberal subject of modernity 
and replaces it with a bodily assemblage radically open to the world around it, a subject 
that can sustain, rather than harm, the ecological webs to which it belongs. 
 
Dirt-Work: The Aesthetics of Human Composting 
The conceptual groundwork which takes shape in Spade’s (2013) thesis becomes 
an inventional resource for the more publicly visible iterations of the project’s 
decompositional rhetoric, including its website. The UDP’s homepage is a key point of 
entry for people interested in the alternative burial movement and, in particular, the 
UDP’s proposal for human composting. The website’s rhetorical force owes to at least 
two visual tactics that help viewers imagine human decomposition as an ecologically 
sensitive process that also appeals to a more general human desire to memorialize and 
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remember the deceased. First, the website presents several speculative images in the form 
of architectural renderings of the UDP site and interior. These images invite viewers to 
contemplate the scene and rituals associated with death practices in a new way. In 
contrast with more familiar visions of bucolic cemeteries, Spade’s architectural drawings 
of the UDP highlight collectivity, movement, and temporality. Second, as viewers scroll 
down the website, they are confronted with alternating photographs of dirt and flora, 
which represent the connections among life and death engendered by the UDP. Inscribed 
with text that verbally links each photograph to the inevitable cycles of birth-death-
decomposition-growth, these photographs visualize the processual nature of human 
composting. Moreover, these images decenter the liberal human subject, individuated one 
last time at the moment of death, and present instead fragmented ecological elements, 
organic and inorganic materials that collectively compose the “living breathing skin” of 
the earth (Spade 2013, 5).  
Owing to Spade’s background as an architect, the UDP website includes three of 
the architectural renderings that first appeared in her master’s thesis. Designed to help 
viewers imagine what a building will look like once it is built and inhabited, these 
renderings are evocative: they invite viewers to imagine something that does not yet, but 
nevertheless could, exist in a particular place. When viewers first open the UDP’s 
website, they are confronted by a color rendering of the outside of one of the human 
composting cores (Figure 5). The sharp lines of the building’s proposed modernist 
architecture—steel, concrete, and glass arranged into a characteristically boxy but elegant 
structure—are softened in the rendering by fluffy white clouds hovering overhead and 
budding trees flanking each side like living columns. In the courtyard outside the core, 
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Figure 5 Exterior sketch of recomposition center. Screenshot taken on October 29, 2015, 
by the author. 
 
photo-realistic (but monochrome) human inhabitants are superimposed onto the computer 
drawing, which reminds viewers that this is a space for humans in death and in life. Other 
architectural renderings on the site show the interior of the UDP facility and allude to the 
process it contains. As users scroll down the website, they next confront a cross-section 
image of the facility, which shows the scale of the human composter as well as the ramps 
that lead visitors to the top of the core (Figure 6). Less photo-realistic than the first 
rendering, Figure 6 invites viewers to ponder the process at work in the UDP’s proposal. 
The schematic nature of this drawing highlights, in other words, the movement of human 
bodies through this place of decomposition and mourning. The process of mourning is 
further visualized in a third rendering that appears when viewers scroll still further down 
the website, which shows black-and-white inhabitants carrying a shrouded body up the 
ramp that leads to the scene of the laying-in (Figure 7). Together, these 
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Figure 6 Cross-cut view of recomposition center. Screenshot taken on November 4, 
2015, by the author.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Figure 7 Family transporting corpse within recomposition center. Screenshot taken on 
November 4, 2015, by the author.	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renderings depict the UDP as a scene of collective movement in time. 
In Figures 5 and 7, the UDP is pictured as a scene of collective cohabitation and 
movement. In these images, viewers confront multiple human and more-than-human 
elements cooperating within the same place. In Figure 5, for example, viewers see at 
least five different people variously interacting with the UDP structure—one person is 
walking into the building, another stands near the compost pile outside, two move away 
from the building together, and a fifth person pushes a wheel-barrow of compost through 
the outdoor plaza. Like cemeteries and mausoleums, the UDP is pictured as a site where 
people come together to mourn the dead. Unlike other “resting places,” however, the 
people who visit the UDP do not simply come to contemplate; rather, the UDP is a place 
where you come to move with others. The person pushing the wheelbarrow through the 
plaza exemplifies this collective movement in the image by drawing our attention to the 
ways in which the UDP invites the living to move (with) the dead, to take the compost 
produced in the process away from the UDP in order to foster new life. As such, the UDP 
is not so much a “final resting ground” as it is a space of transformation. Yet, as Figure 7 
shows, the UDP is also a scene of more conventional modes of collective movement in 
relation to death practices. In that image, viewers encounter a scene inside the UDP 
structure in which loved ones carry a shrouded body up the inclined ramp toward the top 
of the core. Carrying the body is a collective act, one that brings bodies and more-than-
human elements together in a moving ritual. By highlighting collective movement, these 
two images push against individualizing death narratives. In these images, death is 
figured as a communal affair. 
In addition to foregrounding the collective movement involved in the UDP, these 
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images also highlight the temporal dimensions of the process at stake inside the UDP 
structure. Given that the UDP is predicated on human decomposition, it is important that 
viewers understand the differences between traditional burial/cremation and the 
composting process that takes place in the core. One of the key differences is the time 
scale at which these processes occur—whereas decomposition in a traditional burial 
might take decades (thanks to caskets), and whereas cremation takes just a few hours 
(thanks to heat), composting takes about a year-and-a-half. Figure 6, for example, 
presents viewers with an overview of the composting process in both image and words. 
The image itself is a cross-section of the UDP structure, showing the shape of the core, 
the ramp that surrounds it, the outlet for the compost, and the surrounding plaza and 
common areas that are inhabited by visitors in Figure 5. As a cross-section, Figure 6 
schematizes what happens in the UDP structure or, in other words, the image invites 
viewers to study the structure itself, to gain a better understanding of how the UDP 
works. The words to the right of the image help clarify the temporal process: “Over the 
span of a few months, with the help of aerobic decomposition and microbial activity, the 
bodies decompose fully, leaving a rich compost.” Together, image and words invite 
viewers to imagine human bodies (not seen) inside the core moving relatively slowly 
from the top of the core to the bottom and, eventually, from inside the structure to the 
outside world and beyond. Yet, this process does not appear linear in the rendering.  
Rather, the image shows the strangely cyclical structure of the process by enabling 
viewers to picture how bodies can move through the architectural space—into the facility 
and up the ramp, into the top and down through the core, out into the plaza and beyond 
the edges of the image. Indeed, the accompanying text reminds viewers that the UDP is 
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designed to connect users “with the cycles of nature.” 
The three architectural renderings of the UDP both grapple with the human 
body’s irreducible place within broader ecologies and position humans as agentic within 
those ecosystems. With death and decay as the hinge upon which this decompositional 
rhetoric turns, the renderings invite viewers to picture themselves inhabiting the UDP site 
as both visitors to the site and as fodder for the composting process. Thus, the images are 
constitutive at two levels: on the one level, viewers are positioned as visitors to the site 
and, as such, are invited to consider what it would be like to live in a world in which the 
permeability of the human body is embraced rather than rejected. On the other level, 
however, viewers are invited to see their own bodies as potential participants in the 
composting process. That is, the architectural renderings do the dual work of bolstering 
the subject (who must make decisions about how they will inhabit this world) and 
deconstructing it (since we are, after all, permeable).  
Each of these architectural renderings visualizes various aspects of the process at 
stake in the UDP’s proposal. Given that Spade’s plan for human composting may strike 
some as vulgar and unsanitary (e.g., see Lean 2015), even as disgusting, the architectural 
renderings function rhetorically to aestheticize the process that takes place inside the 
core, to make it palatable to viewers who may otherwise find the idea of death and 
decomposition unnerving or even disgusting. The first image viewers confront is also the 
most complete, the most realistic-looking of the three. Precisely because it is a rendering, 
Figure 5 offers viewers a chance to imagine what it would be like to inhabit the UDP’s 
completed site. Outside the building, people mill around in the courtyard. Although no 
explicit signs of decomposition are present in Figure 5, traces of the decomposed body 
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can be found in at least three places. Near the entrance to the facility, for example, there 
is a bed of exposed soil. Thus, while the process of decomposition is hidden inside the 
core (in Spade’s [2013, 30] thesis, she calls this the “unseen”) its effects spill over into 
the outside world, literally resurfacing at ground level in the midst of the city. This 
compost perhaps nourishes the trees that flank the UDP core and the surrounding plaza, 
enabling new life to flourish even as other life ends. And then there is the person taking 
some of the compost away in a wheelbarrow, which reminds viewers that the compost 
made inside the UDP core will be disseminated into nearby community gardens and will 
provide nutritive soil for flora in other places. This cycle is further highlighted in the text 
that appears at the top of the image: “Because death is momentous, miraculous, and
mysterious / Because the cycles of nature help us grieve and heal / Because our bodies 
are full of life-giving potential / We propose a new option for laying our loved ones to 
rest.” 
In addition to the three architectural renderings, the UDP website is also 
interspersed with three other images of soil and flowers. Below the initial architectural 
rendering, for example, viewers are confronted with a large image of soil (Figure 8) with 
the following text overlaid on it: “The Urban Death Project utilizes the process of 
composting to safely and gently turn our deceased into soil-building material, creating a 
meaningful, equitable, and ecological urban alternative to existing options for the 
disposal of the dead.” Whereas the architectural renderings only marginally bring decay 
and decomposition to the foreground, requiring viewers to imagine the relations between 
the structure and the process it contains, Figure 8 invites viewers to confront more 
directly the idea that human bodies can be composted and transformed into “soil-building 
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Figure 8 Text overlaying dark soil. Screenshot taken on November 24, 2015, by 
the author. 
material.” The earthen material in Figure 8 brings the “unseen” into the realm of the 
“seen,” the contents of the core out into the open for viewers to imagine what a human 
body can become given the right conditions. The soil presents viewers with one stage in 
the cycle—the initial product of human composting, the raw materials for new life.  
The cycle of birth-death-decomposition-growth is further fleshed out in another 
image of a field of flowers (Figure 9), which appears below the Overview section of the 
website (Figure 6). In this image, innumerable wildflowers erupt into a variegated palate 
of colors—green, orange, yellow, red, purple, and blue fill the frame. A patch of visible 
soil in the center-left of the photograph connects this image to Figure 8, reminding 
viewers that soil is at the center of the UDP process. In the background, a metal fence 
extends from the foreground into the distance, locating this patch of wildflowers in a 
human environment. Figures 8 and 9 cooperate to evoke a sense of movement and 
transformation within an ecosystem: the soil produced by decomposing human bodies is 
rhetorically transformed—in the movement between these images—into a lively field of 
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Figure 9 Text overlaying field of flowers. Screenshot taken on November 24, 2015, by 
the author.
flowers. If human bodies have life-giving potential, this potential is realized in the 
transformation of human corpses into soil-building material, which is a vital substance in 
supporting life more generally.  
Taken together, these images on the UDP website visually and verbally articulate 
death with ecological systems, creating a decompositional rhetoric that challenges 
conventional understandings of death, decay, and ecological relations, as well as the 
cultural practices that have accumulated around death in the United States. As I have 
suggested throughout this section, these images position death not through more familiar 
visual codes (tombstones, lawn cemeteries, churches, caskets) but, rather, through a 
movement betwixt and between the living and the dead (survivors, flowers, soil, 
architecture). To better understand the rhetorical force of these images, we can consult 
again Derrida (1993) on the question of the limit. If the boundary between life and death 
has been figured as a limit of humanism, as he argues, these images participate in the 
difficult work of decomposing (at least partially) that very limit. But how? As Derrida 
teaches us, “There is not yet or there is no longer a border to cross, no opposition 
between two sides: the limit is too porous, permeable, and indeterminate” (20). The 
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UDP’s images show us just how porous the border between life and death is: In the 
renderings, those who are living interact with those who are dead, they move with the 
dead, and, indeed, they move the dead. The UDP is not simply a scene of contemplation 
or of rest, as is the lawn cemetery, but of action, motion, movement. It is a scene for 
interacting with that which we usually abject—dirt and corpses. It is a means of 
confronting in mundane practice the disgusting in us, death itself. In the photographs that 
are interspersed with the renderings, death and life converge so that it is unclear where 
one begins and the other ends. The categories of death and life are not limited here to the 
simply human: where human life cannot be visualized, plant life can; where human 
bodies wither away, other life emerges. Decomposition is precisely the blurring of life 
and death or, rather, the transformation of death into life and life into death. In these 
subtle images, viewers confront the withering away of this boundary. 
Dissemination: Human Composting for the Masses
In response to the UDP, dozens of newspapers, magazines, blogs, and television 
and radio shows have disseminated information about the Project’s efforts to develop and 
bring to fruition a human composting system, effectively extending the Project’s reach to 
hundreds of thousands of people who otherwise may not have heard about it (e.g., Bayles 
2015; Berman 2015; Coutts 2013; Einhorn 2015; Eveleth 2014; Fecteau 2015; Frohne 
2016; Herzog 2015; Herzog 2016; Holcombe 2016; Holowka 2015; Hooton 2015; Kiley 
2015a; Kiley 2015b; Lean 2015; Macz 2016; Markham 2014; Moylan 2013; Nuwer 
2014; Palus 2014; Plaugic 2015; Shapiro 2014; Skorheim 2014). As Brandon Kiley 
(2015a) puts it, “Spade’s ideas have rocketed to prominence and begun to change the 
conversation about what it means to be dead.” Writing in The Atlantic, Erica Hayasaki 
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(2013) declared that, “death is having a moment,” and then went on to chronicle the 
experiences of attendees at a Los Angeles, California, “death salon,” which brought 
together academics, artists, professionals, and activists who share a mutual interest in 
death and dying. The recent publication of Caitlin Doughty’s (2015) Smoke Gets in Your 
Eyes and Other Stores from the Crematory, which quickly became a New York Times 
bestseller, further attests to Hayasaki’s claim that people currently seem to be interested 
in deathcare practices. Perhaps owing to the recent upsurge of interest in death and dying, 
newspaper and magazine coverage of the UDP has been largely positive and has often 
implicitly endorsed the principles and aspirations—if not the exact practices—involved in 
composting dead humans. In this section, I discuss several general tendencies in media 
coverage of the UDP and show how decomposition is entering the public vocabulary on 
death and dying. 
Among news coverage of the UDP, many journalists position the project as one 
step in a long tradition of changes to interment practices in the West. Although 
conventional burials and cremation are prominent in the United States today, this has not 
always been the case. Rose Eveleth (2014), writing in The Atlantic, notes that, “The 
graveyard as Americans know it is of relatively recent vintage.” Similarly, as Cara Bayles 
(2015) argues in Slate, “the history of funeral rites is full of new technologies 
overcoming old traditions.” And in an essay for The Verge, Lizzie Plaugic (2015) reports 
that death practices are by no means ahistorical or unchanging: “What many people today 
consider to be a pretty standard burial practice—embalming the dead, choosing a 
casket—didn’t really emerge until the Civil War.” As these authors note, burial practices 
may change slowly, but they do change. As new problems (spatial limits, health, 
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environmental issues) emerge, it should come as no surprise that the technologies of 
interment are responsive. As such, these authors argue, the UDP should be seen not as an 
aberration indicative of 21st century vulgarity but rather as an historical advance: “these 
places where the dead go are going to continue to evolve. The future of graveyards is 
coming, and here’s what it might look like” (Eveleth 2014). What these articles 
demonstrate is a proclivity to place burial practices within the various historical contexts 
from whence they derived. Historicizing such practices, I would argue, is one way to 
make changes to them more acceptable.  
One way of historicizing the UDP is to position it as a response to mounting 
ecological problems. Indeed, many of the articles accept the UDP’s own rhetorical self-
definition, thus discussing the project in terms of environmental sustainability. Before 
introducing the UDP, for instance, Palus (2014) argues that, “As people become 
increasingly concerned with the environment, many of them are starting to seek out ways 
to minimize the impact their body has once they’re done using it.” Along the same lines, 
Plaugic (2015) asks, “If a woman spends a lifetime concerned about her environmental 
impact, why would she abandon those concerns in death?” Writing for TreeHugger, 
Derek Markham (2014) is similarly hopeful that the UDP might lessen humans’ 
environmental impact: “If the prototype performs as designed, then finding a location for 
a full-scale version of the facility will follow, perhaps eventually allowing our bodies to 
do one last good green deed.” As these examples suggest, by portraying the UDP as an 
ecologically responsive and responsible act, it might become more appealing to audiences 
who find themselves concerned about environmental sustainability. In a world in which 
figuring out how to reduce one’s own ecological footprint can be a difficult task, the UDP 
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presents an option to do so even after one has died. 
While media depictions of the UDP tend to be favorable, with at least one notable 
exception (Lean 2015), almost all of the articles written about the project note that many 
people nonetheless feel grossed out by the prospect of being composted after they die. 
The specter of the abject cannot be so easily abandoned. Journalists variously refer to this 
feeling as the “ick” or “yuck” factor, and pose it as something that the UDP must 
overcome before it can attract wide public support. For instance, The New York Times 
reporter Caitlin Einhorn (2015) writes that, “[Spade] and her supporters at the Urban 
Death Project will have to navigate an array of obstacles. Not least is the yuck factor.” 
The “yuck factor” comes mostly from the fact that, because bodies will comingle during 
the composting process, there will be no way to identify individuals after decomposition. 
Like those involved in the suicide bombings cited by Achille Mbembe (2003) and Stuart 
Murray (2006), those who would be composted in the UDP core would become 
physically indistinguishable from others. This indistinguishability perhaps heightens fear 
of decaying corpses because it goes one step further in troubling the ease with which we 
ascribe subjectivity to a body. When friends and family return to the UDP weeks, 
months, or years later to retrieve the soil their loved one’s body has helped to produce, 
they will undoubtedly touch and take home the remains of other people as well. This is 
unavoidable. As Sarah Berman (2015) puts it in Vice, “The soil they get back weeks later 
could technically contain other people.” Or, as Bayles (2015) argued, “[The UDP] 
forgoes the permanent property of an individual grave, the perceived cleanliness of 
cremation, in the interest of the messy prospect of truly being folded back into the earth.” 
The messiness surely disgusts some.  
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However, a number of journalists cited here also recognized the very messiness of 
the UDP as its most radical (even promising) characteristic. Since composting entails the 
comingling of bodies and other materials, since it always means that a body will become 
otherwise, Spade’s project to compost human bodies has been depicted as a substantial 
departure from more conventional burial practices that attempt to maintain the integrity 
of the human body. The UDP is, after all, a mode of disintegrating bodies. Writing in the 
independent Seattle newspaper, The Stranger, Kiley (2015a) makes the point: 
Most importantly, no single body would undergo the process alone. Every 
body would have company on its way down. This is the Urban Death 
Project’s most radical proposition, the thing that sets it apart from 
cremation or burial: It deposes the idea of individuation in death. No 
human body, of course, decomposes on its own. 
 
Thus, Kiley highlights the relational aspect of the UDP, calling attention to the fact that 
when a body is composted in the core it will necessarily become indistinguishable from 
other bodies. Whereas traditional burials function to prevent this process of co-
composting from happening, the UDP would not function otherwise. As Murray (2006) 
argues, one way to resist biopower is to deteriorate the liberal subject, to deconstruct the 
rhetorical boundaries that enable us to imagine subjects as bounded, autonomous 
individuals. Berman (2015) similarly develops this point by citing Spade:  
“I’m kind of forcing the collective issue. You don’t get back just your 
person—you’re going to get back a really beautiful material, something 
you can use to memorialize the person you miss,” she said. “We’re all part 
of a collective ecosystem anyway.”  
 
Focusing on the collective process of decomposition that takes place in the core, these 
authors illustrate the ways in which the UDP decenters and deconstructs the liberal 
subject. Against the ideal of a bounded human being, the UDP offers up collective 
comingling, collaborative composting. 
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Despite pointing out that the UDP may be interpreted as icky or yucky, however, 
many media depictions recuperate the project’s legitimacy by highlighting it spiritual or 
ceremonial aspects. Bayles (2015) ponders whether the UDP’s “perceived rejection of 
existing death rites might also be its biggest stumbling block,” for example, but then goes 
on to show that the UDP develops a ritual of its own that may, in fact, be in keeping with 
many religious rites. “Even if the Urban Death Project isn’t the right model for every 
religion,” she writes, “it does reflect the general direction in which religions might turn 
for death rituals as they come to terms with the practical problem of lack of space and the 
moral imperative to care for the planet.” Similarly, Jessica Fecteau (2015) points out in 
People magazine that, “[Spade] also thought to create spaces within the building where 
families can pay respects to their loved ones before the composting begins.” And, Palus 
(2014) characterizes the UDP this way: “It is a green practice, but not simply a utilitarian 
one.” In focusing on the similarities between the UDP and more conventional burial 
practices, these articles preempt assertions that composting is an act of violence toward 
the body and participate in its normalization. Although the means may be slightly 
different, they seem to argue, the ends remain sacred and substantial. 
As the preceding pages have demonstrated, much news coverage of the UDP has 
implicitly accepted the project’s principles even if it questions some of its specific 
practices. In doing so, these media have disseminated the project’s vocabulary of death, 
decomposition, and ecological politics to broad audiences for whom these issues may 
have otherwise gone unnoticed. Like the UDP’s own rhetoric, news coverage introduces 
some of the potential criticisms of the project, but quickly rebuffs them by arguing for the 
project’s radical, ecologically oriented ends. Moreover, by emphasizing the ritual, 
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ceremonial aspects of the UDP, news coverage depicts Spade’s proposal as being 
sensitive to the needs of the living, those who remain when a loved one dies. The UDP is 
certainly a human composter, but it is also a space where people can grieve. By 
disseminating the concepts driving the UDP in a mostly positive light, news media have 
become allied forces in the alternative burial movement’s efforts to rethink death and 
dying. 
  
Decomposition on the Horizon 
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the Urban Death Project functions to 
rhetorically decompose several historically salient deathcare practices. In the process, the 
UDP’s rhetoric has exerted additional force—decompositional in its own right—on 
broader questions about what it means to be human and about our ecological 
enmeshment. By challenging the given order, which places humans outside of certain 
natural processes (what Spade calls the “cycles of birth-death-decomposition-rebirth”), 
the UDP both decomposes a rather anthropocentric notion of the human and recomposes 
a sense of the human that is more relational. The UDP understands the human not as a 
stable entity to be preserved but, rather, as a shifting assemblage that will inevitably 
transform. Acknowledging and embracing the inevitability of human decay, the UDP 
accepts an ecological understanding of human entanglement and mortal materiality. It is 
through the process of decomposition that the human body becomes most ecologically 
collaborative: allowing our bodies to decay alongside one another, fostering this 
simultaneously destructive and productive process, is a way of channeling the energy 
contained within our flesh and bones back into the land-community from which we were 
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composed. In this way, the UDP’s rhetorical force is exerted most powerfully on our very 
concept of what it means to be a human being. This is a highly significant transformation 
in the history of American deathcare practices that, if realized, could radically alter the 
way we treat our postmortem bodies. 
This view of the body is accomplished through the UDP’s rhetoric of bodily 
decomposition. In a TED Talk that has received nearly 9,000 views on YouTube alone, 
Spade explains the reasoning behind her turn to human composting while also animating 
the concept of decomposition as a means of challenging the status quo in the American 
funeral industry (Life After Life 2016). In that talk, Spade likens decomposition to a kind 
of magic. Describing her initial encounter with the practice of “livestock mortality 
composting,” in which animals are composted and transformed into fertilizer, Spade 
recalls being astonished at the ways in which organic material could be turned into a 
richly nutritious and ecologically beneficial material. Against a view of human bodies 
that confines them narrowly to a select few cultural rituals, Spade wondered if the same 
process could be applied to humans. By thinking of dead human bodies as storehouses of 
energy, the UDP unsettles longstanding prohibitions on putting corpses to use. It does 
this, in part at least, by challenging the ways we think of and relate to human corpses. 
Rather than abjecting cadavers, literally excluding them from our everyday lives by 
handing them over to a professional class of funeral workers, the UDP endeavors to bring 
us back into close contact with the dead human body. By bringing the abject back into 
our sphere of everyday life, we are more likely to understand corpses not as distant and 
disgusting but as important parts of the natural cycles that connect the living with the 
dead. The UDP is wagering that such contact is likely to help us see human bodies as 
186 
mortal assemblages teeming with energy. This notion of the human body locates within it 
quite literally the power to create new life outside of heteronormative and biopolitical 
logics of reproduction. Decomposing bodies do not so much reproduce human life as they 
assist in the production of the grounds upon which life can emerge and be sustained. For 
Spade, this process is a kind of magic. 
By playing with the concepts of dirt and decomposition, Spade enacts a sort of 
rhetorical magic of her own. In Trickster Makes This World, Lewis Hyde (1998) 
considers the trickster—a figure in many myths that crosses boundaries and upsets given 
orders—in relation to what he calls “dirt-work.” For Hyde, dirt-work operates by 
thrusting order into disarray—the status quo can, he argues, be challenged by the 
“strategic application of dirt” (176). Here, dirt can be both physical and metaphorical. 
Rhetorics that transgress the given order can function as forms of dirt-work when they 
thrust the taken-for-granted into question or, in other words, when they decompose the 
given order. Since dirt is synonymous with disorder, its “strategic application” serves to 
put hegemonic formations under pressure and to cast doubt on the sureness or rightness 
of tradition. Dirt-work does not serve primarily to create confusion, however much it may 
do so initially. Rather, out of the confusion generated by muddying the boundaries of 
convention, a new order (perhaps one that accommodates or at least tolerates a higher 
degree of messiness, as is the case with the UDP) emerges. Dirt-work, then, is about 
creating new forms of relationality, new assemblages. As Hyde puts it, “Dirt rituals may 
stabilize things for years on end, but when the order is in fundamental crisis these rituals 
can become the focal point for change, catalytic moments for dirt’s reevaluation and true 
structural shifts” (188). 
187 
As I have suggested here, the UDP’s proposal for a human composting system 
initiates serious shifts in the way we think about the human and its ecological 
relationality by decomposing the liberal human subject and giving way to a form of 
bodily assemblage that radically transforms the human into an energy rich material that 
can circulate through the land-community. As the body enters into the assemblage 
imagined by the UDP, it is materially decomposed but not annihilated. Rather, from an 
ecological perspective, the process of decomposition is essentially a reordering of energy. 
Energy contained within the body is fragmented and disseminated in new networks in 
which the human is decentered. In both conventional burial and cremation, the body’s 
energy is either kept in reserve or diminished. Yet, with human composting that same 
energy is made to travel and compose new assemblages: the fragmented human body 
becomes a source of sustenance for vegetables and plants, which in turn support animal 
life. Whereas the liberal subject of conventional burial is identified with stability, 
autonomy, and individuality, the assemblage produced by decomposition is incoherent, 
out of control, and radically plural. In the composter, human bodies will become 
indistinguishable from one another. In the resulting soil material, the remains of multiple 
decaying bodies will comingle. This rich soil material, composed of materials culled from 
multiple human corpses in conjunction with carbon-rich materials, can then nourish other 
biotic assemblages. This new assemblage repurposes energy and, in doing so, radically 
alters not only the form but the concept of the human. 
The assemblage produced by the UDP—let us simply call it “human compost” or, 
more precisely still, just “dirt”—is made possible because it first passes through, and 
decomposes, several of the taken-for-granted views of the human body that govern more 
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conventional burial practices. As the UDP forcefully suggests, conventional burial denies 
our mortal materiality by separating our bodies from the cycles of life, death, and 
decomposition. Through the process of abjection, human corpses are denied their place 
within these cycles, and survivors are disconnected from the fact that they, too, are mortal 
assemblages. By ordering the world to prevent the human body from fully entering into 
and participating in these cycles, the form of human exceptionalism built into the modern 
funeral industry keeps humans at a remove from the inevitable. As Hyde (1998, 179–180) 
writes, “The models we devise to make sense of the world and the shapes we create to 
make ourselves at home in it are all too often inadequate to the complexity of things, and 
end up deadened by their own exclusions.” That is, the pollution ideas that structure 
social reality narrowly confine our understanding and, often, our sensuous experience of 
life and death. The UDP works to open up our collective relation to death and to our 
mortal materiality by thrusting the given order, fostered by the funeral industry, into 
disarray. By creating a scene, a practice, and an idea of the human as irreducibly 
entangled in ecological cycles, the UDP forces a shift in the conceptual order that has for 
more than 150 years denied the materiality of the human form and forestalled its 
inevitable decay. 
The Urban Death Project is poised to open its first Recomposition Center in 2023. 
With much of the research and development completed or underway, the Project now 
faces the challenge of raising the necessary funds to move from its small-scale prototype 
to a life-sized version of the human composter. In an interview with the Capitol Hill 
Times, Spade said, “It’s really dependent on me raising a boatload of money” (Macz 
2016). Like many 21st-century startups, Spade has turned to online crowd sourcing as a 
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means of generating the money needed to officially launch the UDP. Through 
Kickstarter, an online fundraising apparatus, she has secured more than $90,000 from 
some 1,200 individual supporters, and Spade has received fellowships enabling her to 
work full-time on designing, siting, and coordinating the first human composting system. 
Just as the UDP radically reimagines deathcare practices, so too does it depart from more 
established funding models. Without the backing of the deathcare industry, the UDP must 
set out on the more precarious grounds of user-sourced financing. Its future, like the 
future of the decomposing body, is as yet unclear. Yet, its rhetorical intervention has 
already provoked significant conversation and imaginative speculation about the shifting 
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Dominant concepts of human identity position humans 
outside and above the food chain, not as part of the feast in 
a chain of reciprocity. Animals can be our food, but we can 
never be their food. Human Exceptionalism positions us as 
the eaters of others who are never themselves eaten. 
 
— Val Plumwood (2008, 70), “Tasteless” 
 
The question is no longer one of knowing whether it is 
‘good’ to eat the other or if the other is ‘good’ to eat, nor 
of knowing which other. One eats him regardless and lets 
oneself be eaten by him. 
 




Whenever I mentioned that I intended to write a chapter on the topic of human 
edibility, I was almost always met with a shared sense of curiosity that took the form of a 
question: “You mean you’re writing about cannibalism?” Although cannibalism—the 
consumption of human bodies or parts of human bodies by other humans—does not 
constitute this chapter’s entrée, it nevertheless makes for an appetizing intellectual hors 
d’oeuvres, so I want to stick with the question for a moment. In a recent philosophical 
study covering several sorts of cannibalism, Mikel Burley (2016, 17) notes that, “The 
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eating of human beings is often assumed to be something in which only barbarians could 
indulge—something terrible, horrific, even evil.” Despite this perhaps privileged 
presumption, Burley contends, cannibalism is not the sole purview of “barbarians,” nor 
even is it restricted to so-called “primitive” peoples. Humans have historically eaten other 
humans for a variety of reasons, including in the so called West for ostensibly medicinal 
purposes. In some cases, humans have cannibalized out of necessity. In others, they have 
done so as a symbolic gesture. Regardless of circumstance or purpose, cannibalism 
strikes at fundamental concerns about what it means to be human: what (and how) we 
ingest says much about who and what we are, what kinds of beings we are and want to 
become. 
On multiple levels, ingestion constitutes Homo sapiens. It is in this sense that 
cannibalism has long been conceived of as a particularly telling form of consumption, 
either disregarded outright as mere myth or quickly condemned as a crime against 
civilization. Yet, Burley (2016, 3) argues, by taking the consumption of human flesh 
seriously “we enlarge our appreciation of what it is to be a human being, and hence of 
what it is to be the kind of beings we are.” Attending to the cannibalistic rituals of the 
Wari’ tribe in particular, Burley unravels a form of “mortuary cannibalism” (12) in which 
community members take part in consuming the bodies of the deceased. Prior to the 
1960s, when “external religious and cultural forces” (16) began shifting Wari’ traditions, 
it was thought better to ingest corpses than to bury them in the earth. Indeed, up to that 
point, it was important that “no part of the corpse be allowed to enter or even touch the 
earth, for the earth was associated with dirt and pollution—a cold and damp place to 
which neither the body nor even any of its substances should be abandoned” (Burley 
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2016, 13). Instead, the bodies of community members were cut into small pieces, cooked 
over an open fire, skewered on wood splinters, and consumed by friends and family. 
Even the fat, dripping from the heat of the inferno, was not to touch the earth. Caught by 
someone, it was either ingested or smeared onto the bodies of those taking part in the 
feast. The entire body was to be eaten by other humans. 
What Burley and most others who broach the topic of human edibility fail to 
recognize, or choose to ignore, is the extent to which human bodies are always already 
comestible. Cannibalism is only one of many circumstances in which human corpses find 
themselves serving as fodder for others. In fact, human edibility is usually a much more 
banal experience. Within our gut, for instance, microorganisms incessantly make meals 
out of our bodies, an activity that carries on from cradle to grave. Scientists include this 
internal, microscopic buffet in the activity of the “microbiome,” what Joshua Lederberg 
describes as the “ecological community of commensal, symbiotic, and pathogenic 
microorganisms that literally share our body space” (Lederberg and McCray 2001). And 
the feast continues when we die. Decaying bodies become “necrobiomes.” Imagine that a 
human dies in the woods; no one is around to whisk it away to a morgue or funeral home. 
“Quickly,” writes Ed Yong (2015), “a dedicated coterie of bacteria, fungi, and nematode 
worms emerges to dine on this artisanal feast.” As necrobiotic communities spring up 
around a decomposing corpse, organisms thwarted neither by putrescence nor by the 
presence of other messmates make a meal of the rotting flesh. Although some find the 
prospect of becoming food for others comforting (Haraway 2008), for many people 
human edibility is likely a more discomforting possibility. 
Conventional burial practices have offered consumers a sense of reprieve from the 
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reality of human edibility, quite literally segregating corpses from the routes by which 
other organisms might reach them. Metal caskets and concrete vaults serve as seemingly 
impenetrable barriers that keep human bodies safe from the gnawing tendencies of 
organisms large and small. The ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood (2008, 71) found 
in these practices strong evidence of both human exceptionalism and dualist thinking: 
The exceptionalist denial that we ourselves are food for others is reflected 
in many aspects of our conventional death and burial practices—the strong 
coffin, conventionally buried well below the level of soil fauna activity, 
and the slab over the grave to prevent anything digging us up, supposedly 
keeps the western human body from becoming food for other species. 
(emphasis mine) 
 
As Plumwood notes, conventional burial materializes a way of thinking that denies 
human edibility, shielding the human body from the consumptive force of the more-than-
human world. Even conservation burial promises to prevent buried human bodies from 
becoming food for certain kinds of critters. For instance, Ramsey Creek Preserve’s 
website reassures its customers that, “Even relatively shallow natural burials where no 
casket is used are safe from animal interference” (“Frequently Asked Questions” n.d.). 
Animal “interference” is a loosely veiled metaphor for consumption. Fear of becoming 
food for others is rampant within Western cultures (Barnett 2016; Schutten 2008). Just as 
considering cannibalism helps us, as Burley suggests, expand our senses of what it is like 
to be human, so too might an engagement with the broader issue of human edibility 
enlarge and complicate our understandings of the concept of the human and ecological 
enmeshment more generally. 
Throughout the remainder of this chapter I explore one contemporary endeavor to 
render human bodies edible not for other human beings but, rather, for some of the more-
than-human cohabitants upon which we would normally nibble—mushrooms. Launched 
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in 2011 by Jae Rhim Lee, the Infinity Burial Project (IBP) proposes an audacious 
intervention for the deathcare industry: death shrouds laced with human-eating 
mushrooms that not only decompose corpses but also remediate the toxins which have 
accumulated within our bodies. As Thierry Bardini (2014, 7) writes, “We are toxic as 
hell. Yes: you, me and pretty much every well-fed occidental consumer, gorged with 
contaminants and pollutants, heavy metals, cyanide and other lethal poisons slowly 
accumulated in the course of our lives, when we are not born with them.” The IBP’s 
strain of human-eating mushrooms is designed to rapidly reduce the human body to a 
soil-building material. In the process, the accumulated toxins invoked by Bardini are 
reportedly filtered from the body, inaugurating a form of postmortem detoxification. By 
intertwining mycology (the study of fungi) and toxicology (the study of toxins) with 
ecological deathcare practices, the IBP works to unsettle the taken-for-granted sense of 
hierarchy regarding consumption that has long imposed itself in human cultures, namely, 
the idea that human beings are not supposed to be eaten. 
The IBP forces human audiences to grapple with the possibility that becoming 
fodder for others is a means of intervening in a world brimming with toxins. In a filmed 
TED Talk that has garnered more than 1.3 million views online, Lee (2011), clad in a 
head-to-toe prototype of her mushroom burial suit, explains that the project is a response 
to the toxicity of the modern funeral industry. “By trying to preserve our dead bodies,” 
Lee tells audience members, “we deny death, poison the living, and further harm the 
environment.” Wanting to buck tradition, she looked for an alternative to conventional 
burial and cremation: “I thought maybe I could train an army of toxin-cleaning edible 
mushrooms to eat my body.” The initial idea was simple yet innovative: raised in petri 
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dishes, the mushrooms eat their companion’s loose hair, fingernail clippings, and dead 
skin. Over time the mushrooms become accustomed to eating the sloughed off elements 
of their companion and are eventually able to be incorporated into a death suit that will be 
wrapped around the human body and buried in a shallow grave. Lee explains: “When I 
die the infinity mushrooms will recognize my body and be able to eat it.” While a handful 
of audience members chuckle in the background, Lee further reports that, “believe it or 
not, a few people have offered to donate their bodies to the project to be eaten by 
mushrooms.” For Lee, the IBP is not only scientific experimentation or performance art. 
Rather, rethinking modern burial practices is a means of making visible, and thus taking 
responsibility for, the fact that humans are, as she says, “intimately connected” to our 
environments as both eaters and eaten. 
Since Lee unveiled her idea publicly in 2011, the IBP has metamorphosed from a 
big, experimental idea into a small business called Coeio that sells the mushroom burial 
suits online to anyone with $1,500 (a mushroom casket liner, on the other hand, costs just 
$700) and a willingness to give themselves over as fodder for the more-than-human 
world. The name Coeio, as Laura Regensdorf (2016) notes, “riffs on a Latin word 
meaning ‘assemble, or come together.’” What the IBP proposes to create is a world in 
which coming together, or assembling, around the comestible human body is less science 
fictional than ordinary, less worrisome than welcomed, by human beings who make end-
of-life choices about whether and how their bodies will be consumed by other kinds of 
beings. Thus, the project takes on the double burden of transforming deathcare practices 
and, more fundamentally, challenging anthropocentric visions of the human as somehow 
transcending the food web. When compared to conventional burial, which sequesters the 
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human body in layers of temporary barriers, and cremation, leaving little of the body to 
nourish ecosystems, the IBP’s vision of deathcare radically upsets the given order by 
creating the conditions of possibility for alternative assemblages in which the human 
body is intimately entangled in comestible relations.  
Over the course of this chapter, I flesh out some of the rhetorical tactics through 
which the IBP produces these conditions of possibility. Drawing on and extending my 
earlier argument that the IBP mobilizes a rhetoric of carnality to generate a politics of 
edibility (Barnett 2016), I argue here that the IBP digests the notion of the human subject 
and produces, as a byproduct, a robust notion of assemblage that takes seriously human 
edibility and consumptive reciprocity. In doing so, the IBP deteriorates two longstanding 
assumptions about the human subject—namely, that the subject is qualitatively different 
from the ecosystems within which it is enmeshed and is distinguished in part by its 
capacity to consume other kinds of beings while remaining, for the most part, off the 
table for others to consume. Before turning to a close reading of the IBP’s rhetoric of 
carnality, I engage in an extended meditation on the relationship among consumption, 
subjectivity, and theories of assemblage. Tracking arguments made by Derrida, Val 
Plumwood, Donna Haraway, and Jane Bennett, I consider what it means to “eat” and “be 
eaten” by others. I then put these ideas to work in my reading of several textual fragments 
circling around the IBP—from the TED Talk that launched the IBP onto the public screen 
to the documentary Suiting Dennis that introduces audiences to the first adopter, and from 
Coeio’s website to public responses to the possibility of becoming food for others. I bring 
the chapter to a close by sketching the sort of assemblage made possible by the IBP’s 
rhetoric of carnality—an assemblage that brings human bodies into intimate, 
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consumptive contact with more-than-human forces through the mediation of the 
mushroom burial suit, muddling the very boundaries between inside and outside, subject 
and object, self and other, eater and eaten. This gustatory, digestive assemblage, I 
suggest, eats away at the human as we have long known it. 
  
Digesting Subjectivity 
There is nothing controversial in remarking that humans typically eat plants and 
animals and that, in doing so, they sustain themselves through the ingestion and digestion 
of others. Consumption is a fundamental part of what it is to be alive. One cannot live 
long if one does not consume other organic matter. Consumption is constitutive, quite 
literally giving material form to the human body upon which all life processes and 
cultural practices depend. Hence, we eat in order to live. We eat certain kinds of things, 
however, so that we might live this or that kind of life. Recognizing that what and how 
one consumes gives shape to the sort of life one might lead, or be presumed to lead, 
consumptive practices vary both inter- and intraculturally. There is no universal diet, nor 
even a common “taste” for the same things. Consumptive practices therefore index the 
stratification of social life; as such, it becomes possible to read the world based on who 
eats what and how—and why. In this sense, it is possible to notice that consumption is 
not only constitutive at a biological level, but also at a cultural level. Consumption is 
precisely one of several activities that makes us (and the other animals and plants we 
consume) what we are. To put it colloquially, “you are what you eat.” More rigorously, 
“you are a product of what you consume and what consumes you.” It is this reciprocal 
relation of edibility that I turn to throughout this section. 
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Beginning in somewhat familiar territory, with the relatively homey fare of 
“subjectivity,” it is impossible to not notice that the deconstructor of subjectivity par 
excellence—Derrida—swerves into a series of gustatory metaphors when asked by Jean 
Luc Nancy to describe “what comes after the subject.” In an interview titled “‘Eating 
Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject,” Derrida (1991) sets out a series of claims about 
the still lingering subject, or its post-deconstructive specter, through a meditation on the 
question of consumption. While Derrida cannot completely digest the classical discourse 
on subjectivity, neither can he resist taking yet another bite out of this residual 
intellectual feast. He refuses the somewhat popular, if not relatively limited, claim that 
the subject has been “liquidated” (97), referring instead to the ways in which the subject 
has been “re-interpreted, displaced, decentered, [and] re-inscribed” (98) in philosophical 
discourses. In other words, philosophers, especially those working in the poststructuralist 
tradition, are themselves (and “who” are “we”?, Derrida asks) unable to fully digest and 
excrete this residual notion of subjectivity. Even if we were able to chew up, sometimes 
violently, the features of the classical Western subject with its “qualities of stance or 
stability, of permanent presence, of sustained relation to self, everything that links the 
‘subject’ to conscience” (99) … even if we were able to do so, it seems the best we have 
been capable of thus far is a partial digestion. We suffer from a form of intellectual 
indigestion. 
Like indigestion, the question of the subject bothers a great many thinkers. 
Derrida’s work offers some relief. In texts like Speech and Phenomenon and Margins of 
Philosophy, Derrida (1973; 1982) displaces the classical Western notion of subjectivity 
by calling into question the most elemental quality of those theories—presence. Through 
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a close reading of Edmund Husserl’s work, for instance, he disrupts the ease with which 
something like a “phenomenological voice” (simply put, an internal—purely internal—
monologue) can be taken for granted. Husserl was working within the Cartesian tradition 
in which subjects contemplate objects and human beings are understood through their 
consciousness. Focused as he was on consciousness, Husserl was interested not in 
whether objects actually exist but, rather, in the fact that they exist for some 
consciousness. What mattered for Husserl was that one experienced, consciously, a world 
of objects. One could discern such objects through an investigation of conscious thought 
in the form of the phenomenological voice.1 As Derrida (1982) teaches us elsewhere, 
though, humans are always already composed by their limits. We are not self-enclosed, 
purely contemplative, self-conscious beings. We become subjects, in the Sausserian 
sense, through our initiation and ingratiation into langue, or the system of language that 
precedes and exceeds every individual human being (Saussure 1998). Derrida goes a step 
further, though, by suggesting that it is not just in relation to language but in relation to 
everything outside ourselves that we become what we are. Hence, Husserl’s notion of the 
phenomenological voice, the purely internal soliloquy, is untenable since even an 
“internal” conversation “with oneself” is dependent at least on the outside force of 
language. If “Man, since always, is his proper, that is, the end of his proper,” then any 
realistic conception of the human must attend closely to what is outside, or at the “end,” 
of the human (Derrida 1982, 134). “The relation to self,” Derrida argues, “can only be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I offer the example of Husserl here not as a representation of phenomenology 
more generally but merely as one example of how “the subject” has been hemmed in by 
the too-limited notion of “self-presence.” Other phenomenologists, such as Abram 
(1996), Edward Casey (1996; 2001; 2007), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962; 2004), 
espouse a more open conception of the subject that is not only open to but constituted by 
the external world. 
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différance, that is to say alterity, or trace” (100). 
Unlike many poststructural thinkers, Derrida was unwilling to confine this 
“outside” to language as such. Language—even if we include law and society under this 
now sprawling term—alone cannot explain completely the constitution of subjectivity, 
nor certainly of embodied subjectivity, even if it goes a long way in that direction. Rather 
than looking for a “who,” then, Derrida suggests that we think in terms of singularities. 
Echoing Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1999) call to discard abstractions, Derrida (1991, 101) 
notes that, “if we might retain this motif of ‘singularity’ for a moment, it is neither certain 
nor a priori necessary that ‘singularity’ be translated by ‘who,’ or remain the privilege of 
the who.” Put a bit differently, a singularity is an ontological thing composed by many 
different, sometimes competing, forces. Humans are certainly singularities, but so are 
cats, oaks, water bottles, notebooks, and wine glasses—to note just a few of the 
singularities in reaching distance of the singularity writing these words. By shifting from 
the issue of “who” to the question of singularities, Derrida asks us to consider what a 
singularity is—what it is made of, what sorts of forces it exerts, how it can be acted upon, 
et cetera—rather than searching quixotically for an underlying essence, some 
“substratum” (99) of the subject that we could identify with an “I.” Focusing on 
singularities, in other words, is an immanent rather than transcendent way of thinking, a 
mode of thought that works with the given without hopes of tracing things back to an 
origin. 
From this focus on singularities, Derrida pivots to an engagement with the 
broader class of things—human animals, more-than-human animals, plants, objects, 
substances—to which this title of singularity might be applied. By “ceaselessly analyzing 
207 
the whole conceptual machinery” that has sequestered humans from intimacy with other 
kinds of singularities “and its interestedness, which has allowed us to speak of the 
‘subject’ up to now,” Derrida (1991, 109) suggests that we might better be able to make 
sense of singularities without relapsing into a pre-deconstructive sense of subjectivity. 
That is, by “ceaselessly” interrogating the systems we have established to distinguish 
ourselves (as humans) as somehow fundamentally, even essentially, different from and 
better than what is thought to be outside us, we might come to a more rigorous 
appreciation of what it is to be human. As Derrida put it, “it is perhaps more ‘worthy’ of 
humanity to maintain a certain inhumanity, which is to say the rigor of a certain 
inhumanity” (110). Rigorously breaking from the lull of human exceptionalism, that is, 
opens us up to interesting conceptualizations of the human and about its enmeshment in 
broader ecological assemblages. 
As a consequence, Derrida’s own thinking was often besieged—a rupture he 
welcomed again and again—by the question of “the animal.” In a well-known essay, 
“The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” Derrida (2002; see also Derrida 
2008) deconstructed the anthropocentric narrative of humanity’s dominion over 
everything thought to be outside the human. In “’Eating Well,’” he forges a different path 
concerning consumption. When it comes to philosophical discourses on animals, Derrida 
(1991, 112) notes, “it is a matter of discerning a place left open, in the very structures of 
these discourses (which are also ‘cultures’) for a noncriminal putting to death. Such are 
the executions of ingestion, incorporation, or introjection of the corpse.” Cultures are in 
some significant sense coordinated patterns of consumption: real practices of killing and 
eating that find their justification in particular philosophico-ethical narratives. Humans 
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tell themselves certain stories that make sense of killing other kinds of animate creatures 
and plants over and against whatever forms of sentience we might surmise those others 
possess. These stories undergird the “sacrificial structure” (112) of cultures, in which 
some forms of life are given over and given up so that other forms of life might be 
sustained. In the United States, for example, some nine billion farm animals were 
slaughtered in 2015 for human consumption (“Farm Animal Statistics: Slaughter Totals” 
2016). Mass slaughter becomes mass sacrifice once it is framed as a means of providing 
necessary sustenance for human populations. 
And yet, as noted at the outset of this section, few would deny that sustenance in 
the form of food is necessary. Thus, while Derrida raises doubts about the inevitability of 
carnivorousness among humans, he does not attempt to do away with the issue of 
consumption altogether. It cannot be ignored. We cannot, even with the best of 
intentions, extricate ourselves from relations of edibility. Rather, Derrida (1991, 115) 
contends that, 
The moral question is thus not, nor has it ever been: should one eat or not 
eat, eat this and not that, the living or the nonliving, man or animal, but 
since one must eat in any case and since it is good and tastes good to eat, 
and since there’s no other definition of the good (du bien), how for 
goodness sake should one eat well (bien manger)? And what does this 
imply? What is eating? 
 
Since consumption is necessary to live, in other words, some form of sacrifice is also 
necessary. Life and death intertwine at mealtime. Hence, Derrida, very much attuned to 
the ties that bind human animals, more-than-human animals, plants, and ecosystems, 
pushes a different agenda: if we must consume others, how can we consume them well? 
How to eat ethically? This entails, above all, a certain openness, I would suggest, to the 
reciprocity of eating, which is to say that consumptive gestures move in multiple 
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directions, across and among species. This reciprocity implies an openness to thinking of 
humans as food for others. As Derrida notes in the long passage above, our moral 
consideration cannot rule out, from the beginning in an unqualified way, that “man” 
should not be eaten. After all, “One never eats entirely on one’s own” (115): consumptive 
relations are never unidirectional. 
It is precisely this point—that “one never eats entirely on one’s own”—that 
attracts Donna Haraway to Derrida’s musings on consumption. Haraway has long been 
curious about entanglements among humans and more-than-human critters, technologies, 
processes, and microorganismic others. In When Species Meet, she explores this issue of 
entanglement through what she calls “becoming-with.” Against the language of both 
Being and being, Haraway advises a more processual, unfolding understanding of what it 
is to be human. For her, humans become human only in relation to a host of more-than-
human others, some of which are benign and others of which threaten us. She cites a 
biological commonplace to substantiate this argument: 
I love the fact that human genomes can only be found in about 10 percent 
of all the cells that occupy the mundane space that I call my body; the 
other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, 
protists, and such, some of which play in a symphony necessary to my 
being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the rest 
of me, of us, no harm. (Haraway 2008, 3–4) 
That is, embodiment entails an inextricable form of relation: my body is never simply my 
own for the simple yet undeniable reason that my body is composed of many other kinds 
of beings. Just as there is no way to live and not eat, there is also no way to live and not 
be in constant contact with a great deal of others that are simultaneously different from 
me and integral to what I am. We are bound up in several sorts of symbiotic relations 
from the very beginning and without pause. The “I” is thus always already an “us” or a 
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“we.” 
An implication of Haraway’s biological and relational view of the human body as 
always “becoming-with” others is a reciprocal concept of ecological consumption. That 
90 percent of “me” that is not quite “human” is incessantly at work consuming my body 
from the inside, nibbling away in my gut, for instance, as I get on with everyday life 
largely unaware of this ongoing internal feast. As Haraway (2008, 4) suggests, “I become 
an adult human being in company with these tiny messmates” (emphasis mine). The body 
is a veritable feast for all sorts of others—gut flora consume me from the inside while 
mosquitos take their bite from the surface of my skin. Healthy human bodies mostly keep 
these consumptive practices in check; the immune system works to prevent too much of 
the body from becoming fodder for others. Illness and death shift these circumstances, 
though. Whenever an organism, including humans, dies, a community of messmates 
above and beyond our normal internal community of eaters arrive as if out of thin air to 
make a meal out of the decomposing body. This necrobiotic assemblage of flies, worms, 
microorganisms, and other scavengers are uninhibited since the body no longer defends 
itself against rampant consumption. The buffet is open! Haraway embraces the potential 
of this process: “I love that when ‘I’ die, all these benign and dangerous symbionts will 
take over and use whatever is left of ‘my’ body, if only for a little while, since ‘we’ are 
necessary to one another in real time” (4). Recognizing the inevitability of this process of 
human consumption, Haraway welcomes rather than repudiates the fact that “her” body, 
too, is comestible. 
The reciprocal notion of consumption found in Derrida and Haraway entails not 
only a modified concept of the human but also a reconsideration of consumptive practices 
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more generally. Stories of messmates gathering for meals of all sorts are sprinkled 
throughout When Species Meet. For example, readers encounter graduate students eager 
to take part in a placental feast in the Santa Cruz mountains. One of their colleagues has 
recently birthed a baby and is serving the placenta, sautéed with onions, to mark the 
occasion. While Haraway winces at the idea of a cooked placenta, she delights in the 
earthly prospects of this communal affair. A bit later, we encounter a meal of another 
sort: an end-of-the-year departmental party composed of hungry faculty members, some 
of whom are appalled by the host’s gustatory offering: a whole pig roasting over an open 
fire during the backyard gathering. The host, whom Haraway paints as an avid hunter 
with a proclivity for primitive techniques, killed the pig himself. The offended guests 
raise such a stink that the following year the pig is replaced by sliced deli meats. Again, 
Haraway sits uneasily with these dueling conceptions of how to eat well, but cannot help 
but think that the whole pig would go down better than sliced meats of unknown origins. 
Aware that eating is in some significant sense bound to be impure, Haraway elides too-
easy vegan and vegetarian prohibitions against consuming flesh and instead sits with the 
messy fare among messmates who, after all, consume one another at multiple scales and 
in many different ways. 
To put it slightly differently: organisms are entangled in symbioses of several 
sorts, all of which entail consumption. Symbiosis entails living alongside other organisms 
in mutually beneficial—and transformative—relations (Margulis 1998). Haraway (2008, 
31) notes that, “Organisms are ecosystems of genomes, consortia, communities, partly 
digested dinners, [and] mortal boundary formations.” This understanding shades her 
politics of reciprocal consumption. If we must eat, and if we will inevitably be eaten, 
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there is no chance of becoming pure. Others will always intervene to make our bodies 
what they are, and our bodies will give form to other beings who prey upon them. This is 
why Haraway offers no easy answers to questions about what we ought to eat. For her, it 
is a question of how one eats, fully recognizing and appreciating that all eating implies 
killing. Like Derrida, Haraway advises that “mortal companion species who cannot and 
must not assimilate one another but who must learn to eat well, or at least well enough 
that care, respect, and difference can flourish in the open” (287) is the goal, not a feigned 
purity. Thus, over and against totalizing pronouncements about what ought (not) to be 
eaten by humans, Haraway’s point is that: “There is no way to eat and not to kill, no way 
to eat and not to become with other mortal beings to whom we are accountable, no way to 
pretend innocence or a final peace” (295). One can, and perhaps should, oppose factory 
farming, as I do (along with Haraway and Derrida), without therefore condemning all 
forms of carnivorous consumption. One should also accept human edibility as part of 
consumptive practices within complex ecosystems where eating is the name of the game, 
where “living and dying are at stake in practices of eating” (295). 
While Haraway hints at the possibility of humans becoming fodder for others, she 
nevertheless misses an opportunity to think about the full range of cultural 
transformations an embrace of our own edibility could entail. In “Being Prey” and 
“Tasteless,” Val Plumwood (1999a; 2008) offers an extraordinary account of what it felt 
like for her to recognize, in a moment of visceral excitement, that being human does not 
mean transcending the food web. While kayaking in her native Australia, Plumwood was 
caught in a downpour and taken hold of by an adult saltwater crocodile. Repeatedly 
jerked under water by the much larger, much stronger saurian creature with an ancient 
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appetite for flesh, Plumwood was subjected to several “death rolls,” the crocodilian 
version of a knock-out. Remarkably, she survived the near-death experience and, some 
years later, drew on her recollection of the event to critique forms of human 
exceptionalism that separate humans from the consumptive circuits at work in 
ecosystems. “Since then,” Plumwood (2008, 69) writes, “it has seemed to me that our 
worldview denies the most basic feature of animal existence on planet earth—that we are 
food and that through death we nourish others.” Despite the ongoing feast made of our 
bodies by microorganisms, it is easy to forget that human bodies are inherently and 
inevitably comestible. Culturally, most of us have avoided this fate. Human edibility is 
prohibited at all costs: “Predation on humans,” notes Plumwood, “is monstrous, 
exceptionalised and subject to extreme retaliation” (70). Hence, it is a common response 
to kill more-than-human animals that attempt to or succeed in making a meal out of 
human bodies. 
Given Plumwood’s recognition of the basic, fundamental fact that humans, like 
other animals, are edible, she suggests that we embrace our edibility within a larger 
ecological ethic. If we are in some significant sense bound to be eaten anyway, why not 
challenge the anthropocentric and exceptionalist traditions that deny this corporeal fate? 
Plumwood (2008, 70) contends that, “Dominant concepts of human identity position 
humans outside and above the food chain, not as part of the feast in a chain of 
reciprocity.” To counteract these “dominant concepts,” Plumwood turns to certain 
indigenous traditions as inspiration for potentially alternative relations, noting that “the 
indigenous imaginary sees death as part of life, partly through narrative, and partly 
because death is a return to the (highly narrativised) land that nurtures life” (70). 
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Although Plumwood here surely paints “the indigenous imaginary” with too broad a 
stroke, what is important for my purposes is that she seeks out rituals that work to 
robustly incorporate the human body into the food web. Doing so entails 
reconceptualizing the human body, not as the possession of an individual but, rather, as 
“borrowed from the earth community” (71), as contingent aspects of embodiment. If our 
bodies are not our exclusive property, as Plumwood and Haraway both contend, it makes 
some sense that we would be willing, from an ecological perspective, to return them to 
the broader biotic communities to which they belong. 
Plumwood positions deathcare practices as one particularly productive point of 
intervention. She notes that, “The exceptionalist denial that we ourselves are food for 
others is reflected in many aspects of our conventional death and burial practices” 
(Plumwood 2008, 71). In contrast with the exceptionalist process of sequestering human 
bodies from others who might consume them, Plumwood suggests that we adopt 
practices that actually foster these relations of edibility. Inspired by a visit to a “bush 
cemetery,” she wonders what would happen if we got rid of the heavy coffins and 
concrete vaults to which so many of us in the global west have become accustomed. 
Rather than seeing this disavowal of conventional burial as an acknowledgement of some 
genuine finality (wherein death is tantamount to an absolute end), Plumwood turns to 
animist thinking to suggest that the dead human body is an important opening: “of course 
the body does not just ‘end’—it decays or decomposes, its matter losing its prior 
organizational form and taking on or being incorporated into new forms in a sharing of 
substance/life force” (74). Put differently, from an animist perspective, even the dead 
human body is full of life. Choosing to keep that life force from circulating back into 
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broader ecosystems is a way of refusing the body’s mortal materiality. What we 
desperately need, according to Plumwood, are “mortuary symbolisms and grave 
practices” that “aim to nourish rather than exclude other life forms” (74). 
Such practices will come only after we have adopted an ecological conception of 
the human—one that is attentive to the ways in which human bodies are part of, not apart 
from, ecological assemblages that include relations of edibility. In Vibrant Matter, the 
political theorist Jane Bennett considers the issue of “edible matter,” including human 
bodies within this category, from a new materialist perspective. Drawing on insights from 
Henry David Thoreau and Nietzsche, Bennett (2010, 49) understands “eating as the 
formation of an assemblage of human and nonhuman elements, all of which bear some 
agentic capacity.” Food produces effects that exceed the merely physical. For some eaters 
(this one included), for instance, potato chips may exert a force that makes it difficult to 
stop consuming. The greasy slivers of fried potato exert a force on my hands, which 
deliver the carbohydrates to my mouth and into my digestive system. I can feel good and 
bad about these encounters, fulfilled but also let down by the gustatory routes I have 
travelled to satiate a form of hunger that is not, strictly speaking, pressing. Bennett’s 
point is that practices of eating are both nourishing and more than nourishing; eating also 
produces public affects: foodstuffs modify the assemblages into which they are 
introduced. They change the eater’s mood and disposition. They draw us in or repel us. 
They form our bodies in certain ways and not others. 
Another way of putting Bennett’s argument would be to say that eating is a 
process of circulating vital material. She develops the concept of “thing-power” in order 
to draw attention to the ways in which matter—even the things we think of as being dead, 
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inert, and passive—affects change in the world through entering into and transforming 
assemblages. To say that something exerts “thing-power” is an acknowledgment that 
“things do in fact affect other bodies, enhancing or weakening their powers” (Bennett 
2010, 3). Perhaps this is nowhere more clear than in relations of edibility where one thing 
literally consumes the other, thereby strengthening itself while weakening what is 
consumed. Food here, in whatever form, literally energizes the consumer. The consumer 
extracts from food a necessary life force in the form of energy. While Bennett sticks close 
to instances where nonhuman edible matter is ingested by humans, she is also taken by 
the notion that “a profound reciprocity between eater and eaten” (43) ultimately governs 
relations of edibility. This reciprocity entails that just as carrots and pig flesh powerfully 
impact upon and shape the human bodies who consume them, so too does human flesh 
serve as vital matter for other species. Bennett invites us to recognize our own 
ontological status in relation to those who would make a meal out of our bodies. By 
seeing our bodies as vital matter we are able to enter into a more ecological relation with 
what the more-than-human world of organisms and objects, animate and inanimate alike. 
Indeed, eating is a “series of mutual transformations in which the border between inside 
and outside becomes blurry” (49). One of the ethical and political challenges, then, is 
imagining ways of allowing the human body to become more robustly entangled in these 
ecological processes of consumption. 
Deathcare presents an important scene of intervention since, as Plumwood argues, 
it has turned into a site where human bodies are prevented from becoming fodder for 
others. The embalming-coffin-vault assemblage of conventional burial literally barricades 
the human body from hungry others. A product of human exceptionalism and its 
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attendant pollution ideas, conventional Western deathcare operates with a largely non-
ecological conception of the human body and its place within broader land communities. 
Bennett (2010, 49) notes that, “If the eaten [and I would add eater] is to become food, it 
must be digestible to the outside it enters.” That is, edible matter is not simply available 
to be eaten. It must be given over, offered up, presented to others who might make a meal 
of it. It must be served up as edible matter, made accessible to the kinds of beings who 
might consume it. Plumwood contends that this is an ethical issue: how humans do or do 
not give their bodies as edible matter shapes our ecological relations and, in a sense, the 
stability of ecosystems. I turn in the following sections to a close reading of the Infinity 
Burial Project’s “rhetoric of carnality,” which, I argue, inaugurates a “politics of 
edibility” through which human bodies are installed into the food web not only as eaters 
but also as food for others. I end by considering what sort of edible assemblage these 
politics make possible. 
  
Making Humans Edible: The Infinity Burial Project 
With this conceptual background in mind, it is now possible to make sense of the 
Infinity Burial Project’s efforts to upend Western burial and cremation practices by 
reconceptualizing dead human bodies as edible parts of the food web. It is one thing to 
assert that human beings are comestible, to say that humans ought to see themselves as 
part of—not apart from—the food web. It is quite another to reassemble the concept of 
the human such that the notion of human edibility can be taken up willingly in practices 
that exceed the microorganismic feasts always already taking place inside our guts. In the 
following pages, I examine the IBP’s rhetorical efforts to reassemble the human through 
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three thematic lenses: exposure, edibility, and ecological response-ability. First, I show 
how the IBP conceptualizes the body as fundamentally and inextricably exposed to 
others. Human bodies are made in encounter with others, human and more-than-human 
alike, which means that they open onto the world rather than close in upon an underlying 
subject. Second, I demonstrate how this sense of exposure contributes to a view of the 
human body as edible, that is, capable of both eating and being eaten. Human bodies, as 
noted earlier, are irreducibly part of, not apart from, the food web. The IBP invites 
audiences to embrace their role within relations of consumptive reciprocity. Finally, I 
suggest that this sense of the human body as edible gives way to an ecological framework 
in which humans are intimately entangled with the more-than-human world and in which 
the question shifts from whether one will be eaten to how and under what circumstances 
one’s body will be consumed by others. The IBP invites us to engage in acts of ecological 
response-ability, to choose other ways of dealing with our dead bodies. This ecological 




One thing that each of the four theorists cited above—Derrida, Haraway, 
Plumwood, and Bennett—tacitly agrees upon is that in the course of their lives and 
deaths human bodies are fundamentally exposed to what is not-human, and that it is 
precisely through such ceaseless exposure to others that we become most fully what we 
are. Indeed, for these thinkers, embodiment implies exposure: one lives and dies to the 
extent to which one’s body is exposed to others. In Precarious Life, Frames of War, and 
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elsewhere, Judith Butler (2004; 2009; 2016) articulates exposure to embodiment by way 
of “precariousness.” As Butler (2009, 14) argues: 
Precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact that one’s life is 
always in some sense in the hands of the other. It implies exposure both to 
those we know and those we do not know; a dependency on people we 
know, barely know, or know not at all. Reciprocally, it implies being 
impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others, most of whom 
remain anonymous. 
Exposure, then, assumes several meanings at once. First, exposure can mean simply that 
one is unavoidably in contact with others, human and more-than-human alike, that one 
leads a necessarily social life. That “one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the 
other,” as Butler writes, suggests that sociality is itself inescapable. One cannot be totally 
extricated from social relations, no matter how hard one tries. Second, exposure can mean 
that one is co-dependent within these relations, that the relations are not optional in either 
the weak or strong senses of that term. It is this “dependency” that ties us to others and 
which makes it impossible to survive outside of various forms of relationality. And, third, 
exposure can mean as well that one is subject to the dependency of others, to the needs of 
others without whom one’s own existence would be unthinkable. Just as we depend on 
others, so too do others depend upon us. 
This tripartite concept of exposure, I argue, implicitly underwrites the IBP’s 
efforts to transform dead human bodies into edible matter. Rhetorically, the IBP situates 
human bodies as nodal points in networks of flows and exchanges of various kinds of 
materials. According to the Coeio website, Lee first wore the mushroom burial suit in 
public during a 2008 fashion show, “Seamless: Computational Couture,” at the Museum 
of Science in Boston. Intrigued by the suit and Lee’s conceptual work, followers joined 
Lee’s journey as members of the Decompiculture Society. “The Society joined JR on her 
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exploration,” the website reports, “which included tours of embalming fluid factories, 
organizing workshops and lectures, even one ejection from the National Funeral 
Directors Association Annual Convention” (“The Story of a Green Burial Company” 
2016). This following helped push the IBP beyond its meager beginnings and laid the 
foundation for Lee’s participation in the TED Global conference in 2011, where she 
presented “My Mushroom Burial Suit” to an audience of entrepreneurs, scientists, 
activists, and concerned citizens. As we will see later, this initial TED Talk propelled the 
IBP’s mushroom burial suit, and ecological deathcare, into popular culture. 
At the beginning of her TED Talk, Lee (2011) frames the human body in terms of 
its exposure to and accumulation of toxic chemicals. Toxins are, in fact, the raison d’etre 
for Lee’s efforts, operative at the most basic level of her endeavor to robustly incorporate 
human bodies into the food web. Standing on stage before hundreds of live audience 
members in her head-to-toe mushroom death suit, she says, 
So I’m here to explain why I’m wearing these ninja pajamas. And to do 
that, I’d like to talk first about environmental toxins in our bodies. So 
some of you may know about the chemical Bisphenol A, BPA. It’s a 
material hardener and synthetic estrogen that’s found in the lining of 
canned foods and some plastics. So BPA mimics the body’s own 
hormones and causes neurological and reproductive problems. And it’s 
everywhere. A recent study found BPA in 93 percent of people six and 
older. But it’s just one chemical. The Center for Disease Control in the 
U.S. says we have 219 toxic pollutants in our bodies, and this includes 
preservatives, pesticides, and heavy metals like lead and mercury. 
 
In this opening set of statements, Lee links the human body to broader flows of matter 
through the example of “environmental toxins.” The term “environmental toxins” is 
something of a misnomer, she suggests, since it could easily lead one to believe that this 
class of toxic chemicals resides out there in some abstract space that we might be tempted 
to call “the” environment, a space that is both outside of and surrounding the human. 
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Toxins are not only floating around in the environment, but they are also “everywhere” 
and even “in our bodies.” Thus, Lee mobilizes toxins like Bisphenol A as a way of 
demonstrating the porousness of the human body: toxic pollutants transgress bodily 
boundaries, moving from the outside to the inside, thus bringing exposure to the 
foreground. Here, exposure is framed as potentially dangerous. Toxins, which by 
definition can cause human health problems, are lurking inside our bodies, threatening us 
from the inside. Hence, Lee frames the human body as a strange scene of encounters that 
easily pass out of normal perception. Crisscrossed by forms of exposure, she suggests, the 
human body is not always what it appears to be. 
Foregrounding toxic chemicals in this way, Lee’s (2011) TED Talk draws on and 
exploits widespread cultural aversions to things labeled toxic. The word “toxic” suggests 
that something is dangerous, risky, even lethal. As Mary Douglas (1966) suggests in 
Purity and Danger, cultures are made through processes of separating the clean from the 
unclean, the pure from the impure. Though unequally distributed, toxic chemicals are 
generally understood as unclean, impure, and dangerous and, thus, most of us try to avoid 
them. There are indeed social movements—the antitoxics and environmental justice 
campaigns come to mind (see Bullard 1993; Carson 1962; Gibbs and Levine 1982; 
Gottlieb 1994)—that struggle to thwart the dissemination of some toxic chemicals. Thus, 
treating toxics as a point of departure in her TED Talk, Lee rhetorically articulates her 
work to an already acknowledged exigence: toxic chemicals demand attention and action. 
Moreover, highlighting Bisphenol A, a chemical that has been widely covered in the 
news media because of its presence in everyday products like water bottles, tin cans, and 
even “baby teethers,” heightens this sense that one is dealing in this talk with something 
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significant. Since it can cause, as Lee reminds audience members, “neurological and 
reproductive problems,” BPA and other chemicals like it warrant our sustained attention. 
“Toxics,” Pezzullo (2014) writes, “persist as both extraordinary signifiers of precarity 
and ordinary elements in our everyday lives.” Here, exposure to toxics is figured as 
something to be concerned about, something to worry over, something extraordinary that 
nevertheless impinges upon us all. 
Since human bodies are exposed to toxic chemicals, Lee contends, they are also 
themselves potentially toxic. Since, in other words, we have up to “219 toxic pollutants in 
our bodies,” according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, then our bodies are not in 
and of themselves pure but are, rather, contaminated from the very beginning (the term 
“pre-polluted” is an apt reminder that even human fetuses inherit some of the toxins 
inside their host’s body). And since human bodies accumulate toxins, they become 
partially indistinguishable from the nefarious chemicals that reside within them. We, too, 
become toxic. Having laid out in her opening statement the ways in which human bodies 
are always already contaminated, Lee continues: 
To me, this says three things. First, don’t become a cannibal. Second, we 
are both responsible for and the victims of our own pollution. And third, 
our bodies are filters and storehouses for environmental toxins. So what 
happens to all these toxins when we die? The short answer is: They return 
to the environment in one way or another, continuing the cycle of toxicity. 
But our current funeral practices make the situation much worse. If you’re 
cremated, all those toxins I mentioned are released into the atmosphere. 
And this includes 5,000 pounds of mercury from our dental fillings alone 
every year. 
 
At least two senses of exposure are embedded in Lee’s comments. First, she frames the 
human body as itself something to which other kinds of beings, human and otherwise, are 
exposed. Troubling an anthropocentric notion of exposure, which focuses only on the 
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ways in which human bodies are themselves impinged upon, sometimes forcefully, by 
more-than-human others, Lee implies here that the human body itself can be an unwitting 
source of danger for others. Hence, she half-jokingly implores that audience members not 
“become a cannibal.” Eschewing the more stereotypical injunctions against cannibalism 
with which I began this chapter, Lee finds reason to worry about human consumption 
because of the toxic pollutants we harbor within our flesh. Framing human bodies as 
“filters and storehouses of environmental toxins” is a way of unsettling the presumed 
beneficence of the human body. While other discourses (e.g., on HIV/AIDS and some 
other diseases) frame the body as potentially dangerous (Sontag 1989), Lee brings this 
logic of impurity to bear on ordinary, “healthy” bodies by drawing attention to the ways 
in which toxins might render our bodies the nefarious partners in certain relations. Like 
fish that live in ponds polluted with mercury, she suggests, we should be wary of 
consuming human flesh brought up in postindustrial environments. 
There is also a second, more expansive sense of exposure at work in Lee’s 
framing of the human body that extends from the idea that toxic accumulation might 
make our bodies dangerous for others. When Lee says that, “our current funeral practices 
make the situation much worse,” she points to the ways in which our cultural practices 
themselves can be toxic to other cohabitants of ecosystems. Citing cremation specifically, 
Lee highlights the fact that heavy metals inside our bodies like mercury can be dispersed 
into the air as a byproduct of incineration. “If you’re cremated,” she explains, “all those 
toxins I mentioned are released into the atmosphere.” Enthymematically drawing on 
longstanding cultural understandings of the dangers of mercury (cf. Chen 2012), Lee 
invites audiences to come to their own conclusions about the dangers of emitting mercury 
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into the atmosphere. If it is unhealthy for individual bodies, the hidden logic goes, it must 
also be bad when disseminated. Moreover, by highlighting “our current funeral practices” 
more generally, Lee proposes a much more wide-ranging critique of human activity. Not 
only does cremation damage ecosystems by releasing emissions of various kinds, but 
conventional burial also harms environments through its resource-intensive use of 
hardwoods, metals, and reinforced concrete, as well as the immense amounts of toxic 
embalming fluids (approximately 827,000 gallons) it pumps into corpses annually to 
preserve them for funerals and viewing services (Harker 2012). As Lee notes, these 
bodies are “pumped with toxic formaldehyde to slow decomposition—a practice which 
causes respiratory problems and cancer in funeral personnel. So by trying to preserve our 
dead bodies, we deny death, poison the living, and further harm the environment.” Thus, 
Lee not only frames particular human bodies as potentially toxic but also contends that 
human cultural activity more generally threatens ecosystems. In this way, Lee aligns 
herself with ecological critics who condemn human practices that do harm to the more-
than-human world by overlooking or ignoring the ways in which seemingly benign 
activities such as burial and cremation pose threats to other forms of life. 
Thus far, I have suggested that Lee frames the human body as exposed to 
environmental toxins while simultaneously framing the more-than-human world as 
exposed to human cultural activities. Exposure runs in multiple directions. Indeed, Lee 
implies that exposure is a necessary condition of life itself; it can be neither avoided nor 
abandoned. At the end of her TED Talk, Lee subtly points to this underlying sense of 
exposure when she says that, 
Accepting death means accepting that we are physical beings who are 
intimately connected to the environment, as the research on environmental 
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toxins confirms. And the saying goes, we came from dust and will return 
to dust. And once we understand that we’re connected to the environment, 
we see that the survival of our species depends on the survival of the 
planet. I believe this is the beginning of true environmental responsibility. 
 
Here, “accepting death” implies repudiating conventional burial and cremation since both 
of those practices, as Lee earlier put it, “deny death, poison the living, and further harm 
the environment.” Abandoning these practices also entails grappling with the physicality 
of the human form, the fact that human bodies are “intimately connected to the 
environment.” In other words, taking death seriously means coming to terms with our 
mortal materiality, the ontological fact of our material entanglement with others, human 
and more-than-human alike, as a precondition for living and dying. This sense of 
exposure is further fleshed out when Lee notes that, “the survival of the species depends 
on the survival of the planet.” The species—Homo sapiens—cannot be separated from 
the planet—Earth—since the two are always already exposed to one another. Yet, Lee’s 
logic runs only in one direction: it is the species, not the planet, that ultimately depends 
upon the other for continued survival. Earth does not need human beings, but human 
beings can only carry on with the infrastructural supports of their home, their ecosystem 
(Butler 2004; 2016). Thus, Lee ends her TED Talk by opening onto an ethical question 
about the forms that such exposure might take in the future: “true environmental 
responsibility,” she contends, can come only after human beings have accepted their 
physicality, which brings them into inextricable connection with that which is more-than-






Another name for this fundamental connection with the more-than-human world 
is “edibility.” In the journal Environmental Communication, I have argued that the IBP 
rhetorically generates a “politics of edibility,” or ecological relationships that engender 
consumptive reciprocity, by framing human bodies through a language of carnality 
(Barnett 2016). And as noted in an earlier section, edibility is a banal quality of carnal co-
existence: human bodies are consumed constantly by microorganisms inside of them and 
on their surfaces, and human bodies must consume others in order to survive. Plumwood 
and Haraway, in particular, teach us that eating and being eaten are insuperable aspects of 
what it means to be human. For these thinkers, the (dead) human body is no different than 
any other organic material in so far as it is bound to decompose and be consumed by 
others. Thus, the question is not whether one will be eaten, but how, by whom, and under 
what circumstances. To play with Derrida’s (1991) question—How are we to eat well?—
we might also ask, How are we to be eaten well? The IBP confronts this question 
frontally by challenging the ways in which modern funeral practices deny human 
edibility by sequestering the body from the more-than-human world. Whereas cremation 
largely destroys the nutritive elements of the human body through incineration, 
conventional burial creates physical barriers between the body and the outside world, 
effectively delaying decomposition. The mushroom burial suit offers an alternative, one 
that avows rather than avoids human edibility. In this section, I demonstrate how the IBP 
rhetorically carves out a space for considering and creating relations of reciprocal 
consumption. 
The IBP positions consumption as a partial solution to the ecological challenges 
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imposed by both cremation and conventional burial. In her TED Talk, Lee (2011) invites 
audiences to consider the possibility that mushrooms, known for their potential for bio-
remediation, might be capable of filtering the very toxins to which we are exposed and, 
through our cultural practices, to which we expose the more-than-human world. After 
outlining the ecological problems with the modern funeral industry, she introduces the 
project in this way: 
I’m an artist, so I’d like to offer a modest proposal at the intersection of 
art, science, and culture: the Infinity Burial Project, an alternative burial 
system that uses mushrooms to decompose and clean toxins in bodies. The 
Infinity Burial Project began a few years ago with a fantasy to create the 
Infinity Mushroom—a new hybrid mushroom that would decompose 
bodies, clean the toxins, and deliver nutrients to plant roots, leaving clean 
compost. But I learned it’s nearly impossible to create a new hybrid 
mushroom. I also learned that some of our tastiest mushrooms can clean 
environmental toxins in soil. So I thought maybe I could train an army of 
toxin-cleaning edible mushrooms to eat my body. 
 
These statements outline the possible ecological benefits of conceiving of human bodies 
as edible matter and creating practices that harness that consumptive potential. Here, 
mushrooms—usually understood as food for humans—are framed as consumers of 
humans. This reversal is accomplished first in a somewhat indirect way, as when Lee 
notes that her “fantasy” of creating a new strain of mushrooms was thwarted by the 
mushrooms themselves, which resisted her attempts to manufacture a novel form of 
fungi. Lee’s attempt at mastery, in other words, was stifled by the more-than-human 
mycelia, which cannot simply be controlled for human ends. Having given up on this 
fantasy, Lee learned that certain strains of already existing mushrooms could “decompose 
bodies, clean the toxins, and deliver nutrients to plant roots.” The verbs decompose, 
clean, and deliver do not immediately suggest consumption but, rather, forms of 
transformation. Lee’s invocation of these verbs makes clear that the mushrooms will 
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perform actions on the body, but these actions initially seem more or less benign. The 
mushrooms are first pitched, then, in terms of their active relation to the toxins that 
accumulate within human bodies. While they cannot be entirely controlled, their 
decompositional tendencies can be channeled in productive directions. 
 This reversal of the taken-for-granted relationship between eaters and eaten—a 
relationship that would typically position humans exclusively as eaters of mushrooms, 
which do not likewise consume humans—is further accomplished through a more direct 
invocation of the idea of consumption. Lee notes that she attempted to “train an army of 
toxin-cleaning edible mushrooms to eat [her] body” (emphasis mine). In this partly 
metaphorical, partly factual statement, Lee positions herself as the commander-in-chief of 
a cadre of mycelia, as one who prepares fungi to decompose and consume her body. The 
IBP’s deconstructive logic is encapsulated within this statement. By training mushrooms 
to “eat [her] body,” Lee anticipates her own decomposition—not only her own death but 
also the consumption of her body by others. Moreover, she trains the very organisms that 
will carry out this act of bodily ingestion and digestion. Through the process of training 
her “toxin-cleaning edible mushrooms,” then, Lee simultaneously exerts force on her 
mushroom companions but also, and more profoundly, acknowledges and harnesses the 
force of the mycelia that will eventually surpass whatever force of control she has over 
them. More simply, at the precise moment Lee seems to be managing the mushrooms by 
training them she also loses control since they will eat her body. The consumer becomes 
the consumed, the eater the eaten, not in a spectacular scene of one force overcoming 
another but through a subtle displacement of the power to consume. 
Another way of putting this point would be to say that the IBP invites users not 
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only to relinquish dreams of mastery by seeing themselves as full participants in the food 
web but also to make their bodies available as fodder for others. It is in this sense that the 
IBP carries out what Plumwood (2008) advises in “Tasteless,” namely creating funeral 
practices that honor human edibility and that materialize possibilities for humans to be 
consumed by more-than-human others. In her TED Talk, Lee (2011) describes the initial 
process of giving her body over as fodder: 
So today, I’m collecting what I shed or slough off—my hair, skin, and 
nails—and I’m feeding these to edible mushrooms. As the mushrooms 
grow, I pick the best feeders to become Infinity Mushrooms. It’s a kind of 
imprinting and selective breeding process for the afterlife. So when I die, 
the Infinity Mushrooms will recognize my body and be able to eat it. 
 
Figured as a collection of edible fragments—“hair, skin, and nails”—the human body 
becomes a source of sustenance for the mushrooms, a coterie of consumable parts that 
nourish other life. Since bits of Lee’s body “shed or slough off,” they disperse as they 
detach from the body. Hence, the human body is always already in a process of becoming 
undone, always giving way to forces beyond its control, always physically coming apart. 
Lee harvests these fragments and feeds them to other organisms, thus cultivating a taste 
for the human among her mushroom companions. This leads, she contends, to an act of 
recognition where her mycelium messmates are “able to eat” her body because they have 
already been trained to do so. Already given over as fare for others in life, that is, Lee 
speculates that her body will be particularly probable food when she dies. This effect of 
recognition, however, is premised on prior acts of training: the mushrooms are able to 
consume her body because she has already shown them how and that it is acceptable to 
do so, because she has “trained” them to treat her body as fodder. 
As Lee describes this process of training the mushrooms to eat her body, an image 
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appears on the large screen behind her. In the photograph are three petri dishes, small 
plastic containers normally used to grow cultures in laboratories, that each contain little 
piles of the hair, skin, and fingernail clippings that Lee had been collecting. Arrayed like 
tapas, these gatherings of organic material visually reinforce the point that Lee verbally 
articulates, namely, that the body—whether living or dead—can be served up as food for 
others. That is, the image visualizes the fact that human bodies are always already 
comestible, even when they are living, because the body itself is not whole but instead is 
composed of fragments that come and go. Though the goal of the mushroom burial suit is 
to turn corpses into fodder, we see in this photograph the potential to imagine our bodies 
as food for others right here, right now: You are already food! Simultaneously sterile 
(since in petri dishes) and homey (since we know these little bits of DNA once belonged 
to the shrouded woman we see on stage), this image forcefully demonstrates as well how 
human bodies are always already fragmenting, coming undone, disseminating, and 
dispersing. These bits of Lee’s body would normally accumulate in the crevices of our 
couch cushions and on our bathroom floors, but here they are gathered purposefully as a 
meal. This visualization of the fragmenting, edible body serves to make real the claims 
that Lee advances. Human edibility becomes not simply an idea but a practice, not just 
science fiction but science itself. 
In addition to describing and visualizing her efforts to train mushrooms to eat her 
body, Lee and colleagues also developed an iPad application to help audiences 
themselves visualize the process of becoming-food for others. Designed for the Zero1 
Biennial, an exhibition hosted in both California’s Silicon Valley and the San Francisco 
Bay area that featured works by local, national, and international artists whose projects 
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were situated at the “nexus of art and technology” (“About: Zero1 Biennial” 2012), the 
application, called “Decomp Me,” allowed participants to take pictures of themselves and 
then drag-and-drop mushroom spores onto their portraits (Figure 10). In an exhibition 
space, Lee affixed an iPad to a suspended arm that hung over an operating table like a 
dentist’s lamp. Participants laid under the device, took pictures of themselves with the 
iPad, and then dragged digital mycelia onto their portraits. The application then created 
and displayed a time-lapse image sequence of the body being digitally decomposed 
(Figure 11). As the simulated timeline progressed the human body gave way to the 
mushrooms, which “ate” away at their flesh and eventually transformed the recognizable 
human form into a scene of multispecies decomposition and edibility. These images offer 
viewers a glimpse of what their bodies might look like should they choose to embrace 
their own edibility and don the mushroom burial suit when they die. 
Following Christine Harold (1999, 166), we might say that the IBP’s images of 
human decomposition and consumption operate by “making the body and our 
conceptions of it strange.” In the images, bodies mingle with one another in a confusing 
mix of sprawling spores, budding mushrooms, and the persistent though impermanent 
remnants of a human body. In Figure 12, for instance, a barely visible set of teeth in the 
bottom center of the image recalls an X-ray’s visualization of the body’s bones, 
reminding viewers that they are seeing a human body being worn away. The mushroom 
spores spread, web-like, across this background we recognize as a human face, taking 
over and covering it in a thick, sinewy maze. A cluster of mushrooms reaches out at the 
viewer from where we imagine a set of eyes once was. As Julie Schutten (2008) argues, 
we not only need philosophical understandings of the interconnectedness of humans and 
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Figure 10 Dragging-and-dropping mushroom spores. Image from the “Decomp Me” app 
produced by the Infinity Burial Project. Reprinted with permission.	  	  	  
 
 
Figure 11 Mushrooms consuming a human face. Image from the “Decomp Me” app 
produced by the Infinity Burial Project. Reprinted with permission. 
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Figure 12 Jae Rhim Lee wearing the mushroom burial suit. Screenshot taken from the 
video of Lee’s 2011 TED Talk.
nature, but we also need practical examples of what these relations might look like when 
they are enacted. Although images of decomposition may instill fear for the afterlife in 
some, confirming precisely the dangers of letting one’s body comingle with others, they 
might also help viewers come to terms with, and even appreciate, decomposition and 
edibility. In other words, although the IBP’s images of decomposition and consumption 
might initially confuse or even startle some viewers, they also have the capacity to 
initiate viewers into a way of thinking about their bodies and their relationships within 
broader ecosystems that further deteriorates the discursive boundaries between 
body/environment and eater/eaten. 
Moreover, the IBP’s visualization of human edibility invites viewers to imagine 
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the transitional state between life and death differently, to imagine the dead human body 
as a site of sustenance for others rather than a passive object. Instead of keeping the 
bounded body in tact or visualizing a body that “looks alive,” these “Decomp Me” 
images explode normative boundaries among the human body and its environment, 
between humans and other species, between living and dying, between eating and being 
eaten. Just as Douglas (1966, 3) framed the impulse to get rid of dirt as a way of 
“positively re-ordering our environment, making it conform to an idea,” so too is the 
IBP’s embrace of visual disorder in the transitional state a way of creating new relations 
with dying, death, decomposition, and consumption. Contrary to some popular stories 
about humans being eaten by more-than-human others (Plumwood 1999b; Schutten 
2008), these images dedramatize the (potential) pain of being consumed. Rather than 
being forcefully ripped apart and eaten, the body visualized by the “Decomp Me” 
application is slowly eaten away by simulated mushrooms. No sliced skin. No bulging 
organs. No broken bones. No blood.  Figured as fodder for others, the human body is no 
longer merely the consumer of environments, but is also and consequentially implicated 
in relations of consumptive reciprocity. These images provide viewers with a chance to 
imagine what this process might look like without succumbing to the theatrics of gore. 
Human edibility, these images assert, need not be the worrisome act of bodily destruction 
it is made out to be in narratives of cannibalism or stories of humans being eaten alive by 
charismatic megafauna in the wild. Becoming edible might be imagined instead as the 
intimate embrace of one body by others, a slow, elegant form of de-composition. 
In addition to the TED Talk and “Decomp Me” application, the idea and practice 
of consumptive reciprocity is most rigorously materialized in the form of the IBP’s 
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mushroom burial suit itself (Figure 12), which serves as a physical alternative to modern 
burial and cremation practices. The mushroom burial suit is a means of further displacing 
the eater/eaten dualism that has undergirded western funeral practices, particularly 
conventional burial with its strong coffins and heavy vaults. Although conservation burial 
readily exposes the body to the decompositional force of the biotic communities in the 
soil, replete as it is with hungry microorganisms, that practice embraces decomposition 
more than consumption. Indeed, as noted at the outset of this chapter, the Ramsey Creek 
Preserve website ensures readers that animals very rarely disturb buried bodies. On the 
contrary, the IBP’s mushroom death suit creates the conditions for the human body to 
become food for others. During her TED Talk, Lee explains: 
And now about these ninja pajamas. Once it’s completed, I plan to 
integrate the Infinity Mushrooms into a number of objects. First, a burial 
suit infused with mushroom spores, the Mushroom Death Suit. I’m 
wearing the second prototype of this burial suit. It’s covered with a 
crocheted netting that is embedded with mushroom spores. The dendritic 
pattern you see mimics the growth of mushroom mycelia, which are the 
equivalent of plant roots. 
 
Mushroom mycelia are embedded in the suit itself, between layers of thin fabric, and lie 
in waiting to break down whatever nutritive material is placed inside the suit. The 
mycelia recognize human bodies as food and so decompose them, but they also consume 
other materials, such as the wood caskets some users might opt to be buried in. To don 
the mushroom burial suit is to wear a garment that will hasten human decomposition. 
Importantly, use of the mushroom burial suit requires forethought. Since the suits are 
custom-made and thus not available on the shelves of local funeral homes (wait time, 
according to the Coeio website, is between two to four weeks), potential users must work 
in advance of their own deaths to choose this option. In other words, those who might 
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want to give their bodies over as fodder in this way must think about their own deaths 
and mortal materiality and plan accordingly. Thus, the mushroom death suit not only 
materializes human edibility but forces a thoughtful engagement with the question of 
deathcare and with the possibility of becoming edible. 
The documentary Suiting Dennis, produced by Grace Lee (2015) for the IBP and 
released at the end of 2015, follows the mushroom burial suit’s first human adopter, 
Dennis White, and his family as they negotiate what it looks and feels like to prepare for 
an unconventional burial. Suiting Dennis begins in a homey kitchen as family members 
prepare a meal together but quickly cuts to a close-up of Dennis who explains that he was 
recently diagnosed with primary progressive aphasia (PPA), a neurological disease that 
gradually eliminates the capacity for language use, and that he is “going to die sooner 
rather than later.” “I never thought about death until I was diagnosed,” he says looking 
into the camera, “and then it suddenly became urgent. And I want to go out with a bang 
like I’ve lived most of my life.” Having watched Lee’s TED Talk, Dennis notes that he 
“was fascinated” by the prospect of being buried in the mushroom suit. Citing Neil 
deGrasse Tyson’s request that his body be “buried, not cremated, so that the energy 
content contained within it gets returned to the earth, so that flora and fauna can dine 
upon it, just as I have dined upon flora and fauna during my lifetimes” (thiscantbeitagain 
2010), Dennis offered his body up as a test case for the IBP’s mushroom burial suit. He 
thus gave his body over to the Project, and back to the land-community, in an 
unprecedented way—“with a bang,” so to speak. 
The opening scenes of Suiting Dennis articulate consumption and death in subtle 
but important ways that interface with the mushroom burial suit and ecological deathcare 
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more generally. As noted above, viewers initially encounter family members 
collaboratively cooking a meal in the family kitchen. The documentary cuts several times 
to close-up shots of prepared food in glass dishes and cast-iron frying pans, vegetables 
and sausages waiting to be eaten by the members of the family who have gathered 
together to break bread. As meal prep comes to an end, the group sits around a table, 
taking bites of the feast that has been prepared. Kids, not yet required to partake of the 
whole meal, dine on noodles with butter. As this scene of familial consumption unfolds, 
we hear Dennis’s monologue. As noted earlier, PPA causes the afflicted to gradually lose 
control of their voice, making speech a difficult and eventually impossible bodily feat. By 
the time the documentary was shot, Dennis had already begun to lose some of his verbal 
function and, thus, his voice breaks in and out as he speaks. In some cases, there are long 
gaps between words as Dennis struggles to speak forth his desire to desire to decompose 
in the mushroom burial suit. We hear in his voice the deterioration of the human body, 
the often gradual and sometimes rapid withering away of corporeal functions. Just as his 
voice breaks, so too does the body break. It breaks down, becomes otherwise. In these 
opening scenes, then, dying is likened to consumption in a broad sense. Dying begins to 
appear both like the food on the table (edible in the usual sense) and like Dennis’s voice 
(deterioration of the subject, the “I,” materialized in the sonic form of speech). 
The majority of the 27-minute documentary Suiting Dennis oscillates between 
personal vignettes that paint a picture of Dennis’s life and segments showing his family 
making preparations for his funeral. When, towards the end of the film, Lee delivers 
Dennis’s custom-made mushroom burial suit, the family cheers with excitement. 
Noticing that the final version of the suit looks different from the one that Lee wore in 
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her TED Talk, Dennis’s daughter asks where the mushrooms are. The suit prepared for 
Dennis is beige, not black, and the squiggly white lines that represented mushroom 
spores in the first several prototypes are gone. Lee explains that in Dennis’s suit the 
mycelia are embedded between the layers of fabric; they will appear only once his dead 
body is interred and begins decomposing. His daughter’s question indicates an unspoken 
but implied concern with edibility: Are the mushrooms really there? Is this thing going to 
work? Is the suit going to eat Dennis like you said it would? This brief encounter with the 
potential of edibility, though, is quickly eclipsed by the more mundane details of funeral 
planning, such as the costs of burial plots and how different family members will take 
part in the deathcare process. Thus, while Dennis explicitly describes his decision to be 
buried in the mushroom burial suit as an attempt to make his body available as food for 
others, especially when he cites deGrasse Tyson’s now-famous expression of edibility, 
the documentary devotes more time to the interpersonal narratives that shape end-of-life 
care. In a sense, this lines up with Coeio’s shift from the more provocative invocations of 
human consumption offered in Lee’s initial TED Talk to the broader notion of 
“assembling” that now predominates within its discourse. While I am sympathetic with 
the notion of gathering embedded within the new company name, it is disappointing to 
see the more radical sense of edibility fall away as sentimentalism, however well 
intended and powerful, takes its place. Like the documentary, Coeio devotes less energy 
to convincing people to embrace their comestible corpses than it does working to 
reconceive deathcare and death acceptance more generally by creating contexts where 
family and friends can come together around death in new ways. 
Whereas Suiting Dennis largely relegates human edibility to the background, 
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popular reception of the project feasts on the issue of consumption. Following such 
reception is a way of tracing the initial force with which the IBP is moving in the world 
and, indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that humans besides Lee and White are 
willing to give up their magisterial, if not mythic, position at the top of the food chain by 
donning the mushroom burial suit when they die. Or, at least, to consider the shroud as a 
viable deathcare option. Since Lee’s initial TED Talk was released in 2011, the IBP has 
garnered widespread attention, much of it positive. For instance, Steven Colbert included 
the mushroom burial suit in an episode of his show, The Colbert Report (“Tip/Wag: Toys 
‘R’ Us, Shroom Tombs, and John Pike” 2013). Colbert sardonically tells the audience, 
“When I die ... I [hope I] can spend an eternity doing what I love most, taking up more 
space than I need. That’s why I’m so offended by this next product.” A little later on, 
Colbert playfully balks at the environmental justification for what he calls the “shroom 
tomb,” questioning, “Who are these monsters trying to turn my death into some kind of 
natural process?” The mushroom burial suit has also been featured on episodes of the 
CBS show The Doctors, Comedy Central’s Tosh.0, and several NPR shows. The artist 
Björk even curated a playlist of her favorite TED Talks, including Lee’s “My Mushroom 
Burial Suit” as her top pick (Björk 2017). Art exhibitions have been organized around the 
mushroom suit (“Natural Causes” 2017) and, in September 2016, models donned the 
shroud on the Vogue runway during New York Fashion Week (Regensdorf 2016). These 
are just a few examples of how the Infinity Burial Project is moving ecological deathcare 
practices away from the margins and toward the center. 
Online audiences have also indicated interest in the mushroom burial suit. More 
than 750 comments have been added to Lee’s initial TED Talk, which is published on 
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both the TED website and on YouTube. One commenter asked, “Who wouldn’t want to 
become compost that could nourish a beautiful flower garden?” while another reported 
that, “To think that my body will break down into the soil and feed life or even push up a 
tree or daisies is a greater feeling than that of being entombed like some pharaoh who 
could not let go.” By framing their bodies as food for various kinds of flora, these 
commenters acknowledge and avow the edibility of their own bodies. Indeed, in these 
comments, decomposing bodies are figured as precursors to the development of new life. 
Human bodies can “nourish” and “feed life,” which are both thinly veiled euphemisms 
for edibility. Another commenter implores: “Stop wasting. Start feeding back.” The 
injunction to make one’s body useful in death aligns with the IBP’s efforts to reduce the 
burden that toxic bodies have on the planet. Here, “feeding back” is situated as a means 
of giving back to the land-community that nourished one’s own body during life. In a 
way, this commenter’s call mirrors those calls for recycling. Rather than waste the energy 
content in one’s body, they suggest, we should cycle it back into biotic communities 
where it can be put to use by others. Yet another commenter notes that, “I hope I will be 
allowed to decompose in the most nourishing, least toxic way possible!” Expressed in the 
form of a wish, this remark resonates with many of the hundreds of other comments that 
have been posted by audience members to Lee’s TED Talk. Drawing from Lee’s 
characterization of human bodies as storehouses of toxins and of modern funeral 
practices as toxic, many commenters make a distinction between polluting and nourishing 
the earth. Throughout these comments, the idea of nourishment appears again and again 
as a way of signaling human edibility without invoking the concept in the more graphic 
terms laid out in Lee’s TED Talk. 
241 
As expected, others express doubts, concerns, and even feelings of fear in 
response to the IBP’s proposal to transform human bodies into food for mushrooms. 
Many of the more skeptical responses to the IBP revolve around one of two concerns: on 
the one hand, some audience members worry that Lee’s mushrooms will not be able to 
distinguish between living and dead human bodies and, on the other hand, some people 
express an aversion to Lee’s criticisms of human activity. For example, one commenter 
remarked that, “It’s as if we are developing man eating creatures and hoping that we will 
always be able to keep them under control! Seriously! This is scary!” Here, human 
edibility is framed as a dangerous opening onto massive consumption that could easily 
spiral out of control. This commenter’s slippery slope argument rightly questions whether 
humans can ultimately manage their mushroom companions, but mobilizes this concern 
not to move the IBP’s aims forward but, rather, to close down productive conversation by 
calling into question its basic assumption: that mushrooms can be marshaled as allies in 
human efforts to improve ecological conditions. Another commenter asked, “Why not 
donate your body to medical science? Why is the assumption that everything we do is 
‘bad’ and that we cannot even die in dignity, but have to be ‘recycled’—sheer idiocy.” 
Against the IBP’s contention that industrial culture generally, and modern funeral 
practices in particular, do harm to the more-than-human world, this commenter questions 
the underlying assumption embedded within Lee’s TED Talk, namely that humans are 
always in some sense at odds with broader ecosystems. Ironically, however, this 
commenter’s fundamental disagreement hinges on the possibility that humans can act in 
ways that are beneficial. Their response, then, seems to take issue not so much with Lee’s 
proposed alternative but with the way in which she puts forth this proposal. What these 
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two comments, and dozens similar to them, suggest is that when aversion to the IBP 
arises it is often depicted not as a distaste for the concept of human edibility per se but, 
on the contrary, with the modes by which human edibility might enter into and become a 
part of cultural practices. 
 
Ecological Bodies 
The IBP’s call to conceptualize human bodies as edible matter is a provocative 
incitement to think about the various forms of symbiosis in which Homo sapiens are 
always already engaged. “We are symbionts on a symbiotic planet, and if we care to, we 
can find symbiosis everywhere,” writes the evolutionary biologist Lynn Margulis (1998, 
5). “Physical contact is a nonnegotiable requisite for many kinds of life.” Symbiosis, 
simply put, occurs when multiple species live alongside one another, and sometimes 
inside of one another, as joint beneficiaries of mutually sustaining relations. Contrary to 
individualizing conceptions of human being, a view towards symbiosis reveals the many 
ways in which humans are entangled in consequential relationships with other kinds of 
organisms, sometimes latching onto other species and sometimes serving as a host for 
inner worlds of multi-species flourishing. Drawing from Margulis’s highly respected take 
on evolutionary symbiosis (basically, the idea that evolution occurs as a result of 
symbiotic relationships and the transformations they evoke), Haraway (2008) suggests 
that practices of eating and being eaten bring different species into close contact with one 
another in significant ways. Symbiosis itself, one might argue, is the basis and the 
condition for ecological life, if we think of ecological life as being bound up with 
concrete, lived experiences in relation. In this penultimate section, I unpack how the IBP 
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enrolls audiences in forms of ecological response-ability by posing certain forms of 
edibility as decisions to be made, choices to be risked. 
Like ethics, ecological response-ability is related to questioning and pursuing 
what is best for partners in relationality. Unlike ethics in its more transcendent guises, 
however, ecological response-ability involves actors in the immanent and precarious 
game of making decisions. It raises the question, posed in Chapter One, about what it 
means to respond, rhetorically and otherwise, to the relationships one finds oneself 
inhabiting and animating, as well as the choice to enter into new relationships. For 
Derrida, the question of response was always vexing. Not only are there numerous ways 
of responding that produce different effects in the world, but every response implies the 
act of decision. Every decision, as Derrida (1995; 2004) contends, is a response to a more 
fundamental undecidability. If one must decide, that means there are no obvious answers. 
One thus always decides in the face of the undecidable. Hence, one chooses. One risks a 
response. One wagers or gambles, which is to say, one plays in making decisions. Rather 
than serving some transcendental or deontological or even utilitarian end, decisions are 
immanent responses, offered up by meager beings with limited understandings. 
The IBP calls on audiences to make decisions in the face of unknowable 
ecological futures. During her TED Talk, for instance, Lee situates human edibility as a 
means of composing mortal assemblages built on the idea and practice of consumptive 
reciprocity. She says, 
I realize this is not the kind of relationship that we usually aspire to have 
with our food. We want to eat, not be eaten by, our food. But as I watch 
the mushrooms grow and digest my body, I imagine the Infinity 
Mushroom as a symbol of a new way of thinking about death and the 
relationship between my body and the environment. See for me, 
cultivating the Infinity Mushroom is more than just scientific 
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experimentation or gardening or raising a pet, it’s a step towards accepting 
the fact that someday I will die and decay. It’s also a step towards taking 
responsibility for my own burden on the planet. 
 
Here, Lee begins by situating human edibility as one possible form of relation among 
others. Though human bodies are insuperably exposed to the more-than-human world, 
including to microorganismic others who incessantly make meals out of our living 
bodies, Lee suggests that there are decisions to be made about whether and how one’s 
body will be given over as fodder for others when one dies. Since we do not “usually 
aspire” to become food for our food, that is, we do “usually aspire” to inhabit and 
embody other relations. As Lee argues earlier in her TED Talk, the conventional forms of 
burial and cremation popular in the United States are good examples of the kinds of 
relationships we tend to aspire to. In the case of conventional burial, the relationship is 
one of sequestration: the human body is “usually” kept away from other organisms that 
might dine upon it. By acknowledging that the IBP’s proposal stands out against this 
background, Lee recognizes as well that there are important distinctions to be made 
between those practices that deny and those that foster the energy contained within dead 
human bodies. What she advises is embracing an unusual aspiration, a desire to become 
otherwise and in ways that subvert typical human aspirations of mastery, control, and 
distinction from the more-than-human world.  
In contrast with the model of sequestration that governs many modern burial 
practices in the west, the IBP explodes the assumption that one could or should separate 
one’s body from the earth. Rather, Lee positions the mushroom burial suit as a “new way 
of thinking about death and the relationship between [her] body and the environment.” 
Embracing symbiotic relationships, that is, promises to transform ways of thinking about 
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and acting towards and with other species within ecosystems. This “new way of thinking” 
proposed by the IBP forces humans to acknowledge the fact that their bodies are not their 
own, at least not exclusively. One’s body is an opening onto the world, not an airtight 
enclosure that protects one from the world. In Derridean (1991) terms, the human body is 
an exercise in the productivity of limits: we become what we are because of encounters 
with what is outside of us, meaning that whatever we “are” is not in any simple way a 
feature of internal life. Lee’s injunction to conceptualize the human body as edible in 
some ways echoes Derrida’s (1982) claims about the “ends of man,” especially to the 
extent that it mandates an acceptance of the “relationship between my body and the 
environment.” The environment is not external to the human body but is, rather, a 
constitutive part of embodiment, as Martin Heidegger (1953) teaches us. Heidegger 
argues that being human is inextricably bound up with “being-in-the-world,” which is to 
say always already being part of, not alongside or apart from, the very world in which we 
dwell (see also DeLuca 2005). Thus, the “new way” forged by the IBP leads the willing 
into strange forms of encounter, even consumptive encounter, with the more-than-human 
world in which human beings are inescapably situated (Abram 1996; Leopold 1949). 
The IBP’s call to more robustly dwell in the world in relations of consumptive 
reciprocity is grounded in Lee’s framing of human edibility as an opening onto forms of 
ecological response-ability. When Lee describes the process of feeding bits and pieces of 
her body to the mushrooms, she invites audiences to join with her in imagining new ways 
of engendering symbiotic assembly with other species. She links the broader project of 
“accepting the fact that [she] will someday die and decay” with the material practice of 
watching “the mushrooms grow and digest [her] body.” That is, witnessing is figured as 
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an incitement to rethink the world. Witnessing fragments of one’s body being consumed 
by others better enables one to both cope with edibility as a constitutive element of 
human being but also imagine a world in which the human body is readily given over as 
fodder for others. Witnessing makes human edibility visible and thinkable. Thus, the 
IBP’s initial rhetorical gesture—Lee’s TED Talk—can be seen as an attempt to extend 
the range of witnesses to the practices and processes of human edibility by making 
available (verbal and visual) images of the body becoming food for others. In her TED 
Talk, Lee reiterates that coming to terms with the facts of death and decay hinges on 
being able to “witness” and to “imagine” the decompositional processes one’s body will 
undergo after death—being able to see what these processes (might) look like is a way of 
realizing their inevitability, of making them real. 
For the IBP, embracing human edibility is one potential means of making amends 
with the planet that humans have polluted. Rhetorically, humans are framed as the 
responsible party in a long line of environmental crises. The issue that environmentalists 
raise is whether and how humans will attempt to remediate their past actions and make 
the world a more, not less, habitable place for both current and future human beings and 
more-than-human cohabitants. Toward this end, Lee (2011) suggests that giving her body 
over as food for others is “a step towards taking responsibility for my own burden on the 
planet.” Mobilizing the notions of burden and responsibility, the IBP suggests that 
humans owe something to the more-than-human world. If human bodies are a “burden on 
the planet,” this is so because they are both resource-intensive and because they pollute 
the ecosystems within which they dwell. Humans take up space and, in doing so, make 
the world a different kind of place than it would be without them. The IBP is particularly 
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concerned about the toxic legacies of human action, and it is this “burden” that 
necessitates a form of response. As Lee puts it, “we are physical beings who are 
intimately connected to the environment.” This intimate connection with the more-than-
human world means, as noted earlier, that we cannot extract ourselves from the circuits of 
relationality that contingently constitute ecosystems. Taking seriously the fact that all 
humans are intricately entangled in, and exposed to others within, ecosystems provides 
the impetus for reconceptualizing the human body as edible. Thus, for the IBP, to be 
responsible in such a world is to make amends for one’s burden by making the energy 
content stored in one’s body available to others. 
The concept of “responsibility” underwrites the IBP’s calls for action. This 
concept implies that one can respond in better and worse ways to a set of circumstances 
and cohabitants that impinge upon one, that is, that one might respond well or badly to 
the forms of exposure to which one is exposed. I want to say that the IBP “invites” 
audiences to respond to their ecological embededness, their fundamental exposure, by 
making themselves edible through their deathcare choices. Derrida (1995, 14) wonders: 
“What is an invitation? What is it to respond to an invitation? [...] It should never 
[devrait] imply: you are obliged to come, you have to come, it is necessary. But the 
invitation must be pressing, not indifferent.” This invitation extended by the IBP to think 
of oneself and to comport oneself as edible matter, to expose one’s body to the possibility 
of consumptive reciprocity, impinges upon its recipients not only since it poses a question 
about postmortem practices but also, and perhaps more powerfully, because it challenges 
us to think of our bodies differently before death, to apprehend how we are always 
already comestible. There is, of course, the possibility, the good chance, that one will 
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receive without responding to this invitation, perform something of a nonresponse, and 
that this nonresponse exacts a kind of response in its own way. Too, one might respond 
obliquely to the IBP’s call, that is, respond by challenging its claims, putting its position 
under pressure. One might also respond in the negative, say “no!” to this invitation to 
give oneself over, one’s body over, to the more-than-human world in just this way, to 
refuse in a simple way to become food for others. Or one might respond, as the IBP 
hopes one will, affirmatively by embracing this concept of edibility and by deciding, 
rendering a verdict, to embrace not only one’s finitude, one’s exposure, but also one’s 
edibility. Regardless of what decision is made, the IBP submits an invitation, extends an 
opportunity to respond to ecological enmeshment and so to grapple with the ways in 
which we are already intimately connected with our world.  
In this sense, the IBP’s efforts are grounded in an ecological understanding of 
relationality and response. Ecology teaches us that everything is interconnected, that no 
thing stands alone (including human beings), and that the actions of one actor can affect 
all the other actors in ways both minute and magnificent (Morton 2010). Lee makes this 
argument in her TED Talk: “once we understand that we’re connected to the 
environment, we see that the survival of our species depends on the survival of the planet. 
I believe this is the beginning of true environmental responsibility.” Here, the logic 
undergirding the IBP’s invitation is more fully exposed. Three elements of this logic are 
worth noting. First, Lee positions “understanding” as the hinge upon which responsible 
forms of ecological relationality can be assembled. Understanding is not only rooted in 
intellectual activity, but also in embodied forms of connection with more-than-human 
others. Hence Lee’s emphasis on witnessing the human body being consumed by others: 
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sensing the body in new ways, she suggests, can incite new ways of relating to others. 
Second, Lee argues that the vitality of the human species is bound up with the entire 
planet’s well being. Thus, one’s “understanding” must take account of more than the self, 
more than any individual human being’s relationships within ecosystems. Rather, if we 
are intricately interconnected with the planet itself, we must understand our position 
within this broad meshwork and locate potential for transformations in the openings 
engendered by every form of relation. And, third, Lee frames this form of understanding 
as the “beginning of true environmental responsibility” (emphasis mine). Human 
edibility is not an end point but an initial gesture. As a “beginning,” giving one’s body 
over as fodder for others sets new relationships into motion, making new assemblages 
possible. Moreover, linked as it is with a “true” form of “environmental responsibility,” 
this initial gesture of recognizing one’s body as comestible is only part of a processual 
unfolding of relations to come. The truth of responsibility, then, is that it does not start 
and stop with single actions but is rather realized in a series of chain reactions that 
nevertheless depend upon a fundamentally different starting point. What the IBP makes 
possible is a point of departure that begins with the fact of human edibility and that 
therefore proceeds down different paths and into the midst of mortal assemblages 
composed of multiple species in relations of consumptive reciprocity. 
 
Consumptive Reciprocity and Edible Assemblages 
As the Infinity Burial Project reconceives and rematerializes deathcare practices 
in the form of the mushroom burial suit, it puts forth the conditions of possibility for new 
kinds of mortal assemblages. Throughout this chapter, I have been suggesting that 
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edibility is a key entry point for understanding the kind of assemblage this project makes 
possible. As a metaphor and a practice, consumption is all too often confined to its 
relationship with capitalism and, at least among some leftist academics, reduced to a 
“master’s tools” strategy worthy mostly of negative critique. Yet, consumption is not 
simply an act within market relations, nor is every case of consumption necessarily 
something to be condemned. As Phaedra Pezzullo (2011) compellingly argues, 
sometimes ecological politics must engage consumption-based strategies in order to 
transform industrial and market practices. It is not always, and perhaps only rarely, 
possible to extricate oneself from relations of consumption within capitalist economic 
systems. Yet, the IBP offers an opportunity to more fully develop a sense of ecological 
politics that does not simply disavow consumption as a potentially productive scene of 
intervention. Indeed, by expanding our notion of consumption to those processes of 
eating and being eaten, the IBP opens onto a range of material, gustatory tactics for 
making a difference in the way that humans interact with the more-than-human world of 
which they are always already a part. As I have argued throughout this chapter, the IBP’s 
rhetoric of carnality in some significant sense digests the largely Western notion of 
subjectivity and, as a byproduct of this process, produces a radically ecological 
assemblage based in practices of reciprocal consumption. The excremental remains of 
this process offer promising routes forward for ecological thinking and politics. The 
question, as Timothy Morton (2016, 162) puts it at the end of Dark Ecology, is “whether 
you are OK with widening your view, taking your eyes out of the telescopic light of Life, 
[...] and resting in the charnel ground.” 
The assemblage made possible by the IBP is one in which transformation is the 
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primary objective. Against narratives of personal identity, which posit an underlying 
essence in the form of an unwavering “I,” the IBP puts forth a conception of the human 
as always in the midst of transformations. Digestion is one such mode of change. “Death 
is a moment of transformation; it’s not an end. Returning to the earth and reuniting with 
the trees and the soil and the air is a source of potentially deep healing and hope,” Lee 
(2016) contends during a second TED Talk. That is to say, death is not figured as the end 
of the subject per se but, rather, as an inaugural moment in a fundamental alteration: as 
the body decomposes and is consumed by others, it becomes otherwise. Since the 
mushroom burial suit makes it possible for mycelia to break down and consume the 
corpse, this digestive process quite literally materializes the deconstruction of the human. 
Decentered, the human body no longer occupies a magisterial role within the food web. It 
no longer can be seen as apart from the food web’s messy, mortal weave. Displaced, the 
eater/eaten dichotomy withers away as the mycelia consume the human body and 
transform it into a useful and less-toxic part of the ecosystem and its web of consumptive 
practices. The challenge of the IBP lies less in demonstrating that human bodies are 
indeed edible (this point is uncontestable among reasonable people), but rather in 
demonstrating why and how humans ought to give their bodies over as fodder for others 
when they die. It is ultimately about extending an invitation to choose other mortal 
assemblages, to risk a decision to install oneself in an other postmortem gathering, a feast 
among commensal creatures large and small. 
Moreover, the IBP is part of a larger mycological trend within certain ecological 
circles. Mushrooms have long been recognized as important allies within multiple 
contexts—from human health to ecological sustainability. “The bottom line,” as the 
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mycologist Paul Stamets put is, “is that mushrooms generate soil. They are the grand 
molecular decomposers in nature and the grand recyclers of the dead, whether they are 
plants, animals, bacteria, or protozoa” (Stamets and Horrigan 2006, 154). In other words, 
mushrooms are essential elements within ecological networks: they literally help create 
the ground upon which terrestrial life itself can emerge and be sustained. Thus, the IBP 
invites Homo sapiens to join with our mycological counterparts in a collective effort to 
create more livable ecosystems. Human beings, along with all other living creatures, 
benefit from the compositional work of mycelia, but rarely give back to mushrooms in 
concerted ways. By creating practices in which human bodies can be made available to 
mushrooms as fodder, the IBP works to restore one of the key assemblages within any 
ecosystem: the assemblage of human beings and mushrooms, which can cooperate in 
productive ways to lessen the damages of industrialism, pollution, and the toxic practices 
reified by the modern funeral industry. With our mushroom allies, the IBP contends, we 
can stake out new forms of ecological relationality that bring us together with the more-
than-human world to which we are always already exposed in edible compositions and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On September 22, 2016, Dennis White died at his home in Massachusetts 
(Lipovich 2016). Dennis was the first human to be buried in the mushroom burial suit. 
His body will nourish the earth and provide crucial support for the burgeoning ecological 
deathcare movement. The work of this chapter is dedicated to the White family, which 
embraced the Infinity Burial Project’s efforts to imagine and to produce modes of 
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Neither life nor death,  
but the haunting of the one by the other. 
 
— Jacques Derrida (2001, 41),  
The Work of Mourning 
 
The question of the self: ‘who am I?’ no longer 
in the sense of ‘who am I’ but ‘who is this “I”’ 
that can say ‘who’? What is the ‘I” and what  
becomes of responsibility once the identity of 
 the ‘I’ trembles in secret? 
 
— Jacques Derrida (2008b, 93),  
The Gift of Death 
 
We can’t spit out the disgusting real of ecological 
enmeshment. We have to make do with the 
 nasty stuff handed to us on our plate. 
 
— Timothy Morton (2010, 124),  




In the introductory chapter of Mortal Assemblages, I sketched a concept of the 
human composed of three interrelated motifs: first, that we humans are fundamentally 
and inescapably mortal beings, finite creatures that live and die; second, that in our 
finitude we are exposed to the more-than-human world, and that this exposure is the 
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condition of possibility for both our survival and our death; and, finally, that this 
incessant form of exposure is precisely what makes us response-able to the other 
creatures with whom we must coexist, that is, that our capacity for response, rhetorical or 
otherwise, is a product of our relationality. From these three conditions, I suggested that 
we think of humans as “mortal assemblages,” finite gatherings of material-symbolic 
forces. Throughout the central chapters of this dissertation, I drew on these initial 
abstractions to think with three specific cases that display how distinctive modes of 
rhetorical response produce different forms of relationality, which in turn compose 
alternative mortal assemblages. Extrapolating from some of the rhetorical texts 
circulating in and around Ramsey Creek Preserve’s sustained efforts at conservation 
burial, the Urban Death Project’s endeavor to compost human bodies, and the Infinity 
Burial Project’s creation of a mushroom burial shroud, I advised that we disperse, 
decompose, and digest classical conceptions of the human and embrace, on the contrary, 
an ecological understanding of the human that takes seriously the ways in which we are 
always already entangled in complex ecosystems. In doing so, I will soon argue, we 
might discover other ways of coexisting with the human and more-than-human others 
with whom we are inextricably interconnected and interdependent. 
The titular concept of this dissertation, “mortal assemblages,” is a crucial antidote 
to forms of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism which prevail in contemporary 
Western politics. For too long, our sense of political activity has been hemmed in by 
Aristotle’s framework, which he laid out some two thousand years ago. Politics, in the 
Aristotelian sense, is a human practice with its interests lying in the foundation and 
sustenance of the polis. In his Politics, Aristotle (1984) makes clear that it is human 
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beings that have a political existence and interest. He writes: 
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other 
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in 
vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And whereas 
mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found 
in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and 
pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power 
of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and 
therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man 
that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the 
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a 
family and a state. (Pol. I.1253a8-19, trans. Jowett) 
 
Within the span of a mere eleven lines, Aristotle manages to (a) delimit political activity 
to human animals, (b) render this statement a fact of nature, (c) associate politics with 
speech, (d) ascribe speech to human beings alone, and (e) define the political by 
enthymematically linking speech with vitality. Thus, not only is politics, for Aristotle, a 
distinctly human activity, but it is also a decisively vital activity carried out by living, 
breathing, speaking human subjects. Despite its age, Aristotle’s conceptualization of 
politics remains an apt description of how we think of political activity today, namely, as 
a set of human practices that impinge upon both human and more-than-human relations. 
Human political activity defines the right and the wrong, the good and the bad, and 
enforces these definitions so as to maintain order. Linked as it is with life, politics is 
carried out by the living for the living. 
I hope that Mortal Assemblages will give readers several reasons to pause on this 
understanding of politics, to question Aristotle’s fundamental assumption that politics is, 
strictly speaking, the work of living human beings. We need an ecocentric politics, one 
focused on modes of coexistence, some conditions of which I have already outlined in the 
preceding chapters. For starters, we have seen how the human is in no simple sense 
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“human.” We are not autonomous, self-contained individuals but, rather, assemblages of 
all sorts of material, much of which is not-human (bacteria, fungi, fluids, et cetera). We 
become what we are only in relation with these others who compose us within specific 
ecosystems. Thus, when we speak of the human we are really referring to mortal 
assemblages, which means that politics has never, in a strict sense, been the purview of 
the human. We have also seen how human bodies enter into all sorts of strange 
assemblages, both throughout their lives and after their deaths, that impact upon their 
capacities to respond to the world. I have referred again and again to the assemblages 
composed by conventional burial and cremation as examples of how bodies are enrolled 
in assemblages that do damage to the more-than-human world. Similar to Russian nesting 
dolls, corpses are buried inside a complexly layered apparatus that prevents them from 
being reabsorbed by the ecosystem. And, with cremation, bodies are incinerated, leaving 
little of their energy for other actors. These two practices have remained hegemonic in 
the United States since the end of the American Civil War and animate not only corporate 
but also political practices. Moreover, we have seen how human corpses also generate 
counter-hegemonic politics. The three case studies explored in the preceding chapters are 
all examples of how corpses produce a politics of their own, a politics that relies not on 
the classic concept of the human but on an ecological notion of human bodies as mortal 
assemblages. 
If we are to take seriously this concept of the human as mortal assemblages, as I 
have suggested we ought to do, we have no choice but to alter our notion of the political 
as well. Neither anthropocentrism nor human exceptionalism will suffice in the wake of 
this conceptual shift for the simple reason that we are no longer dealing with bounded, 
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autonomous individuals but with multiplicities that are both composed of heterogeneous 
materials and interested in more than human concerns. Ecocentrism offers another way 
forward. Whereas anthropocentrism centers the human and puts human needs first, 
ecocentrism focuses on the ecosystem as a whole and recognizes that there will always be 
multiple, sometimes competing, needs and demands. As Mark Smith (1998, 5) writes in 
Ecologism, “Ecocentrism places human beings in a different relationship to the natural 
environment” by maintaining that “human beings are part of a more complex system and 
no longer sit at the top of the ethical hierarchy.” By decentering the anthropos, 
ecocentrism recognizes what has been true all along—that human beings are neither fully 
in control of the ecosystems they inhabit nor hold any ethical superiority over other 
creatures, indeed, that human beings are part of, not apart from, the world. Ecocentrism 
thus requires a different concept of political subjectivity. Channeling Heidegger, DeLuca 
(2005, 74) argues that, “Humanity is never a subject over and against or above the world 
apart from the world; rather, the subject is always in the world, a part of the world, and, 
indeed, is constituted by relations in the world.” This worldly quality of the subject is 
inevitable; there is no way to transcend the fact that one is in-the-world, situated in 
relations with others, human and more-than-human alike, which impinge upon the very 
kind of being one can be. This is the point I have been making throughout this 
dissertation by grappling with several shifting deathcare practices that are rhetorically 
recomposing some of the assemblages that humans enter into. The activists and 
entrepreneurs that have enlivened these pages are already imagining an ecocentric 
politics. 
Still, ecocentrism has a tendency to center life and ignore death, to focus on the 
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interests of living creatures without fully considering the political claims of the already 
dead and decomposing. Like an ecological version of Michel Foucault’s (1990; 2008) 
concept of “biopolitics,” ecocentrism can easily seem like a more holistic approach to 
managing life. Smith’s (1998, 5) definition of ecocentrism, for instance, maintains a 
“focus on all living and life-supporting things and the interconnections between them.” 
Although it is entirely possible, and in fact appropriate, to understand the dead as 
intimately interconnected with the living, unfortunately Smith and many others do not 
pursue this line of thinking. Perhaps a residual side effect of anthropocentric thinking is 
an affinity for life, the vital, and animate, and a distaste for death, the mortal, and 
inanimateness. We tend to skew towards life even when we embrace ecology. We forget 
that ecology encompasses decay and decomposition, too, as a necessary element of 
coexistence. For Timothy Morton (2010, 16), “The ecological thought is intrinsically 
dark, mysterious, and open [...] realistic, depressing, intimate, and alive and ironic all at 
the same time [...] black, earthy, and cold.” Delving into the darkness of ecological 
politics means leaving behind feel-good environmentalisms that enable humans to see 
themselves once again as saviors of life and embracing instead the messiness of 
ecological enmeshment, which includes death, decay, and decomposition. 
So, ecocentric politics needs at least two supplements if it is to account for and 
make sense of the sorts of postmortem practices that intimately connect the living and the 
dead within ecosystems: first, it needs a really capacious concept of political agency and, 
second, it needs a more nuanced understanding of mortal assemblages and the impact 
they (might) have on political thought and action. In these final pages, I suggest some 
supplementary paths forward for ecological politics in the wake of this work on mortal 
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assemblages while fully acknowledging that these notes are incomplete, perhaps 
incoherent at times, and certainly demand more sustained conceptual labor. Rather than 
formulaically outlining a new form of ecocentric politics, I offer some provocations that 
emerge out of ecocentric thinking while also pushing it further by forcing an encounter 
with death, decay, and decomposition. The postmortem politics I conceive of here is 
offered, then, not as a replacement for other modes of political activity and relation but as 
an opening for thinking more deeply about the ways in which the dead are always already 
impinging upon our modes of earthly coexistence. Or, as Jacques Derrida (2001, 41) puts 
it in The Work of Mourning, I am concerned with “Neither life nor death, but the haunting 
of the one by the other.” 
 
How the Dead Act 
Ecocentrism needs a more capacious concept of political agency, one that can 
account not only for human activity but also more-than-human modes of acting in the 
world. Rhetorical theory in particular must find ways of moving beyond its human-
centered approach to generate ways of recognizing agency in other places and from other 
sorts of sources.1 Fortunately, a great number of thinkers have already called on us to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Despite the postmodern, poststructural, and even posthuman turns, most work 
on rhetoric still assumes that human subjects are the source of material-symbolic activity, 
that “speaking subjects” and the “texts” they produce are the proper unit of analysis for 
rhetorical inquiry. In Karlyn Kohrs-Campbell’s (2005, 3) estimation, to take just one 
recent example, “rhetorical agency refers to the capacity to act, that is, to have the 
competence to speak or write in a way that will be recognized or heeded by others in 
one’s community.” Whereas Campbell’s definition starts out open and strong (“the 
capacity to act”) it is quickly delimited to the apparently human (“competence to speak or 
write”) practice of persuading proximate others (“in one’s community”). While other 
scholars rarely theorize rhetorical agency in such explicit terms, arguably something like 
Campbell’s view underwrites much historical and contemporary rhetorical scholarship. 
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recognize the ways in which more-than-human others act in consequential ways. For 
instance, David Abram (1996) demonstrates how the animate earth is always already 
communicating both with and without human interlocutors. Following Abram, Natasha 
Seegert (2014) asks that we consider “animate rhetoric” as the possibility that more-than-
human creatures might be speaking to us. Similarly, Donal Carbaugh (1999) invites us to 
listen to the more-than-human landscape for signs of all sorts, including despair and joy. 
Jacques Derrida (2008a), too, enjoins us to recognize the ways in which non-human 
animals respond to us and invite our response as well. Pushing a step further, Donna 
Haraway (2008) contends that human and more-than-human make each other in an 
intimate dance of encounters within contact zones where communication takes place. Still 
more radically, Jane Bennett (2010) demonstrates how inanimate things like energy 
systems, twigs, and dead rats form significant gatherings that end up impacting upon 
micropolitics in real time. Each of these thinkers compellingly points to the possibility of 
expanding political agency beyond the merely human. Refusing to be hemmed in by 
anthropocentric modes of thought, they advance along more ecocentric routes to imagine 
a politics of the whole earth and its creatures, objects, networks, in short, all its 
assemblages. 
As it has been deployed throughout this dissertation, the word assemblage comes 
from the collaborative work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987), especially in A 
Thousand Plateaus. Throughout their collectively written tome, Deleuze and Guattari 
frequently invoke the assemblage as a way of describing how every singularity is already 
a multiplicity, a composition of heterogeneous material-symbolic forces that hold 
together for a while. As Manuel DeLanda (2016, 1) notes, however, “The word in 
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English fails to capture the meaning of the original agencement, a term that refers to the 
action of matching or fitting together a set of components (agencer), as well as to the 
result of such an action: an ensemble of parts that mesh together well.” Thus, the word 
assemblage refers both to a process and a product, both a series of actions and the 
resulting conglomeration. Each of the case studies examined in Mortal Assemblages both 
pushes back against hegemonic assemblages produced by the practices of conventional 
burial and cremation (which I have sometimes referred to as the body-embalming-casket-
vault-earth assemblage and the body-fire-emissions-ash-air assemblage, respectively) and 
also produces emergent assemblages of their own. In the case of the mushroom burial 
shroud, for example, we are dealing with a body-cloth-mycelia-earth assemblage that 
produces relations of consumptive reciprocity. Importantly, as DeLanda reminds us, “the 
parts matched together to form an ensemble are themselves treated as assemblages [...] so 
that at [all] times we are dealing with assemblages of assemblages” (3). So, assemblages 
can be studied at multiple levels of complexity to understand the composition of earthly 
gatherings. 
Whatever else this notion of assemblages does for social theory, one of its most 
significant consequences is its ability to decenter human beings as the source of political 
activity. Yes, human bodies are themselves assemblages, and, yes, human bodies enter 
into and transform other assemblages. No assemblage, however, is entirely human. 
Human assemblages are much more complex than we tend to suggest in everyday 
parlance about humanity. Every assemblage includes some elements that exceed the 
human, and which therefore make it impossible to naively ascribe any act to a singular, 
intentional human being (however politically expedient such acts might be). Throughout 
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his oeuvre, Bruno Latour (1987; 1993; 1996; 2007) has developed an approach and a 
terminology for studying both the process of how components (actors) are matched 
together and the resulting assemblages (network). He calls this approach “actor-network 
theory.” His term for the component parts is actors, within which he subsumes human 
agency. Latour’s approach “does not limit itself to human individual actors, but extends 
the word actor—or actant—to non-human, non-individual entities” (1996, 369). Thus, 
humans are actors but they are also made up of other actors. And, moreover, trees, cats, 
wine bottles, iPhones, soil, water cycles, climate patterns, and so on, are also actors. 
Latour’s is a flat ontology: everything that acts and can be acted upon is an actor. If it 
makes a difference, it is an actor. Thus, there is no need to think that only humans are 
endowed with such capacities. Actants are all sorts of things that have force in the world 
or, in other words, actants are components that do things. 
Importantly, neither actants nor assemblages need to be “alive” in the usual sense 
in order to act in/on the world. Plenty of nonliving things exert force. This book, that 
coffee mug, a jacket, some Post-It notes, a dead squirrel in the middle of a two-lane road: 
none are “living” but all do things. The book archives. The mug holds. The jacket covers. 
The sticky notes recall. The decomposing squirrel invites knee-jerk swerving. And these 
are just some of their forces. More radically, though, dead things do work that usually 
passes out of sight, out of mind. We do not usually think of dead, inanimate things as 
actors. As Bennett (2010, ix) avers,  
the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human 
hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption. It 
does do by preventing us from detecting (seeing, hearing, smelling, 
tasting, feeling) a fuller range of the nonhuman powers circulating in and 
around and within human bodies. These material powers, which can aid or 
destroy, enrich or disable, ennoble or degrade us, in any case call for our 
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attentiveness, or even ‘respect.’ 
 
By categorizing some things as dead and therefore inert, or politically passive, we not 
only bolster human hubris but we also fetishize life. In letting ourselves believe that 
what is dead (no longer) impacts upon the world, or no longer has an interest in the 
world, we radically distinguish ourselves as living creatures from the rest of the world. 
We affirm the limited notion of politics as an enterprise carried out by living, breathing, 
speaking human beings, and forget that those classical political actors are themselves 
always already composed in relations with not only the more-than-human world but also 
with postmortem actors. Bennett does not go so far as to question how decomposing 
corpses might act, but her new materialism does help elucidate how they might “be 
potentially forceful agents” (x). It is possible, as I hope to have demonstrated in Mortal 
Assemblages, that dead bodies also have, as Bennett puts it, “the curious ability of 
[other] inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle” (6). 
What I am suggesting here is that dead bodies—whether they are decomposing 
underfoot in a conservation burial ground, decaying alongside other bodies inside a 
human composting system, or being digested by mushrooms—do things in the world. 
These bodies act in important and consequential ways. All too often, however, we assume 
that dead bodies just lie there, passive and inert, until we do something with them, that it 
is up to us to move the dead around. But, in fact, the dead move us in a variety of ways. 
Corpses are no doubt actants in the Latourian sense. They do cultural work, as Thomas 
Laqueur (2015) demonstrates. Indeed, we can ask the same questions of corpses as we 
ask of living, breathing, speaking human beings (or of any thing for that matter): “Does it 
make a difference in the course of some other agent’s action or not? Is there some trial 
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that allows someone to detect this difference?” (Latour 2007, 71). A quick survey 
suggests that decomposing corpses do all sorts of things: they produce necrobiomes, 
biotic communities where other species gather to feast and reproduce upon rotting flesh; 
they transform into a rich soil material, which is necessary for the growth and sustenance 
of other flora and fauna, including other human beings; they might contaminate other 
actors in the surrounding ecosystem if they are themselves contaminated by, say, 
mercury; they generate jobs in the form of land stewards, undertakers, designers, 
architects, construction workers, docents, seamstresses, mushroom farmers, et cetera; 
they change the way we think about dead human bodies and the postmortem practices 
that are plied upon them; they draw attention from other actors, including the author of 
this text, who make other things from the materials they furnish; they give us the gift of 
thought. Future research would do well to survey these and other postmortem forces to 
account for the ways in which corpses act in and on the world of the living. 
We can say that dead human bodies act because we are no longer dealing naively 
with intentional individuals pursuing premeditated ends (Derrida 1988). Rather, corpses 
lay bare what is always true (though normally suppressed) about human bodies, namely, 
that they are teeming with other-than-human things that capacitate them to act (or not) in 
particular ways. When the body’s defenses no longer function to maintain a sense of 
integrity, when the immune system ceases to protect the part of the human that we call 
the “I,” the subject, the corpse makes plain the ways in which those bodies have always 
already been other than themselves. “Each human,” Bennett (2010, 12–13) writes, “is a 
heterogeneous compound of wonderfully vibrant, dangerously vibrant, matter.” As soon 
as someone dies, and sometimes even before, decomposition begins. A lively process, 
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decomposition usually extends over a period of several months, beginning with autolysis 
(self-digestion) in which enzymes already in the body break down cells. Then bacteria 
start eating the intestines and, eventually, more and more of the body. The soft tissues 
transform into gases, liquids, and salts. The body bulges, leaks, burps. When buried in 
carbon-rich materials, the process is aided by a coterie of other organisms. Some insects 
live out their entire life cycles inside dead human bodies. Eventually the body purges, 
opening up and attracting larger animals such as vultures. “Far from being ‘dead,’” as one 
reporter puts it, “a rotting corpse is teeming with life” (Costandi 2015). In the wake of 
decomposition, the land-community experiences a deep biotic enrichment: the space 
where the body decomposes is particularly lively. Decomposing corpses are animated in 
and through their relations with other actors, other elements that gather round the 
postmortem body. And, as I have shown throughout Mortal Assemblages, different ways 
of treating these postmortem bodies produce different sorts of assemblages that generate 
effects exceeding any individual body. 
 
Mortal Assemblages and Postmortem Politics 
Dead bodies act—so what? So long as we define actor capaciously, is it not 
possible to claim that any and every thing acts? Why contend that there is a kind of 
postmortem politics at work? Is it not enough to say that classical political actors, living 
human beings who speak, act on the dead, that it is the living who perform politics with 
corpses? Do not corpses act only in the ways they are made to act by living human beings 
who, after all, not only make choices concerning the dead but who also carry out 
deathcare practices? Are not corpses the passive material of postmortem fantasies and 
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strange but persistent death rituals? Deathcare practices are really for and about 
survivors, right? And even if we admit that corpses are actors, that they exert force in the 
world, does it necessarily follow that they are political actors, that they have a stake in 
and an impact on political activity? 
Out of a sense of curiosity provoked by my work in Mortal Assemblages, I want 
to provisionally answer this final question in the affirmative: yes, there is something like 
a postmortem politics, and, yes, it does follow that decomposing bodies are themselves 
doing political work! This means thinking of politics slightly outside the Aristotelian 
tradition, though. Just after the long quote from the Politics that I have reprinted above, 
Aristotle (1984) remarks that, “the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing” (Pol. 
I.1253a25, trans. Jowett). Thus, if we detach it from strictly human actors, it is not hard to 
see that even Aristotle understood politics as a means of responding to the forms of 
exposure that our finitude entails. Thus, politics will have to mean something like modes 
of coexistence, ways of getting along together, and efforts for ecological ongoingness. 
Politics, in other words, will have to mean more than human deliberation about what is 
right and wrong, good and evil, and will have to exceed the intentional negotiation and 
enforcement of such codes. Conceived of instead as modes of coexistence, politics is 
opened up to more-than-human, even postmortem, forces that might “have a say,” to 
anthropomorphize a bit, in how we get along so as to ensure ecological ongoingness. If 
earthly coexistence is the stuff of politics, then surely the human and the more-than-
human, the living and the dead, all play a part. Having now spent several years thinking 
with and about alternative, ecological deathcare practices, only three of which make 
sustained appearances throughout this dissertation, I have a stronger appreciation for the 
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political work of the dead. 
My sense is that postmortem politics operate on three distinct but interrelated 
levels, each of which deserves further inquiry and creative attention. The first level is 
linked to status quo deathcare practices, to hegemonic mortal assemblages and to the 
industries that maintain them. This form of politics is consolidated in what we might call 
the modern funeral industry, which consists of the owners and operators of funeral 
homes, crematoria, cemeteries, and mausoleums, as well as all the auxiliary companies 
and professionals that play a part in interring the deceased in the areas of transportation, 
refrigeration, embalming, dressing, hairstyling, casket-making, vault-making, grave-
digging and refilling, floral arrangements, memorial production, and so on. Of course, at 
stake in this politics of the status quo are not just the people who make the industry but 
also the products and services which have become, after 150 years of use, taken-for-
granted in the United States. This politics of the modern funeral industry has the benefit 
both of inertia and feeling like tradition. Long-held traditions are hard to break with, not 
because they are the right thing to do in any simple sense, but because they are what 
people usually do. We forget that they are conventions that were invented (Nietzsche 
1999). For instance, it is not legally required that any body be embalmed before burial, 
but funeral professionals rarely disclose this fact to consumers. Consumers also need not 
purchase caskets from the funeral homes burying their lost loved ones, but this fact, too, 
is often overlooked. As Jessica Mitford (2000) compellingly argues in The American Way 
of Death, the modern funeral industry is predicated on practices and products that delude 
consumers into believing that their lost loved ones can be protected from the elements, 
that their bodies can be preserved—for a price. That the modern funeral industry is 
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maintained as well by powerful lobbyists who work hard to enact legislation at multiple 
levels of government is evidence, too, that politics is central to death and that death is 
central to politics (cf. “About” 2016). 
At a secondary level, more subterranean than the first though gradually becoming 
more visible, one finds an array of counter-hegemonic political activities that challenge 
and reimagine conventional deathcare practices, as well as rhetorically recompose mortal 
assemblages. Some of these activities, especially their rhetorical aspects, have been the 
focus of this dissertation. At this level, postmortem politics work to transgress the 
boundaries established by the modern funeral industry by recomposing what it means to 
be human as always already ecologically enmeshed. Entrepreneurs, activists, sympathetic 
journalists, and even Ph.D. candidates participate at this level by decentering the human, 
challenging its association with autonomy, individuality, and privilege, and by working to 
emplace the human within the complex ecosystems out of which it emerges and in which 
it lives and dies. Taking its cues largely from the natural process of decomposition, this 
second level of postmortem politics develops modes of coexistence that treat the dead 
human body not as apart from ecosystems but as integrally and inescapably part of them, 
subject like all other organic matter to the deteriorating force of the world. Rather than 
devising more elaborate means of delaying decomposition (caskets), masking the effects 
of bodily decay from survivors (embalming), or maintaining the look of lawn cemeteries 
(vaults), this counter-hegemonic deathcare politics refutes the goodness or necessity of 
each of these things, finding value instead in the longer, more primordial tradition of 
returning bodies simply to the earth from which they came. Without lapsing into naïve 
back-to-nature discourses, however, this political movement for alternative, ecological 
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deathcare practices envisions technologies, technical and intellectual innovation, legal 
regulations, and human rituals as essential ingredients for sustainable forms of ecological 
ongoingness. 
This second level of postmortem politics, at least when compared to the relatively 
large modern funeral industry, operates on a small scale. Money is one key measure of 
the differences. According to some estimates, the funeral industry in the United States 
brings in more than $20 billion a year in revenue (“Economics of the Funeral Industry” 
2016). This figure accounts not just for the revenue brought in by funeral homes and 
crematoria but the share of funeral-related income generated by auxiliary services as 
well. The Urban Death Project, by comparison, excitedly reported raising about $90,000 
via crowd source fundraising initiatives online in 2016. The costs of various services also 
varies widely. According to the National Funeral Directors Association, the median cost 
of an adult funeral service with a viewing was $7,181 in 2014, or $8,508 if the cost of the 
vault was included (“Trends and Statistics” 2015). The Infinity Burial Project’s 
mushroom death shroud, by contrast, costs about as much as a traditional vault alone—
$1,500. Thus, embedded within this movement for alternative deathcare is a form of class 
politics usually overlooked by even the proponents of more ecological burials practices. 
Cremation, long lauded for its lower costs and accessibility, furnishes an important 
precedent for thinking about the class politics of ecological deathcare: we need affordable 
options that offer the deceased and bereaving dignified means of responding to the 
exigencies posed by death.  
Beyond the financial differences, another gauge of the scales on which the first 
and second levels of postmortem politics work is the rhetorical burden shared by each to 
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articulate its values, goals, and practices. Those working for alternative, ecological 
deathcare practices are engaging the Internet, social media, documentaries, TED Talks, 
and crowd-sourced funding as ways of recomposing mortal assemblages, whereas the 
modern funeral industry largely relies on more traditional routes for gaining consumers. 
In many cities and towns, there is only one apparent deathcare option—the local funeral 
home, which might also include a crematorium—which makes choosing simple, perhaps 
too simple. The grassroots quality of ecological deathcare practices appeals to some who 
are seeking an alternative approach to postmortem care for themselves or their family 
members, but also significantly limits the extent to which the general population is 
exposed to these ideas. 
The third level of postmortem politics is hardest to discern but also, perhaps, the 
most conceptually interesting. It has to do with the political claims and demands made by 
postmortem assemblages, that is, by decomposing bodies themselves. This level is the 
least obvious because the work that happens here is enacted rather than spoken, silently 
performed rather than verbally articulated, offered up to all the senses rather than just 
hearing and seeing. We will have to attune ourselves to the modes of rhetorical activity 
engaged by postmortem assemblages if we are to make sense of the political acts they 
conduct and the lessons for coexistence that they offer. 
In one sense, we can ascertain this third level of postmortem politics by 
considering the ways in which different mortal assemblages act in and on the world. 
Different assemblages do different things, which produce different forms of relationality 
and, thus, divergent modes of coexistence. Conventional burial, for example, works on a 
logic of sequestration: separating the human body from the more-than-human world 
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through the mediation of several techniques and technologies all designed to preserve the 
corpse and delay decomposition. Conservation burial, by contrast, works on a logic of 
incorporation: bringing the body into close contact with the land-community by refusing 
as many mediators as possible. The mortal assemblages produced by these two practices 
exert different kinds of force in the world. Conventional burial, for its part, calls forth all 
sorts of professionals who are trained to handle dead bodies and to enact various practices 
and sell numerous products to survivors. Its logic is therefore not only anthropocentric 
but also capitalistic: it expands as much as possible the number of economic resources 
necessary to carry itself out. Conservation burial, on the other hand, summons far fewer 
resources. Conservation burial grounds tend either to be small operations or small sectors 
of already established conventional burial grounds. Since bodies are buried unembalmed 
and in simple wooden caskets with no vaults, considerable economic and ecological 
resources that form the core of conventional burial are unnecessary with conservation 
burial. Its logic, then, remains capitalistic (though much more modestly) but tends toward 
ecocentrism since conservation burial supports land conservation efforts. Patrons of 
conservation burials not only invest in a final resting place for themselves or a loved one, 
but they also invest in the land-community itself. Thus, these two sets of practices form 
different assemblages that impact upon the world in distinctive ways. They each 
engender modes of earthly coexistence, but conservation burial centers ecosystem rather 
than human interests.  
Mortal assemblages also enact forms of relationality that reveal important lessons 
for thinking about and practicing modes of coexistence. By paying attention to the ways 
that human and more-than-human actors cooperate as a result of different postmortem 
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practices, we can learn from them. The Infinity Burial Project, for instance, offers a 
glimpse of what reciprocity might look like in action. Beyond simply calling for human 
beings to engender relations of mutual exchange, the mushroom death shroud makes it 
possible to physically give back some of what one’s body has acquired through its 
exposure to the ecosystems in which it is entangled. As a medium, the death shroud 
serves as an in-between for energy exchanges. In it, the human body is simultaneously 
enclosed and exposed, contained as a mortal assemblage and opened up to the digestive 
potential of mycelia. When compared to the heavy caskets and vaults deployed in 
conventional burials, the mushroom death shroud operates on an entirely different 
understanding of coexistence. For the Infinity Burial Project, mortal assemblages need 
not be preserved in their wholeness but, rather, ought to be given over and given back to 
the ecosystems upon which they have relied and drawn energy. Reciprocity rather than 
one-way consumption. Digestion rather than preservation. Relationality rather than 
isolation. Immanence rather than transcendence. 
We can witness as well examples of what ecological ongoingness might mean and 
look like by surveying the ways in which mortal assemblages relate to death not as an 
endpoint but as an opening onto other forms of relationality. Ecological ongoingness is 
about deteriorating the border between life and death, of recognizing how life and death 
are necessarily and intricately intertwined within ecosystems. In this dissertation, 
ecological ongoingness is about grappling with the ways that mortal assemblages are 
deeply and consequentially life-giving gatherings. Perhaps the strongest example of this 
line of thinking emerges in the still-speculative work of the Urban Death Project, which 
imagines human bodies as a raw material for soil formation. If the Project carries out its 
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plans, the soil that results from composting multiple human bodies alongside one another 
will be distributed throughout urban areas for use in flower and vegetable gardens. Just as 
the mushroom death shroud mediates forms of consumptive reciprocity, this process of 
composting harnesses the energy contained in human corpses to regenerate vital soil that 
can nourish other plants and animals. Comingling as they decompose together, the human 
corpses that are composted will lose all sense of personal identity. After several months 
in the composting core, it will be impossible, except with DNA testing perhaps, to tell 
one body from another, one corpse from the next, as all transform into dirt. Thus, human 
composting suggests both the possibility of unhinging human worth from individual 
identity but also of developing radical modes of coexistence that generate conditions for 
ecological ongoingness. 
 
Finitude, Exposure, and Response-Ability, Revisited 
Two months into writing Mortal Assemblages, I found myself out of town for an 
academic job interview. Excited about the prospects of finally securing a faculty position 
after nine years of higher education, I spent weeks away from writing to prepare my 
materials and research the university and department that had extended an invitation for a 
campus visit. All the while, I was receiving daily dispatches from my home state of 
Georgia, where my 85-year-old grandmother’s health was quickly deteriorating after a 
year of ups and downs, including stints at in-patient facilities where she received round-
the-clock care. Things were not looking good, my dad told me, and I had a feeling that 
she would not survive much longer when I walked out of the airport terminal to greet my 
hosts. The night before my interview began, I recorded a video telling her how much I 
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loved and missed her. I thanked her for being the most hospitable person I have ever met, 
a real exemplar of unconditional love and acceptance. Shortly after giving my job talk, 
which focused on the Infinity Burial Project’s efforts to recompose how we think of the 
human body in its inescapable ecological entanglement, I noticed that I had several 
missed calls, text messages, and voice mails from family members. When, after a long 
day of interviews and all they entail, I returned to my hotel, I poured a glass of wine and 
called my mom. I knew the sort of news I was about to receive. Granna, as she was 
lovingly known not just by family members but her entire community, perished in her 
longtime home, in bed, surrounded by family members who had been by her side for 
weeks. Two days later I delivered the eulogy to a packed audience at her funeral, shortly 
after which her body was buried in a little cemetery on a hill near the Methodist church 
she had attended since she was a little girl. 
My grandmother’s death and deathcare left me deeply vexed. On the one hand, 
there I was writing a dissertation about the value of embracing finitude and exposure, and 
of pursuing alternative, ecological deathcare practices. Calling on scholars, practitioners, 
and anyone else who would listen to or read my work to reconsider our cultural aversion 
to imagining the human body as ecologically enmeshed, all my work as a researcher led 
me to be deeply suspicious of the modern funeral industry. On the other hand, there I was 
facing my grandmother’s dead body. Everything about her funeral was conventional. 
Soon after she perished, undertakers from a local funeral home retrieved her body from 
her home, which they then embalmed, dressed, and styled for the visitation service they 
hosted in a large room of their funeral parlor. Her sons and their wives chose a beautiful 
wooden casket, purchased a concrete vault, deliberated transportation options, ordered 
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floral arrangements, got on with the business of having her headstone (which already 
included her deceased husband’s information) carved, and generally went through the 
practices of dealing with the loss of a loved one. In that prolonged period of grief, 
knowing that the details were mostly being managed by a professional cadre of workers 
and that all I needed to do was show up, offered some comfort and certainly freed my 
mind to do other things, like visit with family members and friends, write the eulogy, do 
a Skype interview with another university, help my sister put together a slide show for the 
visitation service, and so on. Yet, my comfort was tempered by a feeling that perhaps this 
was not a time for such ease, not a time when I ought to feel so distanced from the fact of 
finitude that I faced so personally. 
When thinking and writing about an issue like death, which affects us all in one 
way or another, one’s intellectual and personal lives are destined to collide. The death of 
my grandmother generated just such an encounter. Simultaneously compelled by her 
wishes for a certain kind of funeral, the very kind that I write against in the pages of 
Mortal Assemblages, and a sense of commitment to the concepts and practices detailed 
throughout this dissertation, I confronted something of an aporia. How is one to respect, 
on the one hand, the choices made by others in difficult times and, on the other hand, 
remain responsive to the ecosystems one inhabits? I am not the only one who dwells near 
this impasse, as the case studies explored in this dissertation attest. We are living through 
a moment of profound disruption in the United States: how we think of our bodies, and of 
our entanglement within complex ecosystems, is shifting to meet with the ecological 
complexities we are learning to appreciate again. Deathcare practices are, perhaps 
surprisingly for some, on the cutting edge of this rupture, exploding long held ideas about 
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what it means to be human, to live a good life, to have a good death. The efforts of the 
entrepreneurs and activists highlighted in the preceding pages are initiating significant 
public conversations about death and deathcare, contesting the hegemonic funeral 
industry, and composing mortal assemblages that promise other ecological futures, ones 
in which the human is no longer understood as somehow apart from the conditions of 
finitude, exposure, and response-ability that connect us all in shared webs of ecological 
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